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INTRODUCTION

State prison officials carried out eleven executions in the first seven
months of 1984,1 half of the twenty-two inmates executed since 19772

when a decade-long moratorium on capital punishment in the United
States3 came to an end. Although the rate of executions is increasing, it
1 The persons executed between January 1984 and July 1984 were Anthony Antona in
Florida on January 26, John Taylor in Louisiana on February 29, James Autry in Texas on
March 14, James Hutchins in North Carolina on March 16, Ronald O'Bryan in Texas on
March 31, Arthur Goode in Florida on April 5, Elmo Sonnier in Louisiana on April 5, James
Adams in Florida on May 10, Carl Shriner in Florida on June 21, Iron Stanley in Georgia on
July 12, and David Washington in Florida on July 13. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ.
Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. 1 (Aug. 1, 1984) (unpublished compilation) [hereinafter cited
as Death Row, U.S.A.].
2 The eleven persons executed between 1977 and 1983 were Gary Gilmore in Utah on
January 17, 1977, John Spenkelink in Florida on May 25, 1979, Jesse Bishop in Nevada on
October 22, 1979, Steven Judy in Indiana on March 9, 1981, Frank Coppola in Virginia on
August 10, 1982, and Charlie Brooks in Texas on December 7, 1982, Johnny Evans in Alabama on April 22, 1983, Jimmie Lee Gray in Mississippi on September 2, 1983, Robert Sullivan in Florida on November 30, 1983, Robert Wayne Williams in Louisiana on December 14,
1983, and John Eldon Smith in Georgia on December 15, 1983. Death Row, U.S.A., supra
note 1, at 1.
3 In the latter half of the 1960s several groups opposing capital punishment supported
challenges to the death penalty in state and federal appellate courts. THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 3, 22-26 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as H. Bedau]; J. GORECKI,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 87-95 (1983); Polsby, The Death of CapitalPunishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 2; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, at 2 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981]. These
constitutional challenges resulted in an unofficial moratorium on executions in the United
States beginning in 1967. According to Professor Bedau, "[t]he de facto moratorium on executions [was] created in 1967 by the litigational efforts of the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund." Bedau, supra, at 24. According to the United States Department of Justice, the "unofficial moratorium on executions stemm[ed] from strong pressures mounted by
forces opposing capital punishment." CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, supra, at 2. Professor
Bedau identified a critical period of decline in the number of executions beginning in the
1940s. Bedau attributed this decline to
social forces of several sorts [including] growing doubts about the morality of
capital punishment, consciousness among high officials that most of western
Europe had abandoned the death penalty, abatement of the "crime wave" of
the 1930s, mounting scientific evidence that undermined belief in the deterrent efficacy of executions and strengthened belief in its racially discriminatory use, [and] increased willingness in appellate courts to delay executions in
order to consider constitutional issues ....
H. Bedau, supra, at 25.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of the death penalty during the moratorium on executions
culminated in 1972 with the landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982, at 2
(1983) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982]. In Furman, the Supreme Court considered whether the death penalty violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against "cruel
and unusual punishments." Furmanconsisted of a one paragraph per curiam decision accompanied by nine separate opinions covering 243 pages in United States Reports and constituting
the longest case report in Supreme Court history. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE
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remains low in comparison with the rate throughout much of this century. There were well over one hundred executions per year between
1930 and 1950, and over fifty executions per year between 1950 and
1960. 4 The relatively low number of executions in the last seven years
reflects the uncertainty caused by recent developments in the judicial
handling of constitutional issues surrounding capital punishment 5 and
the lengthy procedures now required before a death sentence can be
carried out,6 rather than declining death row populations 7 or decreased
public support for the death sentence. 8
BRETHREN 220 (1979). Although the judgment in Furman, striking down the capital sentencing procedures of Georgia and Texas, had the effect of invalidating nearly every capital punishment statute in the nation, see in/ra text accompanying notes 89-91, the decision failed to
decide whether the eighth amendment prohibits capital punishment. Six Justices in Furman
considered whether any death penalty violates the eighth amendment, but three out of five
Justices in the majority decided the case on narrower grounds. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. In 1976 the Court held definitively that capital punishment is not, per se,
cruel and unusual. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The decision in Gregg was
announced on July 2, 1976, and the first execution since 1967 was carried out approximately
seven months later. See in/ia note 149 and accompanying text.
4 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, supra note 3, at 8. For the exact number of persons
executed per year between 1930 and 1967, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 n. 40
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
5 See Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 8-12 (1982). See also Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 614 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[c]onsiderable uncertainty was introduced into this area of the law by this Court's Furman decision"). One
commentator suggested that the Court's failure to hand down clear, consistent capital punishment decisions has allowed the Court to retain control over the development of adequate
procedural safeguards. See Combs, The Supreme Court and CapitalPunishment: Uncertainty, Ambiguity, andJudicialControl, 7 S.U.L. REv. 1, 38 (1980).
6 Although the Constitution does not generally guarantee rights of appeal, see inra note
392 and accompanying text, all thirty-six states with a valid capital punishment law accord
condemned persons an automatic right of review. See in/ia note 743 and accompanying text.
In addition to state appellate review, capital defendants may obtain collateral review of state
court judgments by a federal writ of habeas corpus. Recently, individual Supreme Court
Justices have voiced impatience with execution delays resulting from exhaustive use of postsentencing procedures for challenging the validity of particular death sentences. See in/ia notes
556-59 and accompanying text.
7 Since 1972, when 600 condemned persons were removed from death row because of
the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), see infra note 97, the
number of persons sentenced to death has risen steadily. The NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. estimates that by August 1, 1984, the death row population had
grown to 1,401 inmates including 590 blacks and 18 women. Death Row, U.S.A., supra note
1, at 1.
8 Approximately 73% of nearly 1,600 adults surveyed in a recent poll expressed support
for the death penalty. Granelli,JusticeDelayed, 70 A.B.A. J. 51, 51 (1984). Popular support for
the death penalty has risen steadily since the mid-1960s. A substantial majority of Americans
favored capital punishment between the late 1930s and early 1950s. Sometime in the 1950s,
public support for the death penalty began to erode. In July 1966, one year before the beginning of the 10-year moratorium on executions, see supra note 3, only 42% of those polled
supported capital punishment. Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment, 34 PUB. OPINION Q.
290 (1970). Since 1966 public support for capital punishment has increased. In March 1972,
before Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 50% of the American public approved of the
death penalty. H. Bedau, supranote 3, at 87 (citing various reports in THE GALLUP OPINION
INDEX). Despite the Court's ruling in Furman, public support for capital punishment had
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Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s established that the eighth
amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments" and
fourteenth amendment due process considerations require fairness and
consistency in capital sentencing. 9 This standard reflects the principle
that death is a unique criminal sanction constitutionally different from
other lawful punishments.10 States can attain fairness and consistency
risen to 57% by November 1972. Id In 1976, the year in which the Supreme Court held that
capital punishment is not per se unconstitutional, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
public approval for the death penalty stood at 66%. H. Bedau, supranote 3, at 85. As noted
above, 73% of the American public supported the death penalty in 1983. See Granelli, supra,
at 51.
Several factors may explain the public's increased support for capital punishment: (1) a
corresponding increase in the national crime rate and a concomitant increase in media coverage of violent crimes, see Yunker, Testing the DeterrentEect of Capita/Punishment,19 CRIMINOL-

ocy 626, 627 (1982); Dike, CapitalPunishment in the UnitedStates, Part III- The Practice-Actual
andProposed, 13 CRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 577, 587 (1981); Lotz & Regoli, Public Supportfor the
Death Penalty, CRIM. JUST. REv., SPRING 1980, at 55; (2) the influence of "law and order"
political platforms beginning in the latter half of the 1960s, see Dike, supra, at 587; and (3) a
growing acknowledgement of the retributive function of the death penalty, see Lotz & Regoli,
supra, at 64.
For a detailed analysis of support for capital punishment among members of the legal
profession, see Davidow & Lowe, Attitudes of Potentialand Present Members of the Legal Profession
Toward CapitalPunishment-A Survey and Analysis, 30 MERCER L. REv. 585 (1978-79). For a
discussion of public opinion in Canada, see Vidmar & Dittenhoffer, InfornedPublic Opinion and
Death Penalty Attitudes, 23 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 43 (1981). Finally, for an analysis of
the abolition of the death penalty in Oregon by public referendum in 1964, see Bedau, The
1964 DeathPenalty Referendum in Oregon, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 528, 535-36 (1980) (noting that
"since 1964, public referenda on the death penalty have been used exclusively to restore, not
abolish, the death penalty").
9 In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Court summarized its earlier decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S.
325 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana (H. Roberts), 431 U.S. 633 (1977):
Beginning with Furman,the Court has attempted to provide standards for
a constitutional death penalty that would serve both goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused.
Thus, the rule. . . follow[ing] from the earlier decisions of the Court [is]
that capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency,
or not at all.
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112; see also Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3443 (1983) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting "the Court's past insistence on consistenzy and fairness in the capital sentencing process"). Together with Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court's decisions in Furman, Gregg, Woodson, S Roberts, and H Roberts
establish that the Constitution requires a system of guided discretion in capital sentencing.
See infla notes 63-188 and accompanying text.
10 In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the death penalty has a
unique constitutional status:
As we have often stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments: "[D]eath is a different kind
of punishment from any other which may be imposed in this country. ...
From the point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and
its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in
taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other
legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the
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by combining two methods of controlling capital sentencing discretion:
the promulgation of detailed statutory sentencing guidelines,"' and the
provision of meaningful appellate review of death sentences.' 2 Federal
habeas corpus provides an additional means of detecting and rectifying
13
unfair or inconsistent capital sentencing decisions.
The level of discretion in capital sentencing is the degree to which a
judge or jury may exercise its own judgment and select its own criteria
in determining whether to impose the death penalty. Despite a recommendation by the American Law Institute in 1959 that capital sentencing be guided by statutory lists of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, 14 nearly all modern capital punishment statutes enacted
prior to 1972 accorded the sentencing authority broad discretion in determining whether the death penalty was justified in a particular case.'5
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to
be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357-358 (1977) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)). The trial judge in Gardner had imposed the
death penalty after rejecting the jury's advisory sentence of life imprisonment. In invoking
the death penalty, the trial judge had relied in part on a presentence investigation report that
the petitioner had no opportunity to deny or explain. The Supreme Court vacated the trial
court's judgment on the ground that the defendant had been denied due process because he
was sentenced, at least in part, on the basis of information that he had no opportunity to
rebut. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1977) (Burger, C.J., plurality opinion)
(explaining rationale for requiring more reliable procedures in capital sentencing); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that
more reliable sentencing procedures are needed in capital cases because death penalty is
unique in its finality). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan noted
that "[t]his Court. . .almost always treats death as a class apart." Id. at 286-87 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also id. at 287 n.34 (collecting Supreme Court cases supporting principle that
death is constitutionally different from other punishments); ina note 79 and accompanying
text.
I1 See generally in/ra notes 108-29 and accompanying text.
12 See generally infa notes 374-468 and accompanying text.
13 See generally infra notes 469-566 and accompanying text.
14 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (revised and approved in 1962
as § 210.6 of the Proposed Official Draft) (cited in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,
202-03, 205-06 (1971)). Recognizing a need for capital sentencing standards, the draftsmen of
the Model Penal Code believed that it was possible for legislatures to identify "the main
circumstances of aggravation and of mitigation that should be weighed andweighed againsteach
other when they are presented in a concrete case." MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.1 comment 3
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (quoted in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 205-06 (1971)
(emphasis in original)). In MfcGautha, 402 U.S. at 202-08, the Supreme Court criticized the
Model Penal Code recommendation because such a scheme necessarily provides only an incomplete list of possible sentencing considerations. The MGautha majority concluded that
"[for a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit
rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be
really complete." Id. at 208. See in/ta note 67 and accompanying text. For additional criticism
of lists of statutory mitigating and aggravating circumstances, see in/ra note 117. Section
210.6 of the MODEL PENAL CODE: PROPOSED OFFICIAL DRAFr (1962) is set out in an appen-

dix to the McGaulha Court's opinion. See 402 U.S. at 222-25.
15 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289-292 (1976). Except for four states
that abolished capital punishment in the mid-1800s, every American jurisdiction has at some
time provided for unguided jury sentencing in capital cases. MGautha, 402 U.S. at 200 n. 11;
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Appellate courts are wary of over-broad discretion in capital sentencing
because it allows the sentencing authority to invoke the unique and irrevocable penalty of death in an arbitrary 16 or discriminatory manner. 17
In McGautha v. Califoria2,'8 the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit absolute discretion in capital sentencing. In Furman v. Georgia,19 however, decided just one year after
McGautha, the court made a 180 degree turn, 20 ruling that "untrammeled" sentencing discretion in capital cases violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. At the other end of the spectrum, a complete
absence of sentencing discretion, created by mandating the death penalty for certain crimes, does not allow consideration of the character of
an individual defendant or the particular circumstances of the crime.2 1
Thus in Roberts v. Louisiana (H Roberts)22 the Supreme Court held that
mandatory death sentences also violate the eighth and fourteenth

amendments.
Although the Court has rejected each end of the discretionary spectrum, it has indicated that statutory guidelines can minimize the risk of
arbitrary and capricious action by directing and limiting allowable discretion.2 3 In 1976, the Court held that capital punishment laws providsee also Knowlton, Problems ofJuiy Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1099, 1136
(1953) (providing comprehensive analysis of state statutes according juries absolute discretion
in capital sentencing decisions and concluding that "[t]he system [in 1953 was] haphazard
and arbitrary in most states").
16 As the plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), explained:
The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures
before the Court in that case, sentencing authorities were not directed to give
attention to the nature or circumstances of the crime committed or to the
character or record of the defendant. Left unguided, juries imposed the
death sentence in a way that could only be called freakish.
Id at 206 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (upholding Georgia's new capital sentencing procedures because "the jury's discretion is channeled').
17 See infra note 81.
18 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
19 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
20 See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text. The Court's treatment of sentencing
discretion in capital cases since 1971 has generally been marked by inconsistency. As one
commentator observed: "The [eighth] amendment has stayed the same, but the theory of its
operation has changed as three- and four-member pluralities have had to confront the logical
but disquieting consequences of earlier decisions." Gillers, supranote 5, at 11. See also Radin,
Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Processfor Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143,
1154 (1980) ("the jurisprudence of death has come almost full circle-from . . . discretion
. . . to.

. . guided discretion . . . and back to.

. . discretion').

21 Mandatory capital sentencing schemes are disfavored because they invoke the ultimate penalty regardless of any mitigating circumstances. See infla notes 133-36, 141 and accompanying text.
22 431 U.S. 633 (1977). The Supreme Court has decided two capital cases from Louisiana involving a defendant with the surname Roberts. For purposes of clarity, the case decided in 1976, reported at 428 U.S. 280, will be referred to as S. Roberts. The case decided in
1977, reported at 431 U.S. 633, will be referred to as H. Roberts.
23 See infa notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
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ing for guided discretion in sentencing decisions are not unconstitutional
because they ensure that the sentencing authority imposes the death
24
penalty in a fair and reasonably consistent manner.
Furman and its progeny 25 established a fairly coherent set of principles defining the permissible extent of death sentencing discretion.
These cases indicated that both unbridled discretion and mandatory
death sentences are unconstitutional. These cases also indicated that the
level of sentencing discretion in capital cases must be suitably directed
and limited so as to produce fair and reasonably consistent results. Subsequent decisions have allowed increased discretion in capital sentencing, however, representing a substantial shift by the Court away from
26
these principles.
The vast majority of post-Furmancapital sentencing statutes include
a list of aggravating circumstances that, if present, will weigh in favor of
imposing capital punishment.2 7 These statutes allow the sentencing authority to impose the death sentence only if it finds at least one such
aggravating circumstance.2 8 Most state statutes also provide a list of
mitigating circumstances to guide the sentencing authority in considering certain factors that may warrant leniency.2 9 This basic framework
was designed to produce fair and reasonably consistent capital sentencing decisions by requiring consideration of certain highly relevant fac3
tors.3 0 In 1978, however, a plurality decision by the Supreme Court '
24 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); S.
Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 329 (1976). The Court recently interpreted the
rule from these cases in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) ("capital punishment
[must] be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all"). See supranote 9 and
accompanying text.
25 The Furman line of cases consists of Furman itself, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976), Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts),
428 U.S. 325 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana (H. Roberts), 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
26 See in/ra notes 189-363 and accompanying text.
27 Thirty-four of the thirty-eight states with a death penalty provide the sentencing authority with a statutory list of aggravating circumstances. See infa notes 662 and accompanying text.
28 Most states follow the Georgia formulation upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 155
(1976). Under the Georgia statute, with only limited exceptions, "unless at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances [herein] enumerated . . . is . . . found [by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt], the death penalty shall not be imposed." See GA. CODE
§ 17-10-30 (1982).
29 See infa note 691 and accompanying text.
30 Although the American Law Institute first proposed the use of statutory aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in 1959, see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, states did
not begin to adopt the Model Penal Code approach until after the Supreme Court's decision in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
31 In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Court reversed the death sentence of a
getaway car driver convicted for a murder committed by one of her co-felons on the ground
that the statute improperly excluded consideration of such mitigating factors as her prior
record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and relatively minor role in the murder. Id.
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indicated that the sentencing authority in capital cases may not be limited to exclusive consideration of a statutory list of mitigating circumstances. Instead, the sentencing authority must be permitted to consider
any mitigating circumstances that the defense presents. 3 2 A majority of
3
the Court confirmed this rule in 1982. 3
Two decisions in 198334 indicated that the Supreme Court will also
tolerate increased sentencing discretion with regard to aggravating circumstances. In Zant v. Stephens 5 and Barclay v. Florida,3 6 the Court upheld death sentences even though one of the aggravating circumstances
upon which the sentences were predicated was invalid.37 In Barclay, the
Court also refused to find error in a trial judge's decision to overturn the
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment and impose the death sentence, despite the fact that the trial judge relied extensively on his own
personal experiences in determining the appropriate punishment. 38 In a
third 1983 case, Californav. Ramos,39 the Court suggested that a sentencing authority may rely on factors wholly outside the scope of the statutory aggravating circumstances when imposing capital punishment, as
long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is also present. 40
at 597, 604-05; see in/a notes 150-58 and accompanying text. Although the plurality opinion
in Lockett stated that the state could not exclude any relevant mitigating circumstance from
consideration by the sentencing authority, two Justices filed separate opinions concurring in
the judgment but deciding the case on the narrow ground that execution constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment when the defendant had no specific intent to kill. See 438 U.S. at
619 (Marshall, J., concurring); 438 U.S. at 621 (White, J., concurring).
32 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604-05.
33 See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (interpreting Lockett, 438 U.S. 586,
as "holding that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted to consider any relevant
mitigating factor"). See infra notes 161-76 and accompanying text.
34 See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418
(1982).
35 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).
36
103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
37 The Georgia Supreme Court had ruled in a separate case while Zant's appeal was
pending that one of the three aggravating circumstances supporting the death sentence in
Zant was unconstitutionally vague. See in/fa notes 211-13 and accompanying text. In Barclay,
one of four aggravating circumstances supporting the death sentence was invalid under state
law because it was not listed among the statutory aggravating circumstances and the sentencing authority was not permitted to consider factors not included in the statute. See in/a text
accompanying notes 295, 301.
38 In the required written opinion accompanying his sentencing decision, the trial judge
in Barclay noted that the defendant had committed murder out of racial animus and spoke at
length about personal experiences in World War II and the abhorrent nature of racially motivated killings such as those committed in Nazi Germany. See in/ta notes 289-91 and accompanying text; see also infra note 317. Although California's current death penalty statute lists a
purely racial motive as an aggravating circumstance, the Florida statute in Barclay did not.
See infra note 667 and accompanying text.
39 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
40 Id at 3456 ("Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty. . . [it] is free to consider a myriad of
factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment."). See infra notes 335-63
and accompanying text.
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Although Furman and its progeny held that the state must suitably

direct and limit discretion in the capital sentencing process in order to
minimize the risk of arbitrary or capricious action, 4 ' the Court's recent
decisions permit unbridled discretion once the factfinder concludes that
the defendant is eligible for the death sentence. The only difference between the Court's present position on allowable discretion in capital sentencing and its discredited position in MGautha42 is that the current
standard requires the presence of a single legislatively defined aggravating circumstance before a judge or jury can impose the death sentence.
Capital sentencing errors occur when the judge or jury imposes the
death sentence in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, 43 when the

death sentence constitutes excessive punishment in relation to the crime
committed, 44 or when the death sentence is disproportionate in comparison to sentences given other offenders who were convicted of similar
crimes in that state. 45 Increased capital sentencing discretion carries
with it a greater risk of errors, suggesting a need for more thorough postsentencing appellate review procedures. Although the Supreme Court
has never expressly held that the eighth amendment requires state appellate review of death sentences, 4 6 every capital punishment statute
now in use provides condemned persons with a right of appeal.4 7 In
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), implicitly overruled
McGautha. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
43
See supra notes 16, 17 and accompanying text.
44 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (White, J., plurality opinion) ("the
Eighth Amendment bars... those punishments that are... 'excessive' in relation to the
crime committed").
45
According to one commentator:
41

42

[An] error in capital punishment occurs when we execute someone whose
crime does not seem so aggravated when compared to those of many who
escaped the death penalty. It is in this kind of case-which is extremely common-that we must worry whether, first, we have designed procedures which
are appropriate to the decision between life and death and, second, whether
we have followed those procedures.
Kaplan, TheProblem of CapitalPunishment, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 555, 576. In his dissenting opinion
in Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 889 (1984), Justice Brennan quoted the above passage and
noted that "[c]omparative proportionality review is aimed at eliminating this . . . type of
error."
46
In 1976, the Court approved three statutory capital sentencing schemes that required
state appellate review of death sentences without addressing the question of whether the
eighth amendment mandates such review. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The Court's 1976 cases
also rejected two statutory frameworks that lacked any requirement of state appellate review,
again without addressing the eighth amendment issue. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 325 (1976). In its strongest
indication yet that the eighth amendment may require state appellate review of death
sentences, the court in Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 877 (1984), noted that the plurality
opinion in Gregg "suggested that some form of meaningful appellate review is required."
47
See Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 876.
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particular, most statutes require comparative proportionality review, 48
which ensures that no person is executed without a prior determination
that his punishment is not excessive when compared with sentences
given offenders who committed similar crimes in that state.4 9 Although
proportionality review is an important check against capital sentencing
errors, the Court recently held in Pulley v. Harni 0 that the eighth and
51
fourteenth amendments do not require such review in capital cases.
In addition to direct review of death sentences in state appellate
courts, condemned persons may also seek collateral review in federal
court through habeas corpus proceedings challenging unlawful state detentions. 52 Despite the Court's earlier assertions that execution is a
unique penalty entitling capital defendants to greater procedural protection than noncapital defendants, the Court has recently indicated an
impatience with lengthy execution delays attributable to federal habeas
corpus proceedings. 53 In Barefoot v. Estelle,54 for example, the Court held
that federal courts of appeals may adopt expedited procedures in death
penalty cases to permit resolution of habeas corpus claims prior to the
55
scheduled execution date.
Considered together, these cases illustrate how far the Court has
strayed from the principles it espoused in Furman and its progeny. By
tolerating death penalty statutes that provide greater capital sentencing
discretion, while also restricting a condemned person's opportunity for
meaningful appellate review, the Court has paved the way for procedural schemes that violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments' demand for fair and consistent capital sentencing decisions.
Part I of this Project 56 summarizes the major Supreme Court decisions leading to the emergence of a system of guided discretion in capital
sentencing. Part II 7 discusses and evaluates more recent cases dealing
with discretionary capital sentencing, criticizes the Court for tolerating
schemes that provide only minimal guidance in capital sentencing, and
argues that these schemes ignore the Court's earlier demand that sentencing discretion in capital cases be suitably guided and limited. Part
11158 assesses recent Supreme Court developments in the area of federal
and state appellate review of capital sentencing. Because meaningful
appellate review provides valuable protection against capital sentencing
48

Id

49

See infra text accompanying notes 374, 379-86.
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
Id at 881.
See infra notes 469-73 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 494-96, 556-60 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. 3383, 3393-95 (1983).
See infra notes 511-21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63-188 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 189-363 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 364-566 and accompanying text.

50

51
52

53
54

55
56
57

58
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errors that statutory sentencing guidelines cannot supply,5 9 Part III concludes that two of the Court's most recent capital cases, Barefoot v. Estelle6 ° and Pulley v. Harris,6 1 were wrongly decided. Finally, an
appendix6 2 is included to provide a general description of capital punishment statutes currently in force.
I
THE EMERGENCE OF GUIDED DISCRETION IN CAPITAL
CASES

A. Invalidating Unguided Discretion
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of unguided discretion in capital sentencing in a 1971 case, Mcautha v. Ca4/iomia.6 3 The
Court granted certiorari in Mcautha to determine whether infliction of
the death sentence by a jury without any governing standards constitutes a deprivation of life without due process of law in violation of the
fourteenth amendment. 64 The petitioner argued that giving a jury unbridled discretion to inflict or withhold the death penalty as it sees fit is
59
60
61

See infra note 427 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).

104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).

See infra notes 579-754 and accompanying text.
402 U.S. 183 (1971). In McGaulha, the petitioner and a co-felon were convicted of
63
first degree murder committed during the course of an armed robbery. At a separate sentencing proceeding, the state presented evidence of McGautha's prior felony convictions, and the
same jury which had rendered the guilty verdicts was given a choice between imposing either
the death penalty or life imprisonment on each defendant. The jury was instructed that:
in determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely free to
act according to your own judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion ....
62

[[B]eyond prescribing the two alternative penalties, the law itself provides no standard for the guidance of the jury in the selection of the penalty,
[to the] absolute discretion of the
but, rather, commits the whole matter ...

jury.
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 189-90. The jury returned separate verdicts sentencing McGautha to
death and his co-defendant, who had no prior criminal record, to life imprisonment.
64
McGautha v. California, 70 Cal. 2d 770, 452 P.2d 650 (1969), cer. granted,398 U.S.
936 (1970). Crampton v. Ohio, a second case presenting the same issue of standardless jury
sentencing, was joined and decided with McCautha. See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 183 n*. The
petitioner in Crampton also challenged his sentence on the ground that he had been convicted
and sentenced to die in a unitary proceeding. The Court therefore granted certiorari to decide the second issue of whether the bifurcated proceedings provided for in states such as
California are required in all capital cases. Crampton v. Ohio, 18 Ohio St. 2d 182, 248
N.E.2d 614 (1969), cert.granted,398 U.S. 936 (1970). The petitioner in Cramp/on argued that a
unitary proceeding violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because a
defendant who exercises his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by not testifying
is forced to forfeit any opportunity to speak on his own behalf concerning the sentencing
decision. MeCGautha, 402 U.S. at 210-11. The principal advantage of a bifurcated system for
capital defendants is that potentially self-incriminating testimony and certain prejudicial evidence such as prior criminal convictions may be excluded during the guilt determination
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"fundamentally lawless." 65 In a six to three decision, 66 the Court
rejected this argument, holding that standardless jury sentencing in
capital cases does not offend the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In reaching this result, Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, assumed that legislatures are incapable of formulating standards
for determining what factors justify imposition of the death penalty
without knowing the particular circumstances of a given case. 67 Justice
Harlan thus reasoned that it would be impossible to hold that standardless jury sentencing violates the fourteenth amendment. 68 He constage; but if convicted, the defendant may then testify and present any mitigating evidence at
the sentencing hearing.
The McGautha Court nevertheless upheld Crampton's death sentence, ruling that "[i]t
may well be . . .that bifurcated trials . . .[are a] superior means of dealing with capital
cases if the death penalty is to be retained at all. But the Federal Constitution. . .does not
guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all worlds. . . ." McGautha, 402 U.S. at 221.
See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (affirming a death sentence imposed under a recidivist statute after a unitary trial at which evidence of defendant's past convictions was
presented for sentencing purposes, but where the jury was instructed to disregard such evidence in assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence). Justice Douglas, dissenting in McGautha, argued that bifurcated proceedings should be constitutionally required in capital
cases. MGautha, 402 U.S. at 229-48 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see infia note 66.
65
MGautha,402 U.S. at 196.
66
Justice Harlan wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, White, and Blackmun joined. Justice Black wrote a brief concurring opinion emphasizing that no rights expressly or impliedly guaranteed by the Constitution were denied by
the California or Ohio procedures. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 225-26 (Black, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented on the ground that
a unitary trial for guilt determination and capital sentencing violates the fourteenth amendment because of the tension a single proceeding creates between the defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and his fourteenth amendment right of procedural due
process. MGautha, 402 U.S. at 226-30 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see supra note 64. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, wrote a separate opinion dissenting on the
additional ground that standardlessjury sentencing represents a "stark legislative abdication"
of states' responsibility for establishing capital sentencing standards which violates fourteenth
amendment due process because it allows for an "unguided, unbridled, unreviewable exercise
of naked power." McGautha, 402 U.S. at 252 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 402 U.S. at 207-08. In arguing that the development of capital sentencing standards
is beyond present human ability, see in/ja note 407 and accompanying text, Justice Harlan
expressed the view that the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code capital sentencing
formula, which provides the sentencing authority with lists of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, see supra note 14, merely suggests some subjects for the jury to consider
in its deliberations, but does not provide it with actual standards by which to make that
decision. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207. For a similar argument, see in/a note 117.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan attacked the Court's assumption that "the
legislatures of the 50 States are so devoid of wisdom and the power of rational thought that
they are unable . . . to determine for themselves the criteria under which convicted capital
felons should be chosen to live or die." MGautha, 402 U.S. at 249 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68 MGautha, 402 U.S. at 207. Although Justice Harlan's majority opinion contains
broad dicta suggesting that standardless jury sentencing in capital cases is not "offensive to
anything in the Constitution," id. (emphasis added), Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(per curiam), makes clear that the holding in McGautha is strictly limited to fourteenth
amendment analysis and that absolute discretion in capital sentencing violates the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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cluded that the states are entitled to assume that capital jurors "will act
with due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider
'69
a variety of factors."
One year after its decision in Mcautha, the Supreme Court in
Furman v. Georgia70 reached the issue of whether death sentences imposed
by juries with absolute discretion violate the eighth amendment's ban
against "cruel and unusual punishment. 7 1t In a five to four per curzam
decision with nine separate opinions, 72 the Court invalidated the death
sentences of a convicted murderer and two convicted rapists. 73 The per
curiam opinion states simply that "the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in [the three cases before the Court] constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
'74
Amendments."
It is difficult to derive a constitutional standard from the decision
because the five Justices who voted in Furman to strike down the Georgia
69
70
71

McGautha, 402 U.S. at 208.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Id For a comprehensive commentary and discussion of the arguments and decision

in Furman, see M.

MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL:

THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT (1973); L. STEVENS, DEATH PENALTY: THE CASE OF LIFE vs. DEATH IN THE
UNITED STATES (1978).
72 Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall each filed separate concurring opinions. ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist each filed
separate dissenting opinions.
73 The petitioner in Furman was tried and convicted of murder without a recommendation for mercy. Caught in the act of committing a house burglary, Furman fired a gunshot
through a closed door, killing the owner of the home. Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 254, 167
S.E.2d 628, 629 (1969). Furman was sentenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 261005 (Supp. 1971). The two other cases joined with and decided in Furman were Jackson v.
Georgia, 225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969), rev'dsub nam.Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), in which a convicted rapist who held the pointed ends of scissors to his victim's throat
was sentenced to death pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971); and Branch v.
Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev'dsub nom. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), in which a convicted rapist was sentenced to death pursuant to TEx. PENAL
CODE, art. 1189 (1961).
74 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). For a commentary on the various tests employed by one or more of the five Justices who voted to reverse the death sentences in Furman,
see Wheeler, Towarda Theog of Limited Punishment I" The Eighth Amendment After Furman v.
Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1972).
The two principal arguments articulated in Furman by the four dissenting Justices are
based on separation of powers and stare decisis. A common theme expressed in all four opinions is that legislatures are supposed to represent the moral consensus of the people and that
their "authority should not be taken over by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth
Amendment issue." Furman,408 U.S. at 410 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 383-86, 40305 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 418, 431-33, 442-43, 456, 458, 461-65 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Three dissenting opinions cite "an unbroken
line of precedent," from the 1879 case of Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879) to the
1971 case of McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971), in which the constitutionality
of capital punishment was accepted or assumed. Furman, 408 U.S. at 417, 421-27 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see id at 380-81, 399-400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 407-08 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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and Texas statutes could not agree on a basis for the judgment. Only
two Justices in the Furman majority felt that capital punishment was
inherently cruel and unusual. 75 Justice Brennan argued that capital
punishment does "not comport with human dignity. ' 76 Justice Marshall
believed that it was "an excessive and unnecessary punishment" 77 and
that "the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of [empirical evidence] that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional. 7 8 In addition, three of the concurring Justices emphasized the
unique nature of capital punishment in our system of criminal justice.
Justice Brennan stated in his concurrence: "Death is truly an awesome
punishment. The calculated killing of a human being by the State in'79
volves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity.
75
Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id at 370 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Dike, CapitalPunishment in the UnitedStates,PartP Observationson the Use andInterpretation of the Law, 13 GRIM. JUST. ABSTRACTS 302 (1981).

76 Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued that four
principles inherent in the cruel and unusual punishment clause may be combined to form a
cumulative test for determining whether a particular punishment violates the eighth
amendment:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is
inflicted arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and
if there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more effectively
than some less severe punishment, then the continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict
inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
Id. at 282. Justice Brennan reasoned that the death penalty violates the first principle because
of its "finality and enormity." Id. at 289. He concluded that capital punishment violates the
second principle because its infliction is so rare that "it smacks of little more than a lottery
system." Id. at 293. Capital punishment violates the third principle, according to Justice
Brennan, because "[tihe objective indicator of society's view of an unusually severe punishment is what society does with it, and today society will inflict death upon only a small
sample of the eligible criminals." Id. at 300. Finally, Justice Brennan argued that in light of
the fact that only "a random few" actually are executed, there is no substantial reason to
believe that the death penalty is a superior deterrent or better serves the purpose of retribution than does imprisonment. Id. at 300-05. For a discussion concerning the efficacy of the
death penalty as a deterrent to violent crimes, see infra note 398.
77 Furman, 408 U.S. at 358 (Marshall, J., concurring). After tracing the origins of the
prohibition against "cruel and unusual" punishments and the history of capital punishment,
Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty is excessive and unnecessary primarily
because, in his view, statistics and logic indicate that it is not a better deterrent than life
imprisonment. Id. at 345-54. See infra note 398.
78 Furman,408 U.S. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall concluded that
capital punishment would shock the conscience and sense ofjustice of the people if they were
better informed about its discriminatory use against blacks, men, and the poor, about evidence of its mistaken use against innocent defendants, and about its "deleterious effects" on
the entire criminal justice system. Id. at 364-69. Commentators have dubbed the belief that
the public would repudiate the death penalty if it were better informed about the discriminatory and mistaken application of the penalty as the "Marshall hypothesis." See, e.g., H.
Bedau, supra note 3, at 66; Vidmar & Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes TowardCapitalPunishment,
reprintedin THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 68, 80-84 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982). For a discussion concerning racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty, see infra note 81.
79 Furman, 408 U.S. at 290 (Brennan, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan spoke at length about the unique aspects of capital punishment:

1984]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1143

Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White focused on impermissible procedures under which the death penalty was being inflicted. The Georgia and Texas statutes under review in Furman granted the sentencing
authority complete discretion in determining whether a capital defendant should die or be imprisoned and failed to define any standards for
making that determination. 80 Justice Douglas found that the uncontrolled discretion accorded to judges and juries by this system offended
both the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and the eighth
amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment because the
resulting sentences were "pregnant with discrimination."' ' Justice
Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so
strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that
death is the ultimate sanction. No other punishment has been so continuously restricted. . . . And those States that still inflict death reserve it for the
most heinous crimes. . . . This Court, too, almost always treats death cases
as a class apart ....
The only explanation for the uniqueness of death is its extreme severity. . . . No other existing punishment is comparable to death in terms of
physical and mental suffering. . . . "[T]he process of carrying out a verdict
of death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture .
In comparison to all other punishments today, then, the deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity. I would not hesitate to hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a
"cruel and unusual" punishment, were it not that death is a punishment of
longstanding usage and acceptance in this country.
Id at 286-91 (quoting People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 166 (1972)); see also inJranotes 396-98 and accompanying text; Furman, 408 U.S. at
346 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Death is irrevocable. . . . Death, of course, makes rehabilitation impossible . . . . [D]eath has always been viewed as the ultimate sanction . . .
For a discussion of the principle that capital punishment is constitutionally different from
other lawful punishments, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
80 The Georgia provision under which Furman was sentenced read in part:
The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death, but may be
confinement in the penitentiary for life in the following cases: If the jury
trying the case shall so recommend, or if the conviction is founded solely on
circumstantial testimony, the presiding judge may sentence to confinement in
the penitentiary for life. In the former case it is not discretionary with the
judge; in the latter it is.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971). The separate Georgia provision under which Jackson was sentenced prescribed that "[t]he crime of rape shall be punished by death, unless the
jury recommends mercy, in which event punishment shall be imprisonment for life." GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971). The Texas provision under which Branch was sentenced
provided simply: "A person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in
the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five." TEX. PENAL CODE, art.
1189 (1961).
81 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas reasoned that:
it is "cruel and unusual" to apply the death penalty - or any other penalty
- selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though
it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the
board.
Id at 245. Justice Douglas emphasized that "these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional
in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredi-
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Stewart noted that the petitioners in Furmanwere "among a capriciously
selected random handful"8 2 to be sentenced to death and concluded
that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the in8 3
fliction of a sentence . . . so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.1
ent not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on
'cruel and unusual' punishments." Id. at 256-57.
Capital punishment has been inflicted in vastly greater proportions on black defendants
than on white defendants. The statistics presented to the Court in Furman revealed that unbridled discretion in capital sentencing produced racially skewed results. For example, Justice Marshall cited statistics demonstrating that out of 3,859 persons executed in the United
States between 1930 and 1972, 1,751 were white and 2,066 were black. More revealing than
this was that out of the 455 persons executed for rape, 405 were black and only 48 were white.
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). From these statistics, Justice Marshall
concluded that "[i]t is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than
whites in proportion to their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that. . there is
evidence of racial discrimination." Id at 364. Justice Stewart observed that "if any basis can
be discerned for the selection of these few [defendants] to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Despite procedural safeguards adopted after Furman,which were designed to reduce arbitrariness and caprice in capital sentencing decisions, racial discrimination in the administration of capital punishment continues today. One study examining South Carolina's
constitutionally approved death penalty statute found that "rather than being eliminated,
discrimination and bias have simply taken more sophisticated forms." Jacoby & Paternoster,
Sentencing Disparity andJug' Packing: FurtherChallenges to the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRIM. LAW &
CRIMINOLOGY 379, 379 (1982). The study found that although during the first 29 months
following enactment of South Carolina's new death penalty statute prosecutors were significantly more likely to request the death penalty for whites than for blacks charged with aggravated murder, defendants charged with murdering whites were 3.2 times more likely to have
prosecutors seek the death penalty than those charged with murdering blacks. Id at 383-84.
Moreover, prosecutors sought the death penalty nearly four times as often for blacks accused
of murdering whites than for blacks accused of murdering other blacks; and prosecutors were
only twice as likely to seek the death penalty for whites accused of murdering other whites
than for whites accused of murdering blacks. Id. at 384-85. Jacoby and Paternoster concluded
that "[d]iscrimination still appears to exist, but it now takes the form of a greater probability
that prosecutors will seek the death penalty if the victim is white." Id. at 385. The South
Carolina study also examined the death-qualified procedures for jury selection approved in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and concluded that these procedures "appear to
produce juries biased towards both convictions and the death penalty and disproportionately
exclude blacks from serving on capital juries." Jacoby & Paternoster, supra, at 387.
Similar findings have been recorded in other states. In September 1977, 94% of the 114
men on Florida's death row had killed only white victims, 2% had killed black and white
victims, and 4% had killed only black victims. See Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: The FloridaExperience, 95 HARV. L. REv. 456, 458 (1981). As in South Carolina,
the more blatant form of discrimination has largely been corrected: 67% of those on Florida's
death row were black when Furman was decided, but that figure dropped to 40% in the eight
and one half years after Furman. Id. at 464; see also Note, Discriminationand Arbitrariness in
CapitalPunishment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida 1973-1976,
33 STAN. L. REv. 75, 77 (1980) (finding "no evidence of discrimination" but "evidence of
both selectivity and arbitrariness" in capital punishment imposition); The Death Penalty's Ugly
Question, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1984, at A16, col. 1 (discussing study of capital punishment in
Georgia demonstrating that between 1976 and 1980 the death penalty was imposed on 67 of
the 773 convicted murderers of whites but on only 12 of the 11,345 murderers of blacks, a
disparity of 8.7% to 1%).
82 Furman, 408 U.S. at 238, 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 310. Justice Stewart emphasized this point by declaring that "[t]hese death
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Adopting a similar position, Justice White concurred in the Court's
judgment because he found the capital punishment statutes permitted
the jury, "in its own discretion . . . [to] refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the circumstances of the crime."8' 4 Justice White
believed this delegation of sentencing authority created a situation in
which the "the death penalty [was] exacted with great infrequency even
for the most atrocious crimes and that there [was] no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed form the many
cases in which it [was] not." 85
Despite the Furman majority's apparent inability to agree upon a
common rationale for its decision,86 the five concurring opinions together advance the principle that a basic lack of fairness and consistency
87
in capital sentencing decisions cannot be constitutionally tolerated.
The essential constitutional infirmity of the Georgia and Texas statutes
invalidated in Furman was that they left "trial juries free to sentence to
death or to life without any standards or guidelines to help (or force)
them to make rational and uniform sentencing choices."8' 8 Because
every state with a death penalty, except Rhode Island,8 9 accorded the
sentencing authority absolute discretion in capital cases, 90 the practical
effect of the decision was clear: capital punishment sentencing, as then
administered, was unconstitutional. As Justice Powell noted in his dissenting opinion, "[t]he capital punishment laws of no less than 39 states
[out of 40 permitting the death penalty] and the District of Columbia
are nullified" by virtue of the Court's decision to strike down the two
statutes before it.91
sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and
unusual." Id. at 309; see infra text accompanying note 584. For criticism of this argument, see
infra note 85.
84 Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (White, J., concurring).
85 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger
criticized the argument made by both Justice Stewart and Justice White that the sentences in
Furman were invalid because the death penalty is imposed so infrequently:
This [argument] suggests that capital punishment can be made to satisfy
Eighth Amendment values if its rate of imposition is somehow multiplied; it
seemingly follows that the flexible sentencing system created by the legislatures, and carried out by juries and judges, has yielded more mercy than the
Eighth Amendment can stand. The implications of this approach are mildly
ironical.
Id. at 398 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For the same criticism see Polsby, supra note 3, at 27.
86
See supra note 72; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
87
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
88 H. Bedau, supra note 3, at 249.
89 See injra note 91 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
91 Furman, 408 U.S. at 417 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell pointed out that only
Rhode Island's mandatory death sentence for murder by life term prisoners was not reached
by the Furman decision. Id. at 417 n.2. Mandatory death sentences such as Rhode Island's
later were held unconstitutional in Roberts v. Louisiana (H. Roberts), 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
See infta text accompanying notes 105-07.
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The decision in Furmanimplicitly overruled the Court's earlier decision in MGautha.92 As Justice Douglas noted, the same constitutional
infirmity of the Georgia and Texas statutes invalidated in Furman also
characterized the California statute upheld in Mcauthaone year earlier:
under all three statutes, "jj]uries (or judges, as the case may be) have
practically untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that
he die."'93 Justice Stewart attempted to distinguish the two cases on the
ground that MGautha only considered the statutes' constitutionality
under the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection
clauses while Furman also considered their constitutionality under the
eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 94 He offered no rationale, however, for a principled distinction
between the fourteenth amendment standard and the eighth amendment standard for reviewing a death sentence. 95 In his Furman dissent,
Chief Justice Burger argued that "it would be disingenuous to suggest
that today's ruling has done anything less than overrule MGautha in the
guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication." 96 The basic tension bedistinction was drawn
tween the two decisions suggests strongly that any
"merely to evade an embarrassing precedent. ' 97
92

See D.

PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY 95 (1982).

93 Furman,408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring). In a footnote Justice Douglas discussed the tension between Furman and Mcautha:.
[I]f the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty on petitioners because they are "among a capriciously selected
random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed,"
• . .or because "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases
in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not,". .. then the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would
render unconstitutional "capital sentencing procedures that are purposely
constructed to allow the maximum possible variation from one case to the
next, and [that] provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized
variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 248-49 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id.at 313 (White, J., concurring); and Mcautha, 402 U.S. at 248
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
94 Id at 310 n.12 (Stewart, J., concurring).
95 See D. PANNICK, supra note 92, at 38. Justice Powell argued that the test for determining whether the fourteenth amendment's due process requirement has been satisfied is "fundamentally identical" to the test for determining whether the eighth amendment's ban
against cruel and unusual punishment has been violated. Furman, 408 U.S. at 422 n.4 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
96
Furman,408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
97 D. PANNICK, supra note 92, at 38. The Court's complete reversal on the issue of absolute discretion in capital sentencing in just 14 months was unprecedented in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Justice Harlan's departure from the Court on September 23, 1971, does not
explain the sub silentio
reversal of his majority opinion in Mcautha because Justice Powell,
who replaced Justice Harlan, dissented in Furman. The reversal is attributable to the changed
votes of Justices Stewart and White, who voted to uphold the death penalty statutes considered by the Court in MeGautha, but who voted to invalidate the laws reviewed in Furman. As
one commentator noted, however, "[w]hy Justices Stewart and White found the due process
arguments unconvincing in McGautha but persuasive in Furman is an unusual riddle." Polsby,
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The splintered majority that decided Furman98 provided legislatures
considering new capital punishment statutes with little guidance. 99 As a
result, state legislatures responded to the decision by following two opposite approaches. 0 0 Most states adopted a modified version of the
Model Penal Code approach' 0 1 providing for a system of guided discretion in which the sentencing authority must consider certain statutorily
defined aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether or
not to impose the death penalty. Other states adopted an approach that
eliminated any possibility of arbitrary infliction of the death penalty by
providing mandatory capital punishment for certain forms of murder.
On July 2, 1976, the Supreme Court handed down five major decisions in capital cases challenging the constitutionality of both of these
supra note 3, at 26. Several commentators have suggested that the two Justices may have
changed their minds because of Furman's implications for those on death row. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 244, 247, 255; Polsby, supra note 3, at 26; Note,
Discretionandthe Constitutionality ofthe New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1690, 1692
n.11 (1974). The Furman Court was keenly aware that upholding the Georgia and Texas
statutes on eighth amendment grounds would remove the last constitutional obstacle to fullscale resumption of executions in the United States. See supranote 3. Justice Marshall openly
acknowledged the influence of this factor:
Candor compels me to confess that I am not oblivious to the fact that this
is truly a matter of life and death. Not only does it involve the lives of these
three petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned men and women in this country currently awaitihg execution. While this fact cannot affect our ultimate decision, it necessitates that the decision be free from any
possibility of error.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun commented: "I trust the Court fully appreciates what it is doing when it decides these
cases the way it does today. . . . No longer is capital punishment possible.

. . ." 408 U.S.

at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun ended his dissent by criticizing the
Furman Court for being influenced by legislative, rather than adjudicative, facts: "Although I
personally may rejoice at the Court's result, I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter
of history, of law, or of constitutional pronouncement. I fear the Court has overstepped. It
has sought and has achieved an end." Id. at 414.
98 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
99 In his dissenting opinion in Furman, Chief Justice Burger made the following
observation:
Since there is no majority of the Court on the ultimate issue presented in
these cases, the future of capital punishment in this country has been left in
an uncertain limbo. Rather than providing a final and unambiguous answer
on the basic constitutional question, the collective impact of the majority's
ruling is to demand an undetermined measure of change from the various
state legislatures and the Congress.
Furman, 408 U.S. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Soon after the five separate opinions in the
Furman majority were handed down, one commentator suggested that the opinions "seemed
almost deliberately calculated to make this judgment of dubious value as a precedent." Polsby, supra note 3, at 40.
100

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1979,

at 2 [hereinafter cited as 1979 STATISTICS]. For an analysis of state court interpretations of
Furman and different legislative approaches to writing a valid post-Furman death penalty law,
see Note, supra note 97.
10 t J. GORECKI, supranote 3, at 15. For a description of the Model Penal Code approach,
see supra note 14.
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approaches. Gregg v. Georgia,10 2 Proffitt v. Florida,' 03 and Jurek v. Texas'0 4
established that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment and held that the

guided discretion approach satisfied that amendment's requirements.
Woodson v. North Caroiza 10 5 and Roberts v. Louisiana (S Roberts) 10 6 established that mandatory death sentences for first-degree murder are im10 7
permissible under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
B.

Providing for Guided Discretion

Gregg, Profit, and Jurek were all decided by the same seven member
majority, with Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting in each case on
the ground that the death penalty is inherently cruel and unusual. In
all three cases, the defendants were convicted of murder in one proceeding and later sentenced to death in a separate proceeding in which the
sentencing authority balanced aggravating and mitigating factors to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed. 0 8 In Gregg, the
jury imposed the death sentence on a defendant convicted of armed robbery and the murder of two victims after it had found two of ten possible statutory aggravating circumstances. The aggravating factors were
that the defendant had committed the murders during the course of
armed robberies, and that he had committed them for pecuniary
gain. 10 9 In Proffitt, the trial judge imposed the death sentence 10 on a
102 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
103 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
104 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
105 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
106 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
107 In both Woodron and S. Roberts, the rule against mandatory death sentences was announced in plurality opinions. In Roberts v. Louisiana (H. Roberts), 431 U.S. 633 (1977),
five Justices joined in a per curiam opinion confirming the unconstitutionality of mandatory
death sentences. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
108 Under this bifurcated system, after guilt is determined, a separate proceeding is held
in which the prosecution presents evidence of aggravating factors and the defense presents
evidence of relevant mitigating circumstances. The sentencing authority then can weigh all
the evidence to determine whether the particular facts of the case warrant leniency or justify
execution. Bifurcation permits introduction of evidence relevant to sentencing which may
have been inadmissible or voluntarily withheld, see supra note 64, in the trial. In McGautha,
the Court held that bifurcated proceedings in capital cases are not constitutionally required.
See supra note 64. Nevertheless, all states with an active death penalty law now provide for
bifurcated proceedings. See incfa note 643 and accompanying text.
109
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 161. Under the Georgia statute, the sentencing authority must
consider "any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized
by law and any of [10] statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the
evidence . . . ." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)

(1982).

The statute also provides that

"[e]xcept in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the [enumerated]
statutory aggravating circumstances [is found beyond a reasonable doubt], the death penalty
shall not be imposed." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(c) (1982).
110 Under Florida procedure upheld in Proftitt, the same jury that returns a guilty verdict
also sits in a second evidentiary proceeding and renders an advisory opinion concerning both
the presence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances and the appropriate penalty.
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defendant convicted of murder after finding that the evidence supported
none of the seven statutory mitigating circumstances"'I and the following four aggravating circumstances were present: (1) the murder was
premeditated and occurred in the course of a felony (burglary); (2) the
defendant had the propensity to kill; (3) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; and (4) the defendant knowingly created a
great risk of serious bodily harm and death to many persons. 1 2 InJurek,
the trial judge imposed the death sentence on a defendant convicted of
murder after the jury found that the murder was deliberate and that the
defendant constituted a continuing threat to society because he was
likely to commit future violent crimes." 3
The plurality opinion in Gregg, written by Justice Stewart and
joined by Justices Powell and Stevens," 4 first concluded that capital
punishment is not unconstitutional in all circumstances:
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a
legislature to evaluate, in terms of its particular State, the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and its social utility as a sanction,
require us to conclude . . . that the infliction of death as a punish-

ment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
...[T]he death penalty is not a form of punishment that may
never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it. 115
The trial judge then submits written findings upon which the sentence is based. Proffitt, 428
U.S. at 248-50.
I"'
Unlike the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg which only listed statutory aggravating
circumstances, the Florida statute also listed statutory mitigating circumstances. The seven
mitigating factors were: (1) the defendant has no significant criminal record; (2) the defendant committed the crime while under extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) the victim participated in or consented to the criminal conduct; (4) the defendant was an
accomplice to the capital felony of another person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) the defendant acted under extreme duress or substantial domination of another person; (6)
the defendant lacked the capacity to understand the criminality of his conduct or to conform
to the requirements of law; and (7) the defendant's age at the time of the crime. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.141(6)(a)-(g) (West Supp. 1983); see Profit, 428 U.S. at 248-29 n.6.
112 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 246-47.
113 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267-68. The Texas sentencing scheme upheld inJurekis explained
infra at text accompanying notes 126-29.
114 Justice White, concurring in the judgment, filed a separate opinion that was joined in
part by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun also concurred in the
judgment and simply cited all four dissenting opinions in Furman. See supra note 74.
115
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186-87 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Before announcing the
Court's holding that capital punishment does not necessarily violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments, Justice Stewart explained that in Furman,the Court had not resolved the
ultimate issue of the death penalty's per se constitutionality:
Four Justices [Burger, C.J.; Blackmun, J.; Powell, J.; and RehnquistJ.] would
have held that capital punishment is not unconstitutional per se, two Justices
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The plurality in Gregg went on to hold that a procedure under which the
death penalty is imposed only after the sentencing authority has considered a statutory list of aggravating circumstances does not violate the
Furman mandate "that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited
16
so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."'
Justice Stewart believed that by focusing the sentencing jury's attention
on "the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant," the new Georgia sentencing
procedure ensured that capital punishment would not be "wantonly or
[Brennan, J.; and Marshall, J.] would have reached the opposite conclusion;
and three Justices [Douglas, J.; Stewart, J.; and White, J.], while agreeing that
the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, left open the question whether such punishment may ever be imposed.
Id. at 169 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Although Justice Stewart did not contradict himself by voting to uphold the death sentences in Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek after having
voted to strike down the death sentences in Furman, the tone of his plurality opinions in the
1976 cases changed dramatically from that of his concurring opinion in Furman, which had
emphasized the rarity with which the death penalty was imposed. See supra note 83 and
accompanying text. Echoing the dissenting opinions in Furman,see supranote 74, Justice Stewart wrote in Gregg that "while we have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are
not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as legislators. . . . Therefore, in
assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75 (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion). Compare Furman,408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the [presumed] validity
of legislatively authorized punishments. . . narrowly confines the scope ofjudicial inquiry").
Justice Stewart also adopted the second predominant theme of the dissenting opinions in
Furman, noting in Gregg that "[t]he Court on a number of occasions has both assumed and
asserted the constitutionality of capital punishment." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168. Compare Furman,
408 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("until today capital punishment was accepted and
assumed [by the Court] as not unconstitutional"). Justice Stewart's shift in attitude between
Furman and Gregg is also noted in Radin, The Jurisprudenceof Death." Evolving Standardsfor the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1007 (1978) ("Justice Stewart, in
Furman, adopted an activist adjudicatory attitude. . . . Then, in upholding the guided discretion death penalty statute in Gregg, [he] shifted his adjudicatory attitude to the opposite
end of the spectrum."). Justice Stewart's change in tone in Gregg probably resulted from
judicial notice of the effort of state legislatures to retain the death penalty despite Furman's
sweeping invalidation of nearly every capital punishment statute existing in 1972:
[It] is now evident that a large proportion of American society continues to
regard [capital punishment] as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction.
The most marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. . . . [A]ll of the postFurman statutes make clear that capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-81 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). According to Woodward and Armstrong's account, "[w]hen the states began passing new death penalty laws right after the 1972
Furman decision, Stewart realized that he had miscalculated." B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 432-33. For a probing inquiry into the divergent perspectives of
Justice Stewart and Justice White on capital punishment, see Palmer, Two Perspectives on Strucluring Discretion:JusticesStewart and White on the Death Penalty, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
194 (1979).
116 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).

1984]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1151

freakishly" imposed. 1 7 Finally, Justice Stewart praised the Georgia
statute for requiring the sentencing authority to specify the factors
which provided the basis of its sentencing decision. 1 8 He believed this
provision, coupled with a requirement that all capital sentences receive
automatic review by the Georgia Supreme Court, ensures "meaningful
appellate review," of death sentences and thus acts as "an important
additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice."" 19
20
Both Proffill andjurekwere decided on the same grounds as Gregg.1
The basic difference between the Florida statute upheld in Proffitt and
the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg was that in Florida the trial judge
determined the sentence, while in Georgia that decision was made by a
jury.' 2 ' The Proffitt plurality, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, recognized that jury sentencing "can perform an important societal function," but nevertheless concluded that it is not constitutionally
required. 122 Justice Stewart also rejected the petitioner's contention
that the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances were so
vague and so broad that virtually "'any capital defendant becomes a
117 Id. at 206-07. Some commentators have argued that the statutory formulations upheld in Gregg and Proffitt do not ensure the fairness and consistency in the capital sentencing
process required by Furman
"A check list of factors relevant to augmenting or diminishing the severity of a
sentence is not really a standard. The jury with no more than such a list is
neither equipped nor instructed in how to weight the evidence thereundere.g. whether to give all the several circumstances equal weight, or if they are
to weigh disproportionately, to determine which should carry the greater and
which the lesser weight. . . . Merely to make explicit a set of factors relevant
to sentencing is not sufficient to bring the sentences actually meted out under
any uniform standard at all. It is wholly insufficient to provide for fairness in
jury sentencing, which is precisely what introducing these factors for the jury's
use is intended to obtain."
D. PANNICK, supra note 92, at 98 (quoting H. Bedau, supra note 3, at 27).
118 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
119 Id. at 198. The importance of meaningful appellate review to the holdings in Gregg
and the four other capital punishment decisions with which it was announced is discussed at
infta notes 414-27 and accompanying text.
120 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 242, 247 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion);Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262, 268
(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). The petitioners in Gregg, Profitt, and Jurek all argued that the
death penalty is cruel and unusual under any circumstances. Justice Stewart rejected this
argument in Proffitt andJurek by citing his plurality opinion in Gregg. The opinions in Proftt
andJurek then examined the Florida and Texas statutes, and concluded that both frameworks
sufficiently directed the jury's attention to the individual circumstances of the crime. See infra
notes 122-24, 125-29 and accompanying text. For a criticism of this conclusion with respect
to the Texas framework upheld in Jurek, see Crump, CapitalMurder: The Issues in Texas, 14
Hous. L. REv. 531 (1977).
121
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); see Funnan, 408 U.S. at 310
n.12. A second difference was that the Florida law provided a list of statutory mitigating
circumstances whereas the Georgia statute listed only specific aggravating circumstances. See
supra note 111.
122
Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart argued that
judicial sentencing would lead to even greater consistency in the imposition of the death
penalty because a trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury. Id.
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candidate for the death penalty.'"123 He concluded that the Florida

guidelines "[a]s construed by the Supreme Court of Florida. . .are not
24
impermissibly vague."'
The sentencing scheme upheld in Jurek was significantly different
from the Georgia and Florida laws considered in Gregg and Profit, because the sentencing authority in Jurek was not provided with a list of
12 5
aggravating circumstances to be weighed against mitigating factors.
The Texas statute 126 instead provided that only five specific forms of
murder-murder of a peace officer or a fireman, murder committed in
the course of certain designated felonies, 127 murder for hire, murder
committed by a prison inmate, and murder committed while escaping
from a penal institution-constituted capital murder. If a defendant
was convicted of capital murder, the statute required that a separate
jury hear additional evidence to determine whether his act was deliberately intended to cause death, whether he was likely to commit future
violent crimes, and whether his response to provocation, if any, was unreasonable. 128 If the jury made affirmative findings on all three quest23 Id. at 255 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 64). In particular, the petitioner argued that
two of the aggravating circumstances authorizing imposition of the death penalty-the " 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' " nature of the crime and the fact that " '[t]he defendant
knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons' "--were unconstitutionally vague.
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h), (c) (Supp. 1983)). A similar argument was also
raised and rejected in Gregg. See infia note 124.
124 Proffit, 428 U.S. at 256 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). In Gregg, the petitioner had
attacked as unconstitutionally broad the statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder
was "'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.' " Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (Stewart, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982)). Although the Georgia courts
had not had occasion to interpret the challenged provision, the Gregg plurality summarily
dismissed petitioner's contention, stating that "there is no reason to assume that the Supreme
Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction." Id.
125 For an argument that the Texas framework upheld injurek constitutes a mandatory
capital sentencing scheme in the absence of judicial interpretation, see infra note 129.
126 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974); seeJurek, 428 U.S. at 262, 265-66 n.j.
For an analysis of the Texas capital murder statute upheld in Jurek, see Crump, supra note
120.
127 Under the Texas statute, murder constitutes a capital offense if committed in the
course of "committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated
rape, or arson." TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
128 The Texas statute requires the court to submit three questions to the sentencing jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any,
by the deceased.
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1)-(3) (Vernon Supp. 1981); seeJurek, 428 U.S.
at 269 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Where there is no provocation, the first and second
findings are sufficient to require execution. For the argument that this sentencing scheme
constitutes a mandatory death sentence, see infra note 129.

1984]

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1153

tions, it was required to impose the death sentence. The plurality
concluded that "in narrowing the categories of murders for which a
death sentence may ever be imposed," the Texas formulation "serves
much the same purpose" as the statutory aggravating circumstances
1 29
present in Gregg and Proffit.

C.

Invalidating Mandatory Death Sentences
13
In Woodson v. North Carolina130 and Roberts v. Louziana (S. Roberts), '

the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the approach
taken by a second group of states in response to the Furman decision.
Under this approach, mandatory death sentences were imposed for capital murder. The Court divided five to four in both cases. 132 The threemember plurality, again speaking through Justice Stewart, invalidated
a North Carolina statute and a Louisiana statute of this type on the
grounds that mandatory imposition of the death sentence conflicted
with contemporary standards of decency 3 3 and "fail[ed] to provide a
129 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270. The plurality injurek concluded that by limiting the crime of
capital murder to five specific forms of murder, see supratext accompanying notes 126-27, and
then requiring a sentencing jury to make two and in some cases three findings in aggravation
of the penalty, see supra note 128, the Texas scheme "essentially requires that one of five
aggravating circumstances be found" before capital punishment can be imposed. Jurek, 428
U.S. at 273. Although Justice Stewart correctly viewed the Texas formulation as implicitly
requiring one of five aggravating circumstances before a death sentence can be imposed, his
conclusion that the Texas scheme "serves much the same purpose" as the statutes upheld in
Gregg and Proffitt was incorrect. The two statutory frameworks differ in that the Georgia and
Florida laws permit the sentencing authority to impose the death penalty upon the finding of a
statutory aggravating circumstance, while the Texas statute requiresthe sentencing authority
to impose the death sentence upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance. There is no
room for sentencing discretion in the Texas statute as written: "If the jury finds that the State
has prove[n] beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to each of the three questions is yes,
then the death sentence is imposed." Jure, 428 U.S. at 269 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added). On its face, the Texas sentencing scheme constitutes a mandatory death sentence
for five types of murder if the defendant acted deliberately, if he is likely to commit future
acts of violence, and if he responded to provocation, if any, in an unreasonable manner.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion attempts to reconcile the result injurek with the decisions in Woodron and S Roberts striking down mandatory death sentences, see infra notes 132-33
and accompanying text, by asserting that the Texas courts had interpreted the future dangerousness question to permit the defendant to "bring to the jury's attention whatever mitigating
circumstances he may be able to show." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. One commentator concluded,
however: "The Supreme Court should have struck down the Texas statute in Jurek v. Texas;
thereby encouraging the Texas legislature to redraft their death penalty statute to bring it
into line with the practice of the Texas courts." D. PANNICK, supra note 92, at 101.
130 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
131 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
132 In both Woodson and S. Roberts,Justice Stewart again wrote the plurality opinion with
Justices Powell and Stevens joining. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the judgment of both cases, adhering to their conclusion in Furman that the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented in both cases. Justice Blackmun also dissented, citing
his dissenting opinion in Furman.
133
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 301; S Roberts, 428 U.S. at 332-33. "The history of mandatory
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constitutionally tolerable response to Furman's rejection of unbridled
jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences."' 134 Justice Stewart argued that instead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a
mandatory sentencing scheme results in "blind infliction of the penalty
of death."1 35 He concluded that a mandatory death sentence is inconsistent with "the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment" because it does not permit individual consideration of the
circumstances of a crime or the character of the defendant.136
The Court considered the issue of mandatory death sentences a second time in Roberts v.Louisiana (H.Roberts)137 in 1977. Woodson and S
Roberts had failed to establish a constitutional rule prohibiting all
mandatory death sentences because Justices Brennan and Marshall filed
separate concurring opinions in which they concluded that capital punishment is inherently cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional
in every case. 138 In H. Roberts, the petitioner challenged a law requiring
capital punishment for the murder of a police officer engaged in the
performance of his lawful duties.139 In this decision, Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined the three members of the Court who had formed
the plurality in Woodson and S Roberts.140 In a per curiam opinion, the
five-member majority found the earlier S. Roberts case to be controlling:
As we emphasized repeatedly in [S.] Roberts and its companion
cases decided last Term, it is essential that the capital-sentencing decision allow for consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances
may be relevant to either the particular offender or the particular offense. Because the Louisiana statute does not allow for consideration
of particularized mitigating factors, it is unconstitutional. 14
The decisions in Woodson and both Roberts cases made clear that states
with mandatory capital punishment schemes would have to amend their
death penalty statutes to provide for a system of guided discretion in
death penalty statutes in the United States . . . reveals that the practice of sentencing to
death all persons convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and
unworkably rigid." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93.
134
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
135
Id. at 304.
136 Id In S.Roberts, Justice Stewart wrote that "[t]he constitutional vice of mandatory
death sentence statutes [is their] lack of focus on the circumstances of the particular offense
and the character and propensities of the offender." S. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 333.
137
431 U.S. 633 (1977).
138
Justices Brennan and Marshall first expressed this view in their respective concurring
opinions in Furman. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
139 The statute defined first degree murder in part as "[w]hen the offender has a specific
intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon, a fireman or a police officer who was
engaged in the performance of his lawful duties." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(2) (West
1974).
140 The other members of this majority included Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens.
141 H Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637 (per curiam) (footnotes omitted).
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capital sentencing proceedings. 142
D.

A Constitutional Requirement of Guided Discretion

Following its inconclusive decision in Furman v. Georgia,143 the
Supreme Court could have pursued a variety of courses in subsequent
capital punishment cases without undermining the Furman principle
that affording absolute sentencing discretion to the sentencing authority
in capital cases offends the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 144 The
five cases 145 announced on July 2, 1976, revealed the Court's postFurman approach in capital sentencing matters. In those decisions, the
Court held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments permit the
death penalty to be imposed only under a system of guided discretion,
which neither grants the sentencing authority absolute discretion nor
prohibits it from exercising any discretion in determining the sentence. 146 Although the Court did not explain how much sentencing disSee 1979 STATISTICS, supra note 100, at 2.
143 See supra notes 72, 99 and accompanying text.
144 The Court could have abolished capital punishment in the United States by concluding that although the Furman Court did not decide the ultimate issue of the death penalty's
constitutionality, see supra note 115, execution is in fact inherently a cruel and unusual punishment. Some commentators thought that Furman had signaled an end to capital punishment
in the United States. See Gardner, CapitalPunishment: The Philosophers andthe Court, 29 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1978); Thomas, Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Death Penalty." The
Relevance of Informed Public Opinion, 30 VAND. L. REv. 1005, 1005-06 (1977). For a post-Furman,
pre-Gregg discussion and argument that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual, see
Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 355 (1973).
A second conclusion the Court could have reached after Furman is that discretionary
death sentences are inherently cruel and unusual, but that mandatory sentencing schemes are
constitutional because they eliminate any possibility of the arbitrariness and caprice permitted by pre-Furman sentencing procedures. Third, the Court could have decided that both
mandatory death sentences and guided discretion sentencing procedures are constitutionally
permissible because neither method leaves the sentencing decision to the absolute discretion
of a judge or jury.
145 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion).
146 "After these five cases," wrote one commentator, "both poles on the jury discretion
continuum resulted in unconstitutional sentences. 'Unfettered' discretion was unconstitutional, while no discretion-mandatory sentence of death legislatively prescribed for certain
crimes-was also unconstitutional." Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respectfor Persons: Super Due
ProcessforDeath, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1149 (1980) (footnotes omitted). Although the 1976
cases are not inconsistent with the judgment in Furman, the Court's attitude toward capital
punishment seemed to change in the years between Furman and Gregg. In Furman, a majority
of the Court was willing to go beyond the ordinary bounds of judicial restraint, and effectively declare that the legislatures of 39 states had enacted penalty statutes that were cruel
and unusual in their operation. In Gregg, however, "[c]onsiderations of federalism, as well as
respect for the ability of the. . . legislature[s]," was the predominant theme. Gregg, 428 U.S.
at 186 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying note 115. This change of
attitude supports the view of some commentators that "[t]he retreat from Furman began with
the 1976 death cases." Gillers, supra note 5, at 99. While some commentators have tried to
explain the result in Furman by the Court's recognition that the lives of 600 condemned per142
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cretion is permitted or required in capital cases, the Georgia, Florida,
and Texas statutes upheld in Gregg, Proftt, and Jurek14 7 finally provided
state legislatures with three models of a valid death penalty law. 148 Less
than seven months after the Court cleared the way for executions to
resume, a convicted murderer in Utah became the first person to be put
49
to death in the United States in over ten years. 1
E. Allowing Increased Discretion as to Mitigating Circumstances
In 1978 the Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio'50 began to define the
degree of capital sentencing discretion allowable under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. The Court's decision in Lockett was based on
the specific concern it had expressed in H Roberts that a capital sentencing authority should not be precluded from considering any mitigating
sons hinged on the resolution of the eighth amendment issue, see supra note 97, the result in
Gregg is best explained by the Court's awareness that both state legislators and the general
public felt that execution was an acceptable criminal punishment. See supra notes 8 & 115.
This rationale for upholding the death penalty is ironically consistent with Justice Marshall's
observation in Furman:
Perhaps the most important principle in analyzing "cruel and unusual" punishment questions is one that is reiterated again and again in the prior opinions of the Court: ie., the cruel and unusual language "must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (holding that penalty of expatriation for wartime desertion was cruel and unusual
punishment)). In concluding that capital punishment violates the eighth amendment, however, Justice Marshall reasoned in Furman that the utility of a public opinion poll "cannot be
very great" because "American citizens know almost nothing about capital punishment," and
if they did, "the great mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of [available empirical
evidence] that the death penalty is immoral and therefore unconstitutional." Furman, 408
U.S. at 361-63; see supra note 78.
147 As one commentator put it:
The Court, in Gregg and its companion cases, did not address in any systematic way what principles would govern drawing the line, or delineate the allowable space on the continuum between the amount of sentencing discretion
requiredin order to save execution from being unconstitutionally cruel and the
amount of sentencing discretion which itself renders execution unconstitutionally cruel.
Radin, supra note 146, at 1149 (emphasis in original).
148
Two weeks after the decisions in Gregg, Proffitt, and jurek were announced, the Executive Committee of the Southern Legislative Conference of the Council of State Governments
"identified the death penalty topic as a priority issue for study and asked that a paper be
prepared on state legislation which would meet the Supreme Court's new standards." H.
SCHWAB, LEGISLATING A DEATH PENALTY at v (Jan. 1977). For a concise analysis of the
Court's decisions in Gregg, Profft, andJurekfrom a legislative planning perspective, see generally id.; see alsdStotzky, CapitalPunishment, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 841 (1977) (discussing implications of Gregg, Proftt, and Jurek for Florida death penalty legislation).
149
Gary Gilmore, who had publicly urged state authorities to carry out his death sentence, was executed by a firing squad on January 17, 1977. For an outline of some of the
events surrounding Gilmore's execution, see Stotzky, supra note 148, at 35 n.l.
150
438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
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circumstances.1 51 The statute in Lockett' 52 required the sentencing judge
to impose the death sentence for aggravated murder 153 unless at least
one of only three specific statutory mitigating circumstances was established by a preponderance of the evidence. 154 This formulation foreclosed consideration of other mitigating factors. The petitioner in
Lockett had participated in an armed robbery in which her co-participant accidentally shot a store owner to death while the petitioner waited
in a getaway car.' 5 5 The petitioner argued that her capital sentence was
unconstitutional because the statute did not permit the sentencing authority to consider her "character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime" as
mitigating factors. 15 6 In a plurality opinion, 5 7 Chief Justice Burger
concluded that the Ohio law failed to "permit the type of individualized
consideration of mitigating factors we now hold to be required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital cases."' 58 The Chief
Justice went on to state that "[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a
death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors."' I59 Although this broad language appeared in a plurality opinion, state legislatures responded to it in 1978 and 1979 by
151 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
152 OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Page 1975) (amended version at OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Page 1982)).
153 The statute required proof of at least one of seven aggravating circumstances to impose a death sentence. The statutory aggravating circumstances were: (1) assassination of an
elected official or a candidate for public office; (2) murder for hire; (3) murder committed to
effectuate an escape from criminal prosecution or incarceration; (4) murder by a prisoner; (5)
a prior murder conviction or multiple killings (or multiple attempted killings) in the same
case; (6) the victim was a law enforcement officer; or (7) the murder was committed in the
course of a kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
Id.; see Lockett, 438 U.S. at 611-12.
154 The statutory mitigating circumstances defined by the Ohio statute challenged in
Lockeit were: (1) the victim induced or facilitated the offense; (2) the defendant acted under
duress, coercion, or strong provocation; or (3) the defendant's conduct resulted primarily from
the defendant's psychosis or mental deficiency. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page
1975) (amended version at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page 1982)); see Lockett, 438
U.S. at 612.
155 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 590.
156
157

Id. at 597.

Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens joined Parts I

and II of the Chief Justice's opinion. Only Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens joined Part
III of his opinion, which announced the judgment of the Court. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 597
(plurality opinion). Justices Blackmun, id. at 613, Marshall, id. at 619, and White, id. at 621,
concurred in the judgment.
158 Id. at 606 (plurality opinion).
159
Id. at 608. Justice Blackmun would have limited the ruling to a constitutional requirement that a lack of specific intent to kill and a limited role in the commission of the
offense may not be excluded from consideration as mitigating factors. Id. at 615-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice White concurred in the judgment on the narrow ground that it is cruel and unusual to impose the death penalty where the defendant did
not specifically intend to cause the death of the victim. Id at 624-25 (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
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rewriting laws limiting the mitigating circumstances a sentencing authority could consider in capital cases to allow consideration of "every
160
possible mitigating factor."
In Eddz'igs v. Oklahoma'6 ' a majority of the Court confirmed that the

Constitution requires that states allow the sentencing authority in capital cases to consider any mitigating factor offered by the defense. 16 2 Eddings, then sixteen years old, shot and killed a police officer who had
stopped his car because of a traffic violation. 163 The trial court found
Eddings guilty of first degree murder upon his plea of nolo contendere. 164 After a separate sentencing proceeding, 65 the trial judge
concluded that the state had proved three statutory aggravating circumstances: first, that the murder was especially "heinous, atrocious, and
cruel;" second, that the crime was committed in order to avoid a lawful
166
arrest; and third, that Eddings was a continuing threat to society.
The judge also found that the defendant's youth was a mitigating circumstance, but he refused as a matter of law to consider substantial
mitigating evidence of the defendant's turbulent family history 67 and
160

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, supra note 3, at 2-3.

161 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
162 Id at 113-17.
163 Id at 105-06. Eddings and several friends were attempting to run away from their
homes when a police officer pulled them over after observing a momentary loss of control by
the driver of their car. As the police officer approached the car, Eddings shot and killed him.
Id
164 Id at 106. The trial court permitted the state to try Eddings as an adult rather than
as a juvenile because the trial judge found that Eddings was not amenable to rehabilitation.
Id. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling and the
Supreme Court denied Eddings's certiorari petition on this issue. In re M.E., 584 P.2d 1340
(Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 921 (1978).
165 The Oklahoma death penalty statute required a separate sentencing proceeding for
convicted capital offenders in which the prosecution could attempt to prove one or more of
seven possible aggravating circumstances, see infta note 166, and the defense could present
"evidence. . .as to any mitigating circumstances." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 106 (emphasis added by
Court).
166 455 U.S. at 108 n.3. At the time of Eddings's trial, the Oklahoma death penalty
statute recognized seven aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony; (2) the defendant knowingly caused a risk of death to many persons;
(3) the defendant was employed, or employed another, to commit the murder; (4) the murder
was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (5) the murder was committed in order to avoid
arrest, (6) the defendant was serving a prison sentence for a felony conviction at the time of
the murder; (7) it is probable that the defendant would commit future violent crimes and
would thus constitute a continuing threat to society. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.12(l)-(7) (West 1980) (amended version at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(1)-(8)
(West 1983)).
After Eddings's trial, the Oklahoma legislature added an eighth statutory aggravating
circumstance: "The victim of the murder was a peace officer. . . or [prison] guard. . .,and
such person was killed while in performance of official duty." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.12(8) (West 1983).
167 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 109. Eddings presented substantial evidence of his unhappy upbringing. Eddings's parents were divorced when he was five years old, and he lived with his
mother for nine years. During this time, Eddings's mother may have been a prostitute and an
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his emotional disturbance.' 68 The judge concluded that the three aggravating circumstances outweighed the single mitigating factor of
youth and sentenced Eddings to death. 169 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the sentence, concluding that "the petitioner's family history is useful in explaining why he behaved the way he
70
did, but it does not excuse his behavior."'
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision. The majority adopted the position advocated by Chief Justice Burger in his plurality opinion in Lockelt, and held that the state court must "consider all
relevant mitigating evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the
aggravating circumstances."'17 Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
quoted from the Chief Justice's opinion in Lockett
"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that the sentencer.
not be precluded from considering, as a miligatingfactor,any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of
the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis
172
for a sentence less than death."'
The Eddings Court relied further on Lockett, stating that "the rule"'

73

of

alcoholic. When she could no longer control him, Eddings's mother sent him to live with his
father who was physically abusive toward the youth. Id. at 107.
168 A state psychologist diagnosed Eddings as having a sociopathic or antisocial personality. Id. A psychiatrist testified at the sentencing hearing that Eddings did not appreciate the
consequences of his actions. Id. at 108.
169 After concluding that Eddings's youth did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the trial judge stated that in following the law he could not consider Eddings's violent
background. Id. at 109.
170
Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980). The Court of Criminal Appeals made three determinations as required by the Oklahoma death penalty statute.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West 1983). First, the court found that the death sentence was not imposed "'under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor.'" 616 P.2d at 1170 (quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West 1983)). Second, the court determined that "the evidence does support the judge's finding of statutory
aggravating circumstances." Id. Third, the court found that the death sentence was not "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime
and the defendant." Id. The court also affirmed the trial judge's refusal to consider mitigating circumstances other than Eddings's youth. Id. at 1170.
In his dissent in Eddings, Chief Justice Burger argued that the record did not clearly
indicate that the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeals excluded consideration of the
mitigating evidence other than youth. The ChiefJustice called the judge's statement "at best
ambiguous." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He commented that "there is
no reason to read [the Court of Criminal Appeals'] statements as reflecting anything more
than a conclusion that Eddings' background was not a sufficiently mitigating factor to tip the
scales, given the aggravating circumstances." Id.at 125. For a brief summary of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision in Eddings, see Recent Development, Criminal Law: Oklahoma's
Death Penalty Statutes Reviewed, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 448 (1980).
17'
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117.
172 Id.at 110 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
The Ohio statute held invalid in Lockett limited the mitigating circumstances which the sentencer could consider. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
173
In Lockett, only three other Justices joined the portion of the Chief Justice's opinion

1160

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1129

the earlier decision "recognizes that a consistency produced by ignoring
individual differences is a false consistency."' 74 In applying the Lockett
rule to Eddings, the Court asserted: "Just as the State may not by statute
preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither
may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter oflaw, any relevant mitigating evidence."' 75 The Eddings Court concluded that a youth's background and mental development should be considered, in addition to
176
his chronological age, in determining the appropriate sentence.
Lockett and Eddngs made clear that any mitigating factor offered
into evidence by a capital offender must be considered by the sentencing
authority. 177 Allowing the sentencing authority to consider any mitigating factor broadens its discretion to make decisions without guidance as
to which factors constitute rational grounds for punishment. This increased discretion inherent in the Lockett-Eddings rule creates a tension
with the Court's position in Furman. 78 In Furman, a majority of the
Court concluded that overbroad sentencing discretion is cruel and unu179
sual to those "random few" on whom the death penalty is inflicted.
By allowing the sentencing authority to rely on any factor to mitigate
the sentence, the Lockett-Eddings rule opens the door to arbitrariness and
caprice in withholding the death penalty. For example, an impermissible consideration such as race' 8° may influence a sentencing authority's
decisions such that the death penalty is inflicted upon one defendant of
a disfavored race but not on a similarly situated defendant of a favored
race. Yet the sentencing authority might be able to disguise its true
enunciating the rule that the sentencing authority must consider all mitigating circumstances.
See supra note 157.
174 Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112.
175 Id. at 113-14 (emphasis in original).
176 Id. at 116. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger argued that neither state court clearly
excluded consideration of mitigating circumstances other than Eddings's youth. See supra
note 170. Consequently, he believed that the lower courts had not violated the Lockett rule.
Eddings,455 U.S. at 126 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The ChiefJustice suggested that the Court
should have decided the case solely on the grounds for which it had granted certiorari: to
determine whether the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit the imposition of the
death penalty on a 16 year old person. Id. at 120, 128. Instead, the majority's holding simply
required sentencing authorities to consider youth as one mitigating factor and failed to provide a "blanket exemption" for juveniles. See Note, Eddings v. Oklahoma: No Blanket Exemption Under the Eighth AmendmentforJuveniles on Death Row, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 785, 804-08 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Note, No Blanket Exemption]; Note, Juvenile Oenders and the Electric ChairCruel and UnusualPunishment or Firm Disciplinefor the Hopelessly Delinquent? 35 U. FLA. L. REv.
344, 364-66 (1983).
177 See Note, No Blanket Exemption, supranote 176, at 806. For an analysis of the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Eddings on Texas capital sentencing procedures, see Benson,
Texas CapitalSentencing Procedures after Eddings: Some Questions Regarding ConstitutionalValidity,
23 S. TEx. L.J. 315, 323-31 (1982).
178 See infia note 188.
179 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
180 Studies indicate that racial discrimination in various forms still exists in the imposition of the death penalty. See supra note 81.
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racial motivations by pointing to some mitigating factor offered by the
defendant of the favored race. Such a result clearly does not meet the
standard of fairness and consistency in capital sentencing developed in
Furman and its progeny. 8 1
The Lockett-Eddings rule, however, reflects the Court's conclusion
that the unique severity and finality of the death penaltyI8 2 require that
a capital defendant be given every opportunity to avoid that sentence,
even though the possibility of abuses of sentencing discretion is thereby
increased. 183 Viewed in this way, the Lockett-Eddings rule can be reconciled with Furman and its progeny by distinguishing between the sentencing authority's "decision to impose a death sentence and the
[sentencing authority's] decision to afford mercy."' 184 The likelihood

that a sentencing authority's decision to spare a defendant's life may be
based on an impermissible reason disguised as a mitigating factor can be

reduced by requiring nonexclusive lists of statutory mitigating circumstances. 185 A nonexclusive list of mitigating circumstances would focus

the sentencing authority's attention on certain relevant factors to be
considered in determining the appropriate sentence without limiting its
181
Other commentators have argued that Locketfs expansion of sentencing discretion increases the possibility of arbitrariness or caprice in capital sentencing decisions. See Radin,
supra note 146, at 1153 ("To understand the significance of this decision [in Lockett] for the
dilemma of discretion, recall that the level of individualization and the level of consistency
must vary inversely. By requiring more individualization in capital murder cases after Locket, the Court has necessarily increased the area of possible arbitrariness"). But see Gillers,
supra note 5, at 30 (arguing that because mitigating factors represent rational grounds on
which to determine the appropriate punishment, it cannot be arbitrary to show mercy towards defendants who present mitigating evidence).
182 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 393-402.
183 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) ("difference between death and other

penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed"). For a
discussion of the principle that capital punishment is constitutionally different from other
lawful punishments, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
184 Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigationof the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital
Defendant's Right to Considerationof Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 317, 375 (1981).
185 The Lockett-Eddngs rule prohibits exclusive statutory lists of mitigating factors because
the rule requires sentencing authorities to consider all proffered mitigating circumstances.
After the plurality opinion in Lockett, states with exclusive lists of statutory circumstances
amended their death penalty laws to permit the sentencing authority to consider any mitigating factor. See supra note 160. Today many capital punishment laws provide no guidance at
all regarding mitigating factors. See injfa notes 616-25 and accompanying text. A constitutional requirement of nonexclusive lists could harmonize the Lockett-Eddings rule with the
requirement of Furmanand its progeny that capital sentencing discretion be suitably directed
and guided.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that raised the issues of whether
the sentencer must be directed to weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances and whether a statute that lists several aggravating circumstances but provides no
specific mitigating circumstances is unconstitutional. Conner v. Georgia, 251 Ga. 113, 303
S.E.2d 266, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 203 (1983). The petitioner, however, did not raise the issue
of whether some guidance as to mitigating factors is required until the petition for certiorari.
Brief for Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Certiorari at 16-17, Conners v. Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 203.
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consideration of other factors. Comparative proportionality review in
state courts also can serve as a check against unfair and inconsistent
capital sentencing decisions. 186 Although most states provide for proportionality review, the Supreme Court has held that it is not constitu187
tionally required.
The results in Eddings and Lockett are probably correct in light of
the principle that the death penalty is constitutionally different from
other sentences. Capital defendants should not be foreclosed from raising any factor or circumstance that may mitigate their sentence. The
disturbing aspect of the Lockett-Eddings rule is, however, that it reflects
the present Court's general willingness to allow increased discretion in
capital sentencing decisions. 188 As the number of factors that the sentencing authority may consider increases, guided discretion becomes a

more difficult goal to attain.

II
ABANDONING THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS AND
CONSISTENCY IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

In 1972, Furman v. Georgia'89 established that the sentencing authority in capital cases could not be granted unbridled discretion in imposing the death sentence. In attempting to clarify the Furman mandate,
the plurality in Gregg v. Georgia'9° acknowledged the unique gravity of
sentencing deliberations involving the death penalty and the consequent
need to require that sentencing discretion in such cases "be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action."'u 9 State legislatures may direct and limit sentencing
discretion by requiring the sentencing authority to consider certain statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to the nature
of the crime and the character of the defendant. Under such a scheme,
a death sentence can be imposed only if the sentencing authority finds at
92
least one of the statutorily prescribed aggravating circumstances.
186 Proportionality review considers whether the punishment in a particular case is excessive compared to sentences given other offenders who committed similar crimes in that state.
See infira note 374 and accompanying text.

187
188

See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984).
According to a 1983 cover story in Time magazine:
Last January in Eddngs vs. Oklahoma,. . . the Justices ruled that the judge or
jury must consider any mitigating factor the convict claims. Yet to many
observers, that sounds like a return toward uncontrollable discretion, the very

flaw the court prohibited in 1972. Says former [Legal Defense Fund] Lawyer
David Kendall: "We're right back to Furman."
An Eye for an Eye, TIME, Jan. 24, 1983, at 7.

189
190

408 U.S. 238 (1972); see supra notes 70-97 and accompanying text.
428 U.S. 153 (1976); see supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.

191
192

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., supra note 109 (explaining Georgia's capital punishment statute).
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In Lockett v. Ohio'93 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,194 the Supreme Court
endorsed greater sentencing discretion than it had previously appeared
willing to accept.1 95 In both cases, the Court permitted increased discretion only in the sentencing authority's consideration of mitigating circumstances. Locket and Eddings established the principle that a capital
defendant is entitled to submit any evidence that might tend to mitigate
his sentence. Three cases decided in 1983,196 however, broaden sentencing discretion in the consideration of aggravating circumstances. Unlike
Lockett and Eddings, these decisions afford the sentencer greater flexibility
in imposing, rather than withholding, the penalty of death.
In Zant v. Sephens,19 7 the Court upheld a death sentence imposed by
a jury that had considered a constitutionally invalid aggravating circumstance in reaching its decision. 198 In so doing, the Zant Court endorsed the concept of threshold guidance. Once the sentencing
authority has found one statutory aggravating circumstance, threshold
guidance allows the sentencer virtually unbridled discretion to consider
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances.1 99 In a holding similar to that
200
in Zant, the Court in Barclay v. Florida
sustained a death sentence even
though the sentencing judge had relied on an invalid aggravating circumstance. 20 1 Barclay also resolved an issue the Court expressly left open
in Zant:20 2 consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance, along
with valid aggravating circumstances, does not render the sentence invalid even where the capital sentencing statute explicitly calls for a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. 20 3 In addition, the Barclay
Court approved the trial judge's reliance on his own personal experiences in determining the appropriate punishment. 20 4 Finally, in Callfornia v. Ramos,20 5 the Court upheld a death sentence despite a sentencing
instruction by the trial court that introduced an extraneous circumstance-the possible commutation of a life sentence-for jury
consideration.
Zant's endorsement of threshold guidance, and the Court's willingness in Zant and Barclay to allow consideration of invalid aggravating
193 438 U.S. 586 (1978); see supra notes 150-88 and accompanying text.
194 455 U.S. 104 (1982); see supra notes 161-88 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
196 Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983);
California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
197
103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983); see infra notes 208-78 and accompanying text.
198
103 S. Ct. at 2750.
199 Id at 2742-44; see infia notes 218-33 and accompanying text.
200
103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); see infia notes 279-334 and accompanying text.
201
103 S. Ct. at 3428.
202 See Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2750.
203 See Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3426.
204 See id. at 3423-24.
205
103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983); see infra notes 335-63 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, indicate the Court's increased tolerance of discretion in
capital sentencing decisions. In Zant and Barclay, the Court upheld
death sentences largely because the sentencing authority had found at
least one valid aggravating circumstance in addition to an improper aggravating factor. By deferring to the sentencing authority's discretion in
these cases, however, the Court disregarded the possibility that the sentencing authority might have rejected the death penalty but for its consideration of one or more improper aggravating factors.
The Court's willingness to allow consideration of invalid aggravating circumstances, and its approval in Ramos of instructions incorporating extraneous factors conflicts with the Court's insistence in Gregg that
sentencing discretion be suitably directed and limited. 206 Thus, these
three cases constitute a substantial retreat from the standard of fairness
20 7
and consistency established in Furman and Gregg.
A.

Zant v. Stephens

In Zant, the Court affirmed a death sentence although one of three
aggravating circumstances relied on by the sentencing authority was
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court.
The Zant decision allows the sentencing authority to exercise unfettered
discretion in capital cases once it has found at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. This result indicates that a statutory capital punishment scheme providing minimal control over sentencing discretion
will survive constitutional scrutiny.
In Zant, a jury convicted Alpha Stephens of first degree murder
committed during the course of a house burglary. 20° In a separate sentencing proceeding, 20 9 the jury found three statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Stephens to death. 210 While Stephens's
appeal was pending, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Arnold v.
Slate21 l that one of the aggravating circumstances relied on by the jury
See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70-119 and accompanying text.
208 Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2736. Prior to the murder, Stephens was serving time for several
burglary convictions and awaiting trial for a previous escape. Stephens again escaped from
prison and, during the following two days, committed a series of crimes. Roy Asbell interrupted Stephens while he was burglarizing the home of Asbell's son. Stephens and his accomplice beat and robbed Asbell, drove him away from the home, and killed him. Id.
209 For a description of the sentencing process in Georgia, see supra note 109.
210
103 S. Ct. at 2737-38. Although the parties agreed that the jury found three aggravating circumstances, the Court noted that the jury's findings could be viewed as encompassing two aggravating circumstances, the first of which rested on two grounds. Id. The jury
found that: (1) "[t]he offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of
conviction for a capital felony," id. at 2737 n.3; (2) "[t]he offense of Murder was committed
by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," id.; and
(3) "[t]he offense of Murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful
custody of a peace officer and place of lawful confinement," id.
211
236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976).
206
207
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that sentenced Stephens-the defendant's "substantial history of serious
213
assaultive criminal convictions ' 21 2 -was unconstitutionally vague.
The Arnold decision thus left the validity of Stephens's death sentence in question. On direct appeal, however, the Georgia Supreme
Court found that the existence of the two additional valid aggravating
circumstances in Stephens's case adequately supported the jury's imposition of the death sentence. 2 14 After a state and federal district court had
rejected Stephens's application for a writ of habeas corpus,

2 15

the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that a
writ should be issued and set aside Stephens's death sentence. 21 6 The
212

213

Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2737 n.3.
Arnold, 236 Ga. at 539-42, 224 S.E.2d at 391-92. In Arnold, the defendant was con-

victed for committing a murder during a liquor store robbery. Id. at 534-35, 224 S.E.2d at
388. The jury found as the single aggravating circumstance that the defendant had "a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions." Id at 540, 224 S.E.2d at 391. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the statutory language, "substantial history," as applied in
death penalty cases, provided an inadequate guideline for triers of fact. According to the
Court, a jury's determination of "[w]hether the defendant's [two prior convictions met] this
legislative criterion [would be] highly subjective." Id at 541-42, 224 S.E.2d at 391-92. The
court therefore held that this aggravating circumstance, as defined in the Georgia statute, was
unconstitutional and set aside the death sentence. Id at 542, 224 S.E.2d at 392.
214
Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 261-62, 227 S.E.2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986
(1976). The Georgia Supreme Court distinguished Stephens from Arnold "In Arnold, [the
invalid aggravating circumstance] was the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury.
In this case, the evidence supports the jury's findings of the other statutory aggravating circumstances, and consequently the sentence is not impaired." Slephens, 237 Ga. at 261-62, 227
S.E.2d at 263.
215
First, Stephens unsuccessfully petitioned for state habeas corpus relief. See Stephens v.
Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). Stephens then applied
for a federal writ of habeas corpus. The federal district court denied Stephens's petition, but
the Fifth Circuit reversed. See Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S.Ct.
2733 (1983).
216
In striking Stephens's death sentence, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's
decision in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d at 406.
Stromberg involved a conviction for displaying a red flag in violation of a California statute.
283 U.S. at 360-61. Under the statute, such a display was prohibited if motivated by any one
of three enumerated purposes. Id. at 361. The Court held that the statutory proscription of
one of the listed purposes was unconstitutional. See id at 368-70. Moreover, given the jury's
general verdict, "it [was] impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction
was obtained." Id. at 368. Thus, "it [could] not be determined upon [the] record that the
appellant was not convicted under [the invalid] clause [of the statute]." Id. The appellant's
conviction was therefore reversed. See id. at 370.
The Fifth Circuit in Zant similarly found that the invalid aggravating circumstance
might have been operative in the jury's imposition of the death sentence:
It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine satisfactorily that the
verdict in this case was not decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance. The jury had the authority to return a life
sentence even if it found statutory aggravating circumstances. It is possible
that even if the jurors believed that the other aggravating circumstances were
established, they would not have recommended the death penalty but for the
decision that the offense was committed by one having a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions, an invalid ground.
631 F.2d at 406 (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit therefore reversed the district court's
denial of habeas corpus relief. See id at 407.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari.2 1 7
Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme Court certified the following question2 1 8 to the Georgia Supreme Court: "What
• . .premises of state law . . .support the conclusion that the death
sentence in [Zant was] not impaired by the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury?" 2 19 In response, the
Georgia high court indicated that it based its decision to affirm Stephens's death sentence in part on the role of statutory aggravating circumstances in the state's capital punishment scheme. 220 According to
the Georgia court, aggravating circumstances merely serve to establish
the class of defendants on which the death penalty may be legitimately
imposed; requiring a jury to find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance before imposing a death sentence serves to establish the eligible class. 22 1 After the death penalty becomes an option, however, "all
the facts and circumstances of the case determine . . . whether or not
. . .the death penalty is imposed. '222 In Zant, the Georgia court found
that the record adequately supported imposition of the death penalty
223
without reference to the invalid aggravating circumstances.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Stephens's death sentence, 224 rejecting Stephens's argument that a capital sentencing
scheme "that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion" 225 once
it finds at least one statutory aggravating circumstance violates the
Furman mandate. "[T]hat argument could not be accepted," the Court
217 The Court granted a petition for certiorari to Walter Zant, the warden of the prison
where Stephens was held. See Zant v. Stephens, 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
218 The Supreme Court certified a question pursuant to Georgia's statutory certification
procedure. See GA. CODE § 15-2-9 (1982).
219 Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1982).
220 Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99-101, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1982). The Georgia Supreme
Court also responded that the death sentence should stand because Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931), on which the Fifth Circuit relied in ruling favorably on Stephens's petition, seesupra note 216, involved a general verdict and was thus not controlling. See 250 Ga. at
98, 297 S.E.2d at 2. In Stromberg, the jury could have relied entirely on the aggravating
circumstance subsequently found invalid, id., but the Zantjury "considered and found each
[aggravating circumstance] on its own merits." Id. at 99, 297 S.E.2d at 3.
221 250 Ga. at 99-100, 297 S.E.2d at 3-4.
222 Id. at 100, 297 S.E.2d at 4.
223

Id.

224 Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which Chief Justice Burger, and Justices O'Connor, Powell, and Blackmun joined.
Justice White filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice
Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Brennan joined.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Zant, Georgia rescheduled Stephens's execution
date for December 14, 1983. On December 13, 1983, the Supreme Court stayed Stephens's
execution pending the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in Spencerv. Zant. Stephens filed a second peition for certiorari on May 11, 1984. 53 U.S.L.W.
3010 (1984).
225
Id. at 2742.
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reasoned, "without overruling our specific holding in Gregg.' 226 In
Gregg, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's death penalty
statute. 227 The statute approved in Gregg, however, does not explicitly
authorize the threshold guidance model of capital sentencing discussed
by the Georgia Supreme Court in its response to the certified question. 228 Nevertheless, the Zant Court found that Gregg approved the
2 29
threshold model when it approved the Georgia statute.
Although the Zant Court felt that statutory aggravating circumstances are essential to "circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty," 230 it nonetheless implied that a sentencing jury may exercise absolute discretion 23' once it finds one such circumstance. The
Court merely added the proviso that the sentencing decision must be
"an individualizeddetermination [based on] the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. '232 The Court thus approved a
statutory capital sentencing scheme in which "the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing
body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the
'233
death penalty.
The Court also addressed the possibility that the invalid aggravating circumstance might have influenced the jury's decision.2 34 The
226

Id

227 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
228 See GA. CODE § 17-10-30 (1982). Under Georgia law, the sentencing authority must
consider "any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized
by law and any of [Georgia's] statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported
by the evidence." Id. § 17-10-30(b). The Georgia statute requires a finding of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance to support a death sentence. Id.§ 17-10-30(c). However,
unlike the Georgia Supreme Court's threshold guidance theory, the Georgia sentencing statute does not differentiate between an eligibility stage, requiring a finding of one aggravating
circumstance, and a decision stage, at which the sentencing authority exercises "absolute discretion," Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 99, 297 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1982), in reaching a decision.
229 See 103 S. Ct. at 2742 n.13.
230 Id at 2743.
231 Id. at 2742 n.13.
232 Id. at 2744 (emphasis in original).
233 Id. at 2741.
234 Id at 2747-49. The Court addressed a third issue in Zant:whether the Fifth Circuit's
reliance on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), see supranote 216, was proper, thus
requiring an affirmance of the court of appeals's decision. According to the Court, Stromberg
established two rules, neither of which required a reversal in Zant. See 103 S. Ct. at 2744-46.
First, Stromberg requires "that a general verdict. . . be set aside if the jury was instructed that
it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of these grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground." Id.at 2745.
Because the jury in Zant "expressly found aggravating circumstances that were valid and
legally sufficient to support the death penalty," the Stromberg rule did not require that the
Court reverse Stephens's death sentence. Id.
Stromberg also requires the reversal of a general verdict on a single-count indictment if the
verdict rests on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground, "even if the defendant's
[constitutionally] unprotected conduct, considered separately, would support the verdict." Id.
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Court acknowledged that the trial judge's designation of the defendant's
criminal record as a valid statutory aggravating circumstance in his
charge to the jury "might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater
weight to [Stephens's] prior criminal record that it otherwise would
have given." 235 Ultimately, however, the Court agreed with the Georgia Supreme Court that the designation had "an inconsequential impact
on the jury's decision regarding the death penalty" because the trial
judge had instructed the jury to consider all mitigating and aggravating
2 36
circumstances in determining Stephens's sentence.
The Zant Court identified two factors critical to its holding, and
suggested that under different circumstances it might have set aside Stephens's death sentence. First, the Court noted that the evidence of a
prior crime was clearly admissible apart from its role as a statutory aggravating circumstance.2 37 Georgia's sentencing statute expressly authorized the judge or jury to consider evidence "including the record of
any prior criminal convictions. '238 The Court concluded that the admission of evidence of prior crimes during the sentencing proceeding did
not have the effect of authorizing the jury "to draw adverse inferences
from conduct that is constitutionally protected; ' 239 nor did the evidence
admitted involve "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process. ' 240 Had the invalid aggravatat 2746. This rule applies, however, "only in cases in which the State has based its prosecution, at least in part, on a charge that constitutionally protected activity is unlawful." Id. In
Zant, none of the aggravating circumstances considered by the jury involved constitutionally
protected conduct; therefore, the second requirement from Stromberg was inapplicable in Zant.
Id.
The Court's proper resolution of this issue does not overcome the infirmity of the Zant
result. In order to rule as it did, the Court also had to find the level of sentencing discretion
present in Zant consistent with Furman and its progeny. If the Court wrongly decided this
discretion issue, its reversal of the court of appeals was improper.
235
See id. at 2749.
236 Id.
237
Id. at 2747.
238 Id. (emphasis omitted).
239
Id.
240 Id.
The Georgia statute permits counsel to introduce a wide range of evidence in the sentencing proceeding. The statute allows the judge or jury to "hear additional evidence in
extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior
criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of
any prior conviction and pleas, provided that only such evidence in aggravation as the state
has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible." GA. CODE § 17-102(a) (1982). This mandate for the sentencing authority to consider a broad array of evidence
is consistent with the GreggCourt'sassertion that "it [is] desirable for the jury to have as much
information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision." Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The courts are split on whether the ordinary rules of evidence apply in sentencing hearings. For a summary of how the states handle this problem, see infra notes 648-61 and accompanying text.
The Court in Zant suggested that a death sentence that may have been based in part on
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ing circumstance consisted of evidence otherwise inadmissible, the jury's
consideration of the invalid circumstance would destroy the reliability
of the sentencing
procedure and presumably invalidate the death
24

sentence .

1

Second, the Court suggested that the result in Zant might differ if
the state statute required the sentencing authority to weigh all statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching its sentencing decision. 242 Georgia's sentencing statute places consideration of aggravating circumstances entirely within the sentencing authority's discretion,
and does not require "that the presence of more than one aggravating
circumstance should be given special weight. ' 243 If a sentencing scheme
required the sentencing authority to weigh all statutory factors, however, and the sentencing authority relied on both invalid and valid aggravating circumstances in reaching its decision, reviewing courts would
be unable to ascertain the weight actually given the invalid factor.
Thus, the subsequent invalidation of an aggravating circumstance in a
statute that requires the sentencing authority to weigh all aggravating
and mitigating circumstances might require reversal of a death sentence.
According to Justice Stevens's majority opinion, Gregg controlled
the decision in Zant because "the Court approved Georgia's capital seninadmissible evidence may be invalid. See 103 S. Ct. at 2747-48. Because the admissibility of
evidence may thus be a critical factor in cases like Zant, the issue of which rules of evidence
apply in sentencing hearings is important. For an argument that the ordinary rules of evidence should not apply to mitigating evidence, see Kaplan, Evidence in CapitalCases, 11 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 369 (1983).
241
103 S. Ct. at 2750.
242 Id. The Court expressly avoided a definitive ruling on the effect of post-sentencing
invalidation of a statutory aggravating circumstance in jurisdictions that require the weighing of all statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances:
[W]e note that in deciding this case we do not express any opinion concerning
the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is "invalid" under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is
specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to. impose the death penalty ...
[T]he Constitution does not require a State to adopt specific standards for
instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and Georgia has not adopted such a system.
Id. In Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983), however, the Court held that the invalidation of a statutory aggravating circumstance in a jurisdiction that requires the weighing of all
statutory factors would not nullify a death sentence. See infira notes 279-334 and accompanying text.
The Court's failure to specify a constitutionally mandated method for determining a
sentence indicates a willingness to tolerate increased sentencing discretion. One commentator
suggests that even though a single method of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances cannot be applied in all circumstances because of Locketts "individual determination"
requirement, the sentencing authority should be required to articulate the weighing method
used in each case. See Note, The BitterFruit ofMcGautha: Eddings v. Oklahoma and the Need
for Weighing Method Articulation in Capital Sentencing, 20 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 63, 97 (1982).
Given the result in Zant, the Court does not seem likely to impose such a requirement on
sentencing authorities.
243 Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2750.
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tencing statute [in Gregg] even though it clearly did not channel the
jury's discretion by . . .guid[ing its] consideration of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. ' 244 Justice Stevens's conclusion shows a lack
of understanding of the Court's decision in Gregg.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg began its review of
Georgia's sentencing scheme by clarifying the earlier decision in
Furman.245 "It is quite simply," Justice Stewart observed "a hallmark of
our legal system that juries be carefully and adequately guided in their
deliberations." 246 The Furman Court recognized that this principle is especially important in capital cases 24 7 because of the unique nature of the
death penalty.248 The Gregg plurality noted, however, that the concerns
expressed in Furman, that the penalty of death not be imposed as a result
of errors in the capital sentencing process, 249 "can be met by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. '250 Justice Stewart's opinion concluded that capital sentencing discretion "must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk" of capital sentencing errors. 25 1
Because the Georgia statute provided the sentencing authority with
a statutory list of aggravating circumstances for consideration in determining whether to impose or withhold the death sentence, the Gregg plurality felt that the Georgia framework "require[d] the jury to consider
the circumstances of the crime and the criminal before . . . recom-

mend[ing] sentence.1 252 "As a result," Justice Stewart stated, "while
some jury discretion still exists, 'the discretion to be exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards.' ",253 Therefore, the Gregg plurality upheld the Georgia sentencing scheme in part because it
concluded that the sentencing authority's exercise of discretion was "always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines. "254
Id.at 2742.
The Court's 1972 decision in Furman was decided by such a splintered majority, see
supra note 98 and accompanying text, that it caused a great deal of confusion as to the constitutionality of capital punishment and capital sentencing procedures. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text. The Court's 1976 decisions in Gregg, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976),Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976),
and Roberts v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 325 (1976), were the first Supreme Court
cases interpreting Furman. See supra notes 102-49 and accompanying text.
246
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 (plurality opinion).
247
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion).
248
See supra note 10; note 79 and accompanying text; inflra notes 393-99 and accompanying text.
249
For an explanation of capital sentencing "errors," see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
250
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
251
Id at 189.
252 Id.at 197.
253 Id at 197-98 (quoting Coley v. State, 231 Ga. 829, 834, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1974)).
254
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207 (plurality opinion). Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in
244
245
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The plurality in Gregg upheld the Georgia framework because it felt
that the Georgia statute "suitably directed and limited" capital sentencing discretion by guiding the jury's decision with objective standards. 25 5 The Zant Court nevertheless interpreted the result in Gregg as a
"specific holding" endorsing the threshold theory. 25 6 The Court in Zant
thus upheld a capital sentencing scheme in which "the finding of an
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentenc'25 7
ing body in the exercise of its discretion.
The Zant majority's conclusion, that by upholding Georgia's capital
punishment statute the Gregg Court upheld the threshold theory, is particularly perplexing given that the threshold concept is not mentioned in
the Georgia statute. 258 The threshold theory was unheard of until the
Georgia Supreme Court's response to a certified question from the
United States Supreme Court six years after Gregg was decided. 25 9 The
fact that the Supreme Court took the unusual step of certifying a question to the Georgia high court in Zant indicates the Court's confusion
260
over the operation of the statute as interpreted by the Georgia courts.
Notwithstanding its own initial confusion, the Court in Zant suggested
that the Gregg Court understood the threshold theory and endorsed its
26 1
use in upholding the Georgia statute.
The result in Zant is inconsistent not only with the plurality opinion
in Gregg,26 2 but also with the entire thrust of Furman and its progeny. "If
this Court's decisions concerning the death penalty establish anything,"
wrote Justice Marshall in dissent, "it is that a capital sentencing scheme
based on 'standardless jury discretion' violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ' 26 3 The Zant Court paid lip service to the "central
mandate" of Furman and Gregg, that "discretion must be suitably diZant elaborates on the way in which the Gregg Court interpreted the Georgia capital punishment statute. See Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2762 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
255
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
256
Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2742.
257
Id. at 2741.
258
See supra note 228.
259 See Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2757 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("this 'threshold' theory ... was
invented for the first time by the Georgia Supreme Court more than seven years [after Stephens was sentenced]"). Georgia's high court may have developed the "threshold" theory as
a means of distinguishing Zant from Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), a case the
Fifth Circuit relied on in setting aside Zant's death sentence. See supra note 216.
260 See 103 S.Ct. at 2762-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("this Court ... as recently as last
Term found it necessary to ask the Georgia Supreme Court to clarify what the instructions in
this case meant").
261
See 103 S.Ct. at 2742-43 (majority opinion).
262 In his dissenting opinion in Zant, Justice Marshall stated: "Today we learn for the
first time that the Court did not mean what it said in Gregg v. Georgia. We now learn that the
actual decision whether a defendant lives or dies may still be left to the unfettered discretion
of the jury." Id. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
263 Id. at 2757 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47 (plurality opinion)).
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rected and limited," 264 but refused to follow that standard.
According to the Zant Court's explanation of the threshold theory
applied in Georgia, 265 statutory aggravating circumstances merely narrow the class of convicted capital offenders who are eligible for the death
penalty by screening out those cases in which none of the ten specified
factors are present. 266 Whenever the sentencing authority finds at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance, "the 10 statutory factors . . .
drop out of the picture entirely and play no part in the jury's decision
whether to sentence the defendant to death. ' 267 The Zant Court concluded that under this scheme, the submission of an invalid aggravating
circumstance to the sentencing authority does not prejudice a defendant
made eligible for the death penalty by the finding of at least one valid
statutory aggravating circumstance because the statutory factors have
no bearing on the ultimate sentencing decision once the threshold has
been crossed.
Such a scheme poses difficulties because statutory aggravating circumstances, although originally designed to provide objective standards
to guide the sentencing authority in its ultimate decision, 2 68 do nothing
to direct or limit discretion once the capital defendant becomes eligible
for a death sentence. As Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissenting
opinion, "[o]nce [the threshold] finding [of one statutory aggravating
circumstance] is made, the jurors can be left completely at large, with
'269
nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices.
Thus, by embracing the threshold theory, the Zant decision allows
virtually the same unbridled sentencing discretion in capital cases that
the Court rejected in its landmark Furman decision. 2 70 The level of discretion permitted in Zant differs from the absolute discretion of preFurman statutes only in that sentencing bodies must make a threshold
finding before they can exercise their will. 27 1 As Justice Marshall

pointed out, the decision in Zant "makes an absolute mockery of this
'272
Court's precedents concerning capital sentencing procedures.
264
265

103 S. Ct. at 2741 (majority opinion).
Justice Marshall argued that the Georgia Supreme Court's response to the certified

question, in which it attempted to explain the role of statutory aggravating circumstances
under the state statute, was far from clear. See 103 S. Ct. at 2758 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

266

Id. at 2758.

267

Id.

268 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
269
103 S. Ct. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
270 The decision in Furman is discussed at notes 70-97 supra and accompanying text.
271 See 103 S. Ct. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The only difference between Georgia's pre-Furmancapital sentencing scheme and the 'threshold' theory that the Court embraces
today is that the unchecked discretion previously conferred in all cases of murder is now
conferred in cases of murder with one statutory aggravating circumstance.")
272 Id. The plurality's opinion in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), foreshadowed
the Court's recent willingness to accept increased sentencing discretion. In Godfrey, the de-
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Even assuming that the threshold theory is not inconsistent with
the principles of Furman and Gregg, the jury's erroneous consideration of
Stephens's prior criminal record as an aggravating circumstance may
have influenced its decision to impose death. Although evidence of Ste273
phens's prior criminal record was admissible at the sentencing stage,
the trial judge's use of an unconstitutionally vague standard-that Stephens had " 'a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions' "-improperly characterized Stephens's record as a statutory
fendant was sentenced to death for the shotgun killings of his wife and mother-in-law. See id.
at 424-26. The jury found as a statutory aggravating circumstance that the murders were
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman." Id. at 426. The plurality set aside
the death sentences because the statutory aggravating circumstance, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague and thus failed to preclude the "arbitrary and capricious" sentencing prohibited by Furman and Gregg. "There is nothing in these few words, standing alone, that
implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence.
A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman.'" Id. at 428-29.
Although the immediate result in Godfrey limits sentencing discretion, the plurality opinion, read as a whole, could allow a disturbing expansion of discretion. The Godfje plurality's
opinion is consistent with the Gregg plurality's conclusion that the statutory aggravating circumstance was not unconstitutional on its face because the statute's language could be narrowly construed by the Georgia Supreme Court. See id. at 423. Moreover, the Godjfey
plurality cited two decisions that demonstrated the ability and willingness of the Georgia
court to keep the statutory aggravating circumstance "within constitutional bounds." See id.
at 429-31.
The fact that the constitutionality of an aggravating circumstance can depend upon the
construction given it by a state supreme court clearly indicates the Court's willingness to
tolerate increased sentencing discretion. A jury in a sentencing proceeding can impose the
death sentence after receiving a broad instruction about an aggravating circumstance. If, on
review, a state's highest court determines that the facts of the case meet an acceptable, narrow
construction of the aggravating circumstance, the sentence may stand. Justice Marshall, in
his concurrence in Godfry, explained the limitless sentencing discretion that could result from
the plurality's analysis:
To give the jury an instruction in the form of the bare words of the statutewords that are hopelessly ambiguous and could be understood to apply to any
murder. . . -would effectively grant it unbridled discretion to impose the
death penalty. Such a defect could not be cured by the post hoc narrowing
construction of an appellate court. The reviewing court can determine only
whether a rational jury might have imposed the death penalty if it had been
properly instructed; it is impossible for it to say whether a particular jury
would have so exercised its discretion if it had known the law.
Id. at 437 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The narrowing function performed
by the state's highest court controls sentencing discretion only in future cases. To circumscribe sentencing authority discretion in compliance with the mandate of Furman and its progeny, a reviewing court must reverse a death sentence imposed prior to the pronouncement of
a narrowing construction.
Godfrey significantly augments the substantial sentencing discretion subsequently authorized in Zant. Zant permits a sentencing authority to impose the death penalty if at least one
valid aggravating circumstance is found. In light of the Court's prior decision in Godr, that
single aggravating circumstance may be stated in unconstitutionally broad language, provided the reviewing court subsequently determines that the facts of the case satisfy a sufficiently narrow construction of the aggravating circumstance.
273 See GA. CODE § 17-10-2(a), (c) (1982); Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2747-48.
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aggravating circumstance. 274 Indeed, the Zant Court recognized that the
"statutory" label "arguably might have caused the jury to give somewhat greater weight to respondent's prior criminal record than it otherwise would have given." 2 75 The Court's ultimate conclusion, that this
error did not amount to a constitutional defect, 276 dismisses too easily
the possibility that, but for the erroneous instruction, the jury would not
have imposed the death sentence. 277 By upholding Stephens's sentence,
the Zant Court compromised fairness and disregarded its own assertion
that "the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the re278
view of any colorable claim of error."
B.

Barclay v. Florida

Elwood Barclay, a member of a group called the Black Liberation
Army, was convicted of first degree murder by a Florida jury for the
racially motivated slaying of a white man. 279 In a separate proceeding,

the jury issued an advisory sentence recommending life imprison281
ment. 280 The trial judge disagreed and imposed the death sentence.

274 103 S. Ct. at 2747.
275 Id at 2749; see also id.at 2757 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("The fact that the instruction gave added weight to this no doubt played some role in the deliberations of some
jurors.").
276 Id at 2749 (majority opinion).
277 Although Georgia's death penalty statute does not require sentencing juries to accord
greater weight to statutory aggravating circumstances than to nonstatutory aggravating factors, 103 S. Ct. at 2739-40, the statute may suggest this by requiring the jury to find at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance as a prerequisite to imposing a death sentence. See
GA. CODE § 17-10-30 (1982). More importantly, the trial judge's sentencing instruction did
nothing to clarify this problem or indicate the method by which the jury was to apply the
statute. See 103 S. Ct. at 2737 (quoting the trial judge's sentencing instruction).
278 103 S. Ct. at 2747.
279 Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3420-21 (1983). On the evening ofJune 17, 1974,
Barclay and three other members of the Black Liberation Army "set out in a car armed with
a twenty two caliber pistol and a knife with the intent to kill. . . any white person that they
came upon under such advantageous circumstances that they could murder him, her or
them." Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978),
reaj'd,411 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), aJ'd, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983). After rejecting several possible victims because the circumstances were not opportune, Barclay and his companions
picked up a white hitchhiker to serve as their victim. They took the man to a garbage dump
where they repeatedly stabbed and shot him. After the killing, the group made tape recordings which they sent to the victim's mother and to radio and television stations. These recordings vividly described the murder and contained threats against the entire white community.
Id. at 1268-69.
280
103 S. Ct. at 3421. In most cases, the Florida death penalty statute requires that, after
a person is convicted of first degree murder, a separate sentencing hearing be held before the
convicting jury. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983). The jury renders an
advisory sentence, id.§ 921.141(2), that the judge may reject after making written findings of
fact concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances, id § 921.141(3). The Supreme
Court upheld the Florida death penalty statute in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See
supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
281 Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3421. Florida's use of advisory opinions by a jury that may be
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As required by Florida law, 282 the trial judge issued written find-

ings of fact concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 28 3 As
statutory aggravating circumstances, he found that Barclay "had knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons,. . . had committed
the murder while engaged in a kidnapping,. . . had endeavored to disrupt governmental functions and law enforcement, . . . and had been
284
especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel."
The judge found no statutory mitigating circumstances. 28 5 In his
written findings, the judge noted that Barclay had an extensive criminal
record and therefore could not benefit from the Florida sentencing statute's stipulation that a lack of criminal activity serves as a mitigating
circumstance. 286 Indeed, the judge found that Barclay's criminal record
constituted an aggravating factor, 28 7 even though the Florida statute did
not include the defendant's prior record as an aggravating circumstance
and expressly prohibited consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. 288 In addition, the judge compared Barclay's "racial hate
murder" 289 to the mass "racial and religious extermination" of the holocaust witnessed by the judge during his tour of duty as a soldier in
World War 11.290 This similarity, claimed the judge, supported his find'29
ing that Barclay's crime was "especially heinous." '
rejected by the sentencing judge in capital cases was recently challenged and upheld in Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
282 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West Supp. 1983).
283 103 S. Ct. at 3421.
284 Id. (citations omitted). The pertinent portions of the Florida sentencing statute relied
on by the trial judge in finding these four aggravating circumstances are:
(5) Aggravating circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances shall be
limited to the following:
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged,
or was an accomplice, in the commission of. . . any . . . kidnapping....

(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(c), (d), (g), (h) (West Supp. 1983).
285
103 S. Ct. at 3421.
286 Id; see FiA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
287
103 S. Ct. at 3421.
103 S. Ct. at 3427; see FiA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1983). The Florida
288
statute does not include the general category of "prior criminal activity" as an aggravating
circumstance. It does, however, treat as aggravating circumstances a previous conviction for
another capital or violent felony, see id. at § 921.141(5)(b), and the fact that the capital felony
was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, see id.at § 921.141(5)(a).
289 Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978),
reaj'd,411 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), afd, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983); see supra note 279.
290 See 103 S. Ct. at 3423 n.6.
291 See id. at 3424 n.7. In support of his finding that the crime was particularly heinous,
the judge gave the following written explanation:
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The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. 292 Al-

though the trial judge's consideration of Barclay's criminal record as an
aggravating circumstance was improper as a matter of state law, 293 the

294
Florida court apparently decided that this error was harmless.
On certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, Barclay objected to his sentence on three grounds. First, he claimed that Florida
law did not permit consideration of a defendant's prior criminal record

as an aggravating circumstance.2

95

Second, Barclay argued that the

judge's finding of four statutory aggravating circumstances was unsupported by the evidence. 296 Finally, Barclay contended that the trial
judge's reliance on his personal experiences in World War II constituted
297
prejudicial error.
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist,2 98
rejected all three of Barclay's contentions. Addressing Barclay's first objection, the Court upheld the death sentence despite the sentencing authority's consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance, 299 much
Because of [my] extensive experience, I believe I have come to know and understand when, or when not, a crime is heinous, atrocious and cruel and deserving of the maximum possible sentence.
My experience with the sordid, tragic, and violent side of life has not
been confined to the Courtroom. I, like so many American Combat Infantry
Soldiers, walked the battlefields of Europe and saw the thousands of dead
American and German soldiers and I witnessed the concentration camps
where innocent civilians and children were murdered in a war of racial and
religious extermination.
To attempt to initiate such a race war in this country is too horrible to
contemplate for both our black and white citizens. Such an attempt must be
dealt with by just and swift legal process and[,] when justified by a Jury verdict of guilty [, we must] terminate and remove permanently from society
those who would choose to initiate this diabolical course.
Having set forth my personal experiences above, it is understandable
that I am not easily shocked or moved by tragedy-but this present murder
and call for racial war is especially shocking and meets every definition of
heinous, atrocious and cruel. The perpetrator thereby forfeits further right to
life ....
Id.
292 See Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892 (1978),
reaf'd,411 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), a.fd, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983).
293 103 S. Ct. at 3427.
294 See 434 So. 2d at 1270-71 (upholding Barclay's death sentence as appropriate, without
specifically mentioning the trial judge's error in considering Barclay's criminal record as an
aggravating circumstance); see also infra note 308 (explaining Florida's harmless error analysis
as established in Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 1977)).
295 103 S. Ct. at 3422.
296

Id. at 3422-23.

297 Id at 3423-24.
298 Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice O'Connor joined Justice Rehnquist's
opinion. Id. at 3420. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Powell
joined. Id at 3428. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan
joined. Id at 3437. Justice Blackmun also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id at 3445.
299 Id at 3428 (plurality opinion).
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as it had in Zant.300 The plurality noted that the trial judge's consideration of Barclay's criminal record as an aggravating factor was improper
as a matter of state law because the Florida sentencing statute prohibited the examination of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. 30 The
plurality observed, however, that the federal Constitution does not automatically forbid consideration of a capital defendant's criminal record
as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the issue before the Court was a
narrow one: whether consideration of the defendant's criminal record as
a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance was constitutionally permissible where the state sentencing statute expressly forbids examination of
nonstatutory factors. 30 2 As the plurality noted: "[t]he crux of the issue,
then, is whether the trial judge's consideration of this improper aggravating circumstance so infects the balancing process created by the Florida statute that it is constitutionally impermissible for. . . the sentence
'30 3
[to] stand.
30 4
Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion relied on Profitt v. Florida
to

conclude that the trial court's consideration of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances 30 5 did not offend the Constitution.3 0 6 Justice Rehnquist
asserted that the Proffit plurality "saw no constitutional defect in a sentence based on both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances.

3 0o 7

300 See supra notes 224-44 and accompanying text. Although the Barclay plurality reached
a result similar to the holding in Zant, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Barclay distinguished between the invalid aggravating circumstances under review in the two cases. See
Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3425 n.8 (plurality opinion). In Zant, the invalid aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague. Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2738. Thus, the Georgia legislature
was constitutionally prohibited from including the invalid aggravating circumstance in its
statutory scheme. In Barclay, however, there was no constitutional ground prohibiting Florida
from incorporating the disputed aggravating circumstance in its statutory sentencing scheme.
As Justice Rehnquist noted: "Barclay does not, and could not reasonably, contend that the
United States Constitution forbids Florida from making the defendant's criminal record an
aggravating circumstance." Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3425 n.8. Thus, although the Florida legislature had not chosen to include consideration of the defendant's criminal record as an aggravating circumstance, it was not constitutionally precluded from doing so.
301 See 103 S. Ct. at 3427 (plurality opinion).
302 See id. at 3427-28.
303

Id.

304 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
305 The Barclay plurality recognized that the trial judge's examination of the defendant's
prior criminal record constituted consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance. See
103 S. Ct. at 3427 (plurality opinion). In addition, the trial judge's mention of his personal
experiences in World War II, although cited in support of a finding that the defendant's
behavior was "especially heinous," see supra notes 289-91 and accompanying text, might be
viewed as consideration of a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was
racially motivated. See supra note 38; injfa note 317. Thus, the trial judge arguably considered
two nonstatutory aggravating factors.
306 See 103 S. Ct. at 3428 (plurality opinion) (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 256 n.14).
307 Id The Barclay plurality's reliance on Proflt is misplaced for at least three reasons.
First, the specific issue forming the "central question" in Barclay was hardly discussed in Profftl and was not considered dispositive in that case. In Proffit, the trial judge followed the
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Because the trial court's error involved only a violation of state law

and not a violation of constitutional rights, the plurality in Barclay willingly deferred to the state's harmless error analysis. 308 Justice Rehnquist noted that "mere errors of state law are not the concern of this
Court

. .

. unless they rise for some other reason to the level of a denial

of rights protected by the United States Constitution. ' 30 9 The plurality
found that the state's harmless error analysis sufficiently guaranteed the
defendant's constitutional rights because "the Florida Supreme Court
does not apply its harmless error analysis in an automatic or mechanical
fashion, but rather upholds death sentences on the basis of this analysis
'3 10
only when it actually finds that the error is harmless.
The Barclay plurality also rejected the defendant's contention that
the trial judge's findings concerning four valid aggravating circumjury's advisory verdict recommending the death sentence. Profti, 428 U.S. at 246. In his
written findings supporting the sentence, the judge found four aggravating circumstances. Id.
One of the factors he listed-that Proffitt had the propensity to commit murder-was not
listed among the statutory aggravating circumstances. In upholding the death sentence, the
plurality opinion in Proffitt did not discuss the trial court's consideration of a nonstatutory
factor, except for two brief references. The Proffitt plurality simply observed that "it is unclear
that the Florida [Supreme] [C]ourt would ever approve a death sentence based entirely on
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances." Id. at 257 n. 14. Elsewhere, the plurality concluded
that "[i]t seems unlikely that [the Florida Supreme Court would uphold a death sentence
resting entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances], since the capital-sentencing statute explicitly provides that '[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limitedto the following [eight
specified factors].'" Id. at 250 n.8 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 19761977)) (emphasis by the qrofft plurality).
Second, the Barclay plurality failed to note the Proffitt plurality's observation that reliance
on nonstatutory factors in imposing a death sentence would probably not be tolerated by the
Florida Supreme Court because such reliance violates the Florida statute.
Third, the Barclay plurality failed to mention a factual distinction between the two cases.
Although the two cases involved the same statute, in Proffitt the trial judge erroneously included a nonstatutory aggravating factor in explaining his decision tofollow the jury's recommendation of death, whereas the trial judge in Barclay expressly relied in part on a
nonstatutory aggravating factor in rejecting the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.
Thus, in Profftt, the trial judge committed a seemingly harmless error while following the
sentencing jury's recommendation of death; but the trial judge's error in Barclay may have
meant the difference between life and death because he chose to impose death despite the
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.
308
Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3428 (plurality opinion). The Florida harmless error analysis
established in Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977), is based on the presence of
mitigating circumstances. Where the sentencing authority considered an invalid aggravating
circumstance in reaching its decision, and weighed it against one or more mitigating circumstances, the appellate court must remand for a new sentencing proceeding. Where the sentencing authority considered an invalid aggravating circumstance, but found no mitigating
circumstances, the appellate court must remand only if it finds prejudicial error. The Elledge
court explained: "The absence of mitigating circumstances becomes important, because, so
long as there are some statutory aggravating circumstances, there is no danger that nonstatutory circumstances have served to overcome the mitigating circumstances in the weighing
process which is dictated by our statute." i. at 1003 (emphasis in original).
309
Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3428 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
310 Id at 3428; see aio supra note 308 (explaining Florida's harmless error analysis).
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stances were unsupported by the evidence. 3 11 "Our review of these findings," wrote Justice Rehnquist, "is limited to the question whether they
are so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States
Constitution. "312
The plurality also concluded that the trial judge's use of his World
War II experiences to support a finding that the crime was "especially
heinous" did not warrant reversal of Barclay's sentence. 3 13 The judge's
references to personal experience were acceptable because the Constitution does not require the "rigid and mechanical parsing of statutory aggravating factors" that would inevitably result were an attempt made
"to separate the sentencer's decision from his experiences. '3 14 The plurality stated that "[a]s long as [sentencing] discretion is guided in a constitutionally adequate way . . .and as long as the decision is not so

wholly arbitrary as to offend the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment
'3 15
cannot and should not demand more.
Barclay, like ZanI,3 16 reduces the control that an exclusive list of statutory aggravating circumstances provides over sentencing discretion. In
Barclay, increased discretion resulted from the sentencing judge's improper reliance on his own personal experiences 3 17 and the defendant's
criminal record. The Barclay Court upheld the constitutionality of the
judge's reliance on the defendant's criminal record as an aggravating
circumstance despite the fact that such reliance directly controverted
the state sentencing statute.3 18 In a dissenting opinion, 3 19 Justice Marshall correctly warned that "fairness and consistency cannot be achieved
if non-statutory aggravating circumstances are randomly introduced
into the [sentencing] balance. '320 If judges are allowed to decide for
themselves whether to follow the state statute and consider only statutory aggravating circumstances, "the fate of an individual defendant
will inevitably depend on whether on a given day his sentencer happened to respect the constraints imposed by [state] law. The decision to
execute a human being," asserted Marshall, "surely should not depend
311
312

See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
103 S. Ct. at 3423 (plurality opinion).

313

Id.at 3423-24.

314

Id.at 3424.

Id.(citation omitted).
316 See supra notes 224-78 and accompanying text.
317 Although the trial judge cited his World War II experiences involving mass murders
in Germany in support of his finding that Barclay's crime was especially heinous, see supra
note 291, the judge's words indicate that he was treating Barclay's racial motivation as an
independent aggravating circumstance. According to the judge, the legal system must "terminate and remove permanently from society those who would choose to initiate [a race war
in this country]." 103 S. Ct. at 3423 n.6.
318
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
319
103 S. Ct. at 3437 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
315

320

Id at 3443.
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on such pot luck."'32
The Georgia statute considered in Zant did not require the sentenc322
ing authority to weigh all aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
and the Zant Court explicitly declined to state whether it thought an
invalid factor could be considered in states such as Florida that mandate
the weighing of all statutory circumstances. 323 In Barclay, however, the
Court went further than it had in Zant by approving the consideration
of invalid aggravating circumstances even where the sentencing statute
requires such a weighing. 324 By expanding the Zant decision in this
manner, the Court further decreased the sentencing control provided by
statutory aggravating factors.
In Barclay, the plurality ignored the standard of fairness and consistency that the Court applied in earlier capital sentencing cases. In affirming the death sentence, the plurality limited its examination of the
trial judge's findings concerning the four statutory aggravating circumstances to a determination of whether these findings were "so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the. . . Constitution." 3' 25 In a
concurring opinion,3 26 Justice Stevens objected to this standard, asserting that "the Court has never thought [this standard was] sufficient in a
capital case."'32 7 The plurality opinion typifies the Court's increasing
Id.
322 See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
323 See Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2750 (1983).
324 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983) (jury shall render its advisory
sentence based upon "[w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the
[enumerated] aggravating circumstances found to exist").
325 Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3423 (plurality opinion).
326 Id at 3428 (Stevens, J., concurring).
327 Id at 3429. Stevens rejected the Court's new approach, inquiring instead as to
whether the Florida statute narrows the group eligible for the death penalty and assures "consistently applied appellate review." Id. "A constant theme of our cases," asserted Justice
Stevens, "has been emphasis on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the
death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner." Id
In concluding that the trial court's use of invalid aggravating circumstances did not
require reversal of Barclay's death sentence, Justice Stevens found that
[t]he Florida rule. . . affords greater protection than the federal Constitution requires.
• . . Under Florida law, if there are no statutory mitigating circumstances, one valid statutory aggravating circumstance will generally suffice to
uphold a death sentence on appeal even if other aggravating circumstances
are not valid. The federal Constitution requires no more, at least as long as
none of the invalid aggravating circumstances is supported by erroneous or
misleading information.
Id. at 3432-33 (citing Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. at 2748-49) (footnotes omitted).
Justice Stevens pointed out that Florida law allows a prosecutor to introduce evidence of
a defendant's prior criminal record at the sentencing phase to negate a mitigating factor. Id
at 3434. Thus, Stevens concluded that the jury and judge at Barclay's sentencing proceeding
properly considered evidence of Barclay's prior criminal record. Id at 3434-35.
Justice Marshall also objected to the plurality's standards. In a dissenting opinion, he
noted that
321
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reluctance to find fault with state capital sentencing schemes and state
court capital sentencing decisions.
Because the plurality opinion in Barclay stressed the importance of
deference to state courts in reviewing death sentences where state error
is involved, 328 the decision may not be applicable to similar cases involving questions of constitutional error. Zant held that the sentencing authority may consider statutory aggravating circumstances that are
invalid on constitutional grounds. 329 This holding was limited, however, to statutes that do not require the weighing of all aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. 330 Thus, Zant and Barclay leave open the
question of whether a sentencing authority that must weigh all statutory
factors may consider constitutionally invalid aggravating circumstances.
The plurality opinion in Barclay stressed the nature of the Florida
court's harmless error analysis. 33 1 The Florida analysis regards the trial
judge's reliance on invalid aggravating circumstances as harmless error
only when no mitigating circumstances exist.3 32 The plurality appeared
to place considerable weight on this doctrine in endorsing the state
supreme court's harmless error ruling. 333 Thus, Barclay may be limited
to cases involving a similar state harmless error doctrine.
Even if the Barclay decision is narrowly applied, it still permits the
sentencing authority to predicate the death sentence on invalid or extraneous aggravating factors if it also finds at least one valid statutory aggravating factor. Such a rule is ill advised: although the sentencing
judge in Barclay had the discretionary authority to impose the death
penalty based on the valid aggravating circumstances he found, he
might have decided against the death sentence if he had not considered
the invalid and extraneous aggravating factors. 334 The allowance of
such flexibility in the consideration of aggravating factors undermines
statutory supervision of sentencing discretion and thus increases the possibility of arbitrary, discriminatory, or excessive sentencing decisions.
[t]he plurality opinion departs from the Court's past insistence on consistency
and fairness in the capital sentencing process. Under the plurality's view, the
standard for review of a death sentence would apparently be "limited" to
whether its imposition was "so unprincipled or arbitrary as to somehow violate the United States Constitution." . . . This standard is devoid of any
meaningful content . . . . I see no way to reconcile this standard with the

requirements of the Constitution.
Id.ftt3443 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
328 See id.at 3428 (plurality opinion).
329 See Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2746-50; supra notes 208-78 and accompanying text.
330 Zant, 103 S. Ct. at 2744-46.
331 See Barclay, 103 S. Ct. at 3426-28 (plurality opinion).
332 See id. at 3426-27.
333 See id. at 3428.
334 See id. at 3442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial judge's reliance on
an invalid aggravating circumstance is a constitutional violation).
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California v. Ramos

In California v. Ramos, 3 35 the Supreme Court upheld a death sentence despite the judge's instruction to the sentencing jury that the governor might later commute or otherwise reduce a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole. Ramos, like Zant and Barclay, illustrates
the Court's approval of capital sentencing practices that permit a
greater possibility of unfair or inconsistent sentencing decisions.
A California jury found Ramos guilty of first degree murder for the
slaying of a restaurant employee during the course of an armed robbery. 336 At a separate sentencing proceeding, 337 the judge, in accord
with the statute mandated "Briggs instruction,1 33 8 informed the jury of
the governor's power to commute a sentence following conviction of a
crime. 339 The jury was warned that the governor "may in the future
commute or modify a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility
of parole to a lesser sentence that would include the possibility of parole."'340 The judge did not instruct the jury that the governor could
also commute a death sentence. 34 1 The jury subsequently sentenced Ra342
mos to death.
335
103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983).
336 People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 563-64, 639 P.2d 908, 912-13, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266,
270-71 (1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983). Ramos and a co-conspirator went to a fast food
restaurant, where Ramos was employed as a janitor, to commit armed robbery. Ramos
forced two employees into the walk-in refrigerator and, after emptying the safe, shot both
workers, killing one and wounding the other. Id
337 Under California law, a person convicted of first degree murder may be sentenced to
death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole only when the jury finds a statutory "special circumstance." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1983). The special
circumstance found in Ramos was "commission of the murder during the course of a robbery."
103 S. Ct. at 3449 n.1.
338 The "Briggs instruction" derives its name from a 1978 voter initiative in California,
known as the Briggs initiative. 103 S. Ct. at 3450 n.4.
339 Id at 3450.
340 Id California's death penalty statute also requires the judge to instruct the jury on
the proper use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury must compare the
aggravating circumstances to the mitigating circumstances. If the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances then the jury must impose the death sentence. If the
mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then the jury must impose
a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West Supp. 1983). See 103 S. Ct. at 3449 n.3.
341 California law prohibits such an instruction. See People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 65253, 388 P.2d 33, 46-47, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 214-15 (1964).
342
103 S. Ct. at 3450. The California Supreme Court affirmed Ramos's conviction but
reversed his death sentence, finding the Briggs instruction unconstitutional. See People v.
Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 590-602, 639 P.2d 908, 929-36, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 287-94 (1982),
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983). The California Supreme Court concluded:
Instead of assuring that the jury's life-or-death decision rests on "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense" . . . , the [Briggs] instruction focuses the

attention of thejury on the fact that the Governor has the power to render the
defendant eligible for parole if the jury does not vote to execute him. ...
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In a five-to-four decision, 343 the Supreme Court held that the
Briggs instruction did not violate the federal Constitution.3 44 Ramos
contended that "a capital sentencing jury may not constitutionally consider possible commutation. ' 3

45

This contention raised "two related,

The challenged instruction thus improperly leads the jury far beyond the constitutional safeguards of due process of law.
Id.at 591, 639 P.2d at 929-30, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion)).
The California Supreme Court also found that the Briggs instruction "suffers from a
second and perhaps deeper constitutional flaw" because "it neglects to tell the jury that a
sentence of death may likewise be modified by the Governor to permit parole." Id. at 591, 639
P.2d at 930, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 288 (emphasis in original). The California court concluded
that, because of this omission, "[t]he jury is left with the mistaken belief. . . that the only
sure way to keep the defendant off the streets is to condemn him to death." Id.
343 Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. 103 S. Ct. at 3449. Justice Marshall
wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan and joined in part by Justice Blackmun.
at 3468, also wrote separate
Id. at 3460. Justice Blackmun, id. at 3467, and Justice Stevens, id.
dissenting opinions.
344
103 S. Ct. at 3460.
345
Id. at 3451 (footnotes omitted). Ramos also argued that "the Briggs Instruction unconstitutionally misleads the jury by selectively informing it of the Governor's power to commute" a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, but not of his power to commute the
death sentence. Id. By creating "the misleading impression that the jury can prevent the
defendant's return to society only by imposing the death sentence," the instruction biases the
jury "in favor of death." Id. at 3458. Ramos further contended that a "decision based on
mistake is not only unreliable, it is arbitrary and capricious, and undermines the entire purpose of guided discretion: to provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing between the few
who are sentenced to death and the many who are not sentenced to death." Brief for Respondent at 32, California v. Ramos, 103 S.Ct. 3446 (1983) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).
Ramos argued that the judge should disclose the governor's full power of commutation,
including his power to commute the death sentence. See 103 S.Ct. at 3458. The Court found
this argument "puzzling," and concluded that "an instruction disclosing the Governor's
power to commute a death sentence may operate to the defendant's distinct disadvantage."
Id.
A jury concerned about preventing the defendant's potential return to society
will not [be] any less inclined to vote for the death penalty upon learning that
even a death sentence may not have such an effect. In fact, advising jurors
that a death verdict is theoretically modifiable, and thus not "final," may
incline them to approach their sentencing decision with less appreciation for
the gravity of their choice and for the moral responsibility reposed in them as
sentencers.
Id.
Justice Marshall correctly criticized the majority's conclusion:
If the Briggs Instruction is indeed misleading, and the majority never denies
that it may [be]. . . ,it can hardly be defended on the ground that a balanced
instruction would be more prejudicial. If, as the majority points out, . . .
there are compelling reasons for not informing the jury as to the Governor's
power to commute death sentences, the solution is not to permit a misleading
instruction, but to prohibit altogether any instruction concerning commutation. This point seems to have eluded the majority. For some inexplicable
reason it concludes that, since a balanced instruction is unavailable, the State
is free to mislead the jury about the Governor's clemency power.
Id.at 3461 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall also noted that "[t]he conclusion that juries should not be permitted to consider commutation and parole in deciding the appropriate sentence is shared by nearly every jurisdiction

1184

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

but distinct concerns.

'346

[Vol. 69:1129

First, that consideration of commutation "is

so speculative a factor that it injects an unacceptable level of unreliability into the capital sentencing determination, '347 and second, that such
consideration "deflects the jury from its constitutionally mandated task
of basing the penalty decision on the character of the defendant and the
3 48
nature of the offense.1
The Ramos Court addressed the issue of unreliability in sentencing
by relying on jurek v. Txas. 349 The Court noted that the possibility of
commutation is no more speculative than certain elements of the sentencing statute that the Court approved in Jurek.350 Under the Texas
statute,35 1 the sentencing jury must decide "whether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society. ' 352 The Ramos
Court found that the Briggs instruction required similar speculation because it brought "to the jury's attention" the possibility that the defendant someday may be freed, and thus "invite[d] the jury to assess whether
the defendant is someone whose probable future behavior makes it undesirable that he be permitted to return to society. '353 The Court therewhich has considered the question." Id at 3465-66. See Brief for Respondent at 11-17, Ramos,
103 S. Ct. 3446 (arguing that the overwhelming weight of state authority does not allow such
consideration).
346
103 S. Ct. at 3451 (majority opinion).
347 Id. Ramos argued that the Briggs instruction encourages speculation by requiring the
jury, during its deliberation, to predict the probability that the governor will commute a
death sentence. Ramos contended that governors exercise the power of commutation in an
"erratic and unpredictable way." Brief for Respondent at 24, California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct.
3446 (1983). Therefore, "[a]ny effort to account for these factors in imposing a death sentence
necessarily injects a level of unpredictability and unreliability in the sentence phase of a capital case that cannot be tolerated." Id.at 25.
348
103 S. Ct. at 3451.
349 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
350 Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3453-54. The capital punishment statute upheld inJurek requires
capital sentencing juries to determine whether the defendant deliberately intended to cause
death, and "whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROO.
ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981); see supra note 128. An affirmative answer to each of
these special interrogatories is required before the death sentence is imposed. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(c) (Vernon 1981). Injurek, the defendant argued that "it is
impossible to predict future behavior and that the question [concerning future dangerousness]
is so vague as to be meaningless." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274. The plurality injurek rejected this
argument, reasoning that decisions of whether to release a defendant on bail, what sentence
to impose in noncapital cases, and whether to grant parole all involve some assessment of
future conduct. Id. at 275 (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion concluded: "What is
essential is that the [capital sentencing] jury have before it all possible relevant information
about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine." Id at 276.
351
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
352 Id.art. 37.071(b)(2).
353
103 S. Ct. at 3454. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun referred to the majority's reasoning as "substituting an intellectual sleight of hand for legal analysis." Id at 3468 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
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fore found Jurek controlling, 35 4 and held that consideration of possible
commutation in capital cases was not offensive to the eighth and four355
teenth amendments.
The Ramos Court also dismissed the argument that consideration of
commutation deflects the jury's attention from the defendant's character and offense.3 5 6 The Court reasoned that a sentencing jury may examine a broad array of factors in deciding whether to impose the death
sentence without unconstitutionally deflecting their attention. 35 7 "Once
the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined
category of persons eligible for the death penalty, . . . the jury then is
free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment. ' 35 8 The possibility of commutation " 'is simply one of the countless considerations weighed by the jury in seeking to
judge the punishment appropriate to the individual defendant.' ,,359
See 103 S. Ct. at 3453 (majority opinion).
Id. at 3454 (footnote omitted). Ramos placed particular emphasis on Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), in arguing that informing the jury of the governor's power of commutation reduces sentencing fairness. The Gardner Court reversed a death sentence where the
defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain information in a presentence report that
was prepared by the prosecution for trial but not disclosed to the defendant or his counsel.
Ramos considered Gardner applicable to his case because "the [Gardner] Court considered the
risk too great 'that some of the information accepted [by the judge] in confidence may be
erroneous, or may be misinterpreted' and went on to note that 'if [the information] is the basis
for the death sentence the interest in reliability plainly outweighs the State's interest.' " Brief
for Respondent at 18, California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983) (quoting Gardner v. Flor354
355

ida, 430 U.S. at 359).
The Ramos Court distinguished Gardner. Justice O'Connor concluded that "[t]he Briggs
Instruction gives the jury accurate information of which both the defendant and his counsel
are aware, and it does not preclude the defendant from offering any evidence or argument
regarding the Governor's power to commute a life sentence." 103 S. Ct. at 3454 (footnote
omitted).
356 See 103 S. Ct. at 3455-57.
357 See id.at 3456.
358 Id.
359 Id. at 3457 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2755 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring )).
Ramos relied on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), to support his argument that
consideration of commutation deflects the jury's attention from the defendant's character and
offense. See Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3456. In Beck, the Court invalidated an Alabama statute that
prohibited the jury in a capital case from convicting the defendant of a lesser included offense. See ALA. CODE § 13-11-2(a) (1975). Under the Alabama statute, the jury had to find
the defendant guilty of first degree murder or acquit him. See Beck, 447 U.S. at 628-30. The
Court concluded that such a rule "enhance[s] the risk of an unwarranted conviction" because
a jury would not want to allow someone they believed to be guilty of a serious crime to go
unpunished. Id. at 637. This dilemma facing the jury "divert[s] the jury's attention from the
central issue" of whether the prosecutor has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
"introduce[s] a level of uncertainty and unreliability into the factfinding process that cannot
be tolerated in a capital case." Id. at 642-43.
The Ramos Court was "unconvinced that the Briggs Instruction constrains the jury's sentencing choice in the manner condemned in Beck." Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3456. The Court
reasoned that the scheme in Beck was faulty because it artificially limited the jury's sentencing
alternatives. The Briggs instruction, however, "does not limit the jury,. . . [instead] it places
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The Ramos Court did not reach a sound decision. The holding in
Ramos rejects the conclusion of many state courts, including California's,
that a sentencing jury should not consider the possibility of pardon, parole, or commutation.3 60 Furthermore, the Briggs instruction permits
the jury to consider a factor wholly unrelated to the defendant's character or the nature of his crime.3 6 1 Finally, like the threshold analysis endorsed in Zant 3 62 the Ramos Court's assertion that the sentencing jury in
a capital case may consider a "myriad of factors" 363 translates into virtually unbridled discretion once the sentencing authority finds one statutory aggravating circumstance.
III
ABANDONING THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS AND
CONSISTENCY IN APPELLATE REVIEW OF DEATH
SENTENCES

By accepting capital sentencing schemes that provide the sentencing authority with greater discretion, the Supreme Court has increased
the likelihood that a sentencing authority may mask an otherwise arbitrary or discriminatory sentencing decision as "within its discretion."
Increased discretion therefore creates a higher risk of capital sentencing
errors. 364 Post-sentencing appellate review, conducted by state or federal courts, 3 65 provides a valuable (and final) opportunity to detect and
before the jury an additional element to be considered, along with many other factors, in
determining which sentence is appropriate under the circumstances of the defendant's case."
Id. (emphasis in original).
360 Twenty-nine states have considered this issue. Twenty-six, including California, have
concluded "that the jury should not consider the possibility of pardon, parole, or commutation." Ramos, 103 S. Ct. at 3466 & n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id at 3468 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (listing the 26 states that have adopted this position).
361 See id. at 3464 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("the mere possibility of a commutation...
bears absolutely no relation to the nature of the offense or the character of the individual").
The Briggs instruction encourages the sentencing jury to consider the possibility of release
rather than the probability of future criminal activity. See id. at 3462-63.
362 See supra notes 224-33, 265-72 and accompanying text.
363
103 S. Ct. at 3456 (majority opinion).
364 "Errors" in capital sentencing occur when the sentencing authority imposes the death
penalty in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion, or when the death penalty is excessive in
relation to the crime, or disproportionate in view of sentences given defendants who committed similar crimes in that state.
365 Meaningful state appellate review should include comparative proportionality review, comparing the defendant's sentence with sentences given other defendants who committed similar crimes; a review of the individual sentencing authority's compliance with statutory
capital sentencing guidelines; and, if necessary, the reinterpretation of overbroad or vague
statutory provisions to limit those provisions to constitutionally permissible uses. See, e.g., GA.
CODE § 17-10-35 (1982); see infra notes 374-91 and accompanying text. Collateral federal
habeas corpus review advances fairness and consistency in capital sentencing by providing
condemned persons with a federal forum in which to challenge the constitutionality of a
capital sentencing scheme as applied in particular cases. See injra notes 469-82 and accompanying text.
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rectify such errors before execution. In fact, state appellate courts and
federal courts (primarily by habeas corpus) set aside death sentences in
sixty percent of death penalty cases. 366 Consequently, the more discretion the Court allows judges and juries in capital sentencing, the greater
the need for meaningful appellate review of the sentencing authority's
decision. 367 Post-sentencing judicial supervision reinforces and clarifies
statutory sentencing guidelines, and is an increasingly indispensable ingredient of a constitutionally valid statutory sentencing scheme.
Although meaningful appellate review is particularly useful and
important in capital sentencing schemes that permit broad sentencing
discretion, the Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, upheld significant restrictions on a condemned person's opportunity to obtain such
review. In Pulley v. Harris,3 68 the Court held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments do not require comparative proportionality review
of death sentences.3 69 Harris thus disregarded prior Court assertions of
the importance of such review. Before Harris, the Court frequently recognized that proportionality review provides a valuable post-sentencing
check against unfair or inconsistent capital sentencing decisions 37° -a
check that statutory sentencing guidelines cannot supply.
In Barefoot v. Estelle,37 1 the Court authorized United States courts of
appeals to adopt summary procedures for federal habeas corpus appeals
in death penalty cases, exhibiting new impatience with execution delays
caused by the processing of federal habeas corpus petitions. 3 72 Recent
denials of applications for stays of execution and denials of petitions for
3 73
certiorari further demonstrate this new impatience.
The Barefoot and Harris decisions may herald a new tolerance for
procedural shortcuts in federal and state appellate review of death
sentences. Such shortcuts will inevitably reduce fairness and consistency
in capital sentencing. Coupled with the Court's recent tolerance of increased sentencing discretion, this tolerance of procedural shortcuts may
portend a substantial increase in executions of unconstitutionally convicted or sentenced defendants.
366 Greenberg, CapitalPunishment as a Sstem, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 918 (1982). By comparison, federal appellate courts reverse only 6.5% of appealed federal criminal judgments. Id.
367 The need for meaningful appellate review is even greater when the sentencing authority is ajury because a jury meets only once, has little or no experience with its task, and varies
greatly in its composition. Set McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 295-96 (1971) (Brennan,J., dissenting). Of course, judges may also impose arbitrary, discriminatory, or erroneous
sentences.

368
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
369 Id. at 875-76.
370 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 204-06 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976). For a discussion of Harisand the need for comparative proportionality review, see infra notes 436-68 and accompanying text.
371
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983).
372 103 S. Ct. at 3394-95.
373 See infra note 559 and accompanying text.
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Direct Appellate Review by State Courts
1.

The Functions of Direct Appellate Review

Direct review of death sentences by state appellate courts ideally
consists of a three-part inquiry. First, it involves a comparative proportionality review in which the reviewing court compares the defendant's
sentence with sentences given defendants who committed similar crimes
in that state.3 74 Second, direct post-sentencing review provides a procedural review, allowing a court to determine whether the sentencing authority applied the statutory capital sentencing guidelines improperly or
prejudicially. 375 Third, the reviewing court may perform a narrowing
function: where a statutory capital sentencing guideline is susceptible to
an overbroad, vague, or otherwise unconstitutional interpretation, the
reviewing court may narrowly interpret the guideline to confine it to
constitutionally permissible uses.3 76 In sum, comparative proportional374
See, e.g., Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 63-64, 243 S.E.2d 496, 508 (1978) (finding death
penalty proportional to sentences in similar cases), rev'd in part on other groundsper curiam, 439
U.S. 14 (1978); State v. Bolder, 635 S.W.2d 673, 690 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (same); Smith v.
State, 659 P.2d 330, 337-38 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983) (same). In Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct.
871 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment does not require comparative proportionality review. See infra notes 436-68 and accompanying text.
Comparative proportionality review is distinguishable from "pure" proportionality review, which compares the crime to the punishment. The Supreme Court recently held that
the eighth and fourteenth amendments require courts to perform "pure" proportionality review in the course of all criminal appeals. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3016 (1983). In
Solem, the Court held that a life sentence without parole constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it was "significantly disproportionate" to the defendant's crime-the passing
of a $100 bad check, which resulted in the defendant's seventh nonviolent felony conviction.
Id. The Court found that in performing this review, courts should consider "(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals [for
more serious crimes] in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id at 3010-11. Nevertheless, the Solem Court noted
that findings of a constitutional degree of disproportionality by a reviewing court should be
rare, given the "substantial deference" due the legislature's calculation of what punishment is
most appropriate for a particular crime. Id. at 3009 & n.16. The Supreme Court has performed this crime-to-punishment proportionality review in several capital cases. In Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court found the death penalty unconstitutionally disproportionate to the crime of rape. Id at 592. In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the
Court concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate to a conviction of felony murder where the defendant did not "kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force . . . be employed." Id. at 797.
375
See, e.g., Fleming v. State, 243 Ga. 120, 123, 252 S.E.2d 609, 612 (1979) (death penalty
not imposed under influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factor); Prevatte v.
State, 233 Ga. 929, 931-33, 214 S.E.2d 365, 367-68 (1975) (reversing two death sentences
because prosecutor's reference to defendant's right to appeal constituted prejudicial error);
Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 415 A.2d 830 (1980) (arbitrary factor influenced death sentence imposed upon defendant when defendant waived jury determination of sentencing because ofjudge's comment that case did not merit death penalty); State v. Woomer, 277 S.C.
170, 175, 284 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1981) (reversal of death sentence; solicitor's inclusion of personal opinion during closing argument may have influenced jury to consider an arbitrary
factor in its deliberations).
376
See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973) (limiting statutory aggravating
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ity review focuses on the sentence itself and sentences in similar cases;
procedural review looks at the individual sentencing authority's compliance with that state's statutory capital' sentencing guidelines; and the
narrowing function examines the statutory scheme itself for potential
constitutional flaws.
a.

Comparative ProportionaiyReview

Statutory post-sentencing comparative proportionality review may
be the best means of ensuring that a state's statutory capital sentencing
scheme is functioning within the eighth amendment guidelines estab3 77 Gregg v. Georgia,3 78 and Lockett v. Ohio.379
lished by Furman v. Georgia,
This review measures the consistency with which sentencing authorities
impose the death penalty-a crucial factor in discerning potentially
cruel and unusual punishment.3 80 Of the thirty-seven states that presently permit the death penalty, 38 ' thirty-one require comparative proportionality review of death sentences. 382 For example, Georgia's
statutory capital sentencing scheme, approved by the Court in Gregg,
requires the Georgia Supreme Court to undertake a proportionality recircumstance that murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" to murders that are
"conscienceless or pitiless crime[s] which [are] unnecessarily torturous to the victim"); Harris
v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 731-33, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10-11 (1976) (limiting statutory aggravating circumstance that the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" in that
it involved "torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim" to "those
cases that lie at the core"); State v. Pritchett, 621 S.W.2d 127, 137-39 (Tenn. 1981) (reversing
death sentence; limiting statutory aggravating circumstance that "murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or depravity of mind" to murders involving
torture before victim's death). Some state appellate courts prefer to invalidate unconstitutionally vague or overbroad capital sentencing provisions rather than reinterpret them. See,
e.g., State v. White, 395 A.2d 1082, 1090-91 (Del. 1978) (finding language of statutory aggravating circumstance that victim was "elderly" and "defenseless" unconstitutionally vague);
State v. Chaplin, 433 A.2d 327, 329-30 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (finding statutory aggravating
circumstance that murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" unconstitutionally vague); Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 542, 224 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1976) (holding
statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant had a "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions" unconstitutionally vague).
377 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
378 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
379 438 U.S. 586 (1978). For a discussion of Furman, Gregg, and Locket, see supra notes 70119, 150-60, 177-88 and accompanying text. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112
(1982), the Court summarized the guidelines established in these cases as requiring that "capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all." For a
discussion of Edding, see supra notes 161-88 and accompanying text.
380 See supra notes 70-97 and accompanying text.
381 See injra text accompanying note 579-80. Vermont has a death penalty statute that is
not presently used and may be unconstitutional. See infra notes 589-91 and accompanying
text.

382 See infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text. Of these 31 states, 26 provide for comparative proportionality review of death sentences by statute, in/ja note 749 and accompanying text. In four other states, state appellate case law provides for such review, infra note 752
and accompanying text. In Louisiana, the rules of the state supreme court require comparative proportionality review, see inj/a note 751 and accompanying text.
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view of all death sentences to determine "[w]hether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. ' 383 The Georgia
Supreme Court considers similar death penalty cases as well as appealed
murder cases where the sentencing authority imposed a life sentence. 38 4
In addition, the statute requires the Georgia Supreme Court to "include
in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration. 38s 5 Comparative proportionality review thus fulfills the Furman
mandate of fairness and consistency in capital sentencing by assessing
"whether infact the death penalty was being administered for any given
class of crime in a discriminatory, standardless, or rare fashion." 386
b.

ProceduralCompliance Review

Appellate review also focuses on the sentencing authority's application of the relevant statutory capital sentencing guidelines. For example, the Georgia death penalty statute requires the Georgia Supreme
Court to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. ' 38 7 A
careful, case-by-case assessment of the evidence and the sentencing au383

GA. CODE § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982).

384 See, e.g., Horton v. State, 249 Ga. 871, 880-81, 295 S.E.2d 281, 289-90 (1982) (death
sentence upheld); Buttrum v. State, 249 Ga. 652, 657, 293 S.E.2d 334, 339-40 (1982) (same);
Jones v. State, 249 Ga. 605, 613-14, 293 S.E.2d 708, 715 (1982) (same); Waters v. State, 248
Ga. 355, 370-71, 283 S.E.2d 238, 251-52 (1981) (same).
385

GA. CODE § 17-10-35(e) (1982).

Justice Rehnquist raised a valid objection to comparative proportionality review in his
dissenting opinion in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 318 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The death penalty statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas, upheld in Gregg, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), respectively, do
not require the sentencing authority to indicate the reasons for its decision should it choose not
to sentence the defendant to death. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Any comparative proportionality review performed by an appellate court pursuant to one of
those three statutory schemes must therefore do without such information. This deficiency
creates two problems. First, comparative proportionality review cannot correct the sentences
of the "fortunate few who are the beneftiariesof random discretion exercised by juries." Id. at
318-19 (emphasis added). This random discretion is a minor problem, however. In Gregg, the
Court asserted that because comparative proportionality review "is intended to prevent caprice in the decision to inflict the [death] penalty, the isolated decision of a jury to afford
mercy does not render unconstitutional death sentences imposed . . . under a system that
does not create a substantial risk of arbitrariness or caprice." 428 U.S. at 203 (plurality opinion). More importantly, this deficiency limits the scope of comparative proportionality review. In comparing the defendant's death sentence with sentences in similar death penalty
cases, a reviewing court will have only the objective facts of those cases in which the sentencer
did not impose death. The court will therefore be forced to guess as to the substantive reasons
behind the sentencing authority's decision not to impose the death penalty. This deficiency
may reduce the effectiveness of comparative proportionality review, but it speaks more for the
need for detailed explanations of sentencing decisions in non-death sentence cases than
against such review.
386 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 222-23 (White, J., concurring).
387 GA. CODE § 17-10-35(c)(1) (1982).
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thority's reasoning permits detection of those instances when the sentencing authority, in exercising its discretion, may have exceeded the
bounds of the statutory capital sentencing guidelines. While comparative proportionality review ensures consistent system-wide enforcement
of a constitutionally permissible capital sentencing scheme, procedural
compliance review ensures that an appellate court will reverse a death
sentence imposed arbitrarily or capriciously even when such a sentence
appears consistent with prior decisions of the state's highest court.
c.

The Narrowing Function

Where a statutory capital sentencing guideline is susceptible to an
overbroad, vague, or otherwise unconstitutional interpretation, the reviewing court may narrow the scope or use of the guideline to within
constitutionally permissible bounds. Although at least two Justices have
recognized the possibility of arbitrary sentencing under an overbroad
capital sentencing provision narrowly interpreted on appeal in order to
uphold a sentence, 38 8 the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the
propriety of this narrowing function. 38 9 Given the difficulties inherent
in the legislature's task of minimizing the sentencing authority's discretion while permitting the authority to assess the individual defendant's
character, record, and personal background,3 9 0 this narrowing function
provides needed judicial review of the statutory guidelines themselves.
Although the narrowing function may involve a degree of judicial interference in areas of legislative responsibility, it facilitates swifter establishment of a constitutionally permissible capital sentencing scheme.
Moreover, the narrowing function eliminates the difficulty and potential
inequity of temporary judicial action that could occur without a capital
sentencing statute in force during the period between invalidation and
388 Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, voiced such a concern in a concurring
opinion in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Marshall declared that because "it is the sentencer's discretion that must be...
guided by clear, objective, and specific standards," ambiguous statutory language "could not
be cured by theposthoc narrowing construction of an appellate court." Id. at 437 (emphasis in
original). Moreover, "[a]ppellate case law is less likely to help the sentencing authority directly in jurisdictions where juries rather than judges make the life-or-death decision," because juries are usually unaware of such case law. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose
Death, 68 GEo. LJ. 97, 107 (1979). Justice Marshall would permit courts to use the narrower
construction in subsequent cases, however, provided that they advise sentencing juries of the
narrow construction in sentencing instructions. 446 U.S. at 437 (Marshall, J., concurring in
judgment).
389 See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 202 & n.54 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 256 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Goa'dey Court rejected the Georgia Supreme Court's interpretation of a
statutory aggravating circumstance because it was inconsistent with the Georgia court's own
prior efforts to construe narrowly that aggravating circumstance. Godjrq, 446 U.S. at 432; see
atso Dix, supra note 388, at 108.
390 See infia notes 407-13 and accompanying text.
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reenactment. 1
Comparative proportionality review, procedural compliance review, and the narrowing function in combination provide a comprehensive check on the legislature and the sentencing authority, by evaluating
the statutory scheme, the consistency of the scheme's application in the
courts, and individual application of the scheme by sentencing
authorities.
2.

Supportfor a ConstitutionalRequirement of Appellate Review.Supreme Court Decisions Priorto Pulley v. Harris

The establishment of a constitutional right to any form of appellate
review of death sentences would be unprecedented; the Supreme Court
has long maintained that rights of appeal are not constitutionally guaranteed, but must instead be created by state law. 392 Nevertheless, in
Furman, Justice Stewart recognized that:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability.
It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic
purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
393
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.
In subsequent cases, members of the Court have repeatedly recognized
the unique nature of the death penalty.3 94 Death is "the only punishment that may involve the conscious infliction of physical pain. '3 95 In
addition, the death penalty is unique in its relationship to the four traditional goals of criminal punishment: rehabilitation, incapacitation, de391 Furthermore, judicial review is clearly appropriate as an independent check on the
constitutionality of statutory schemes. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174 n. 19 (1976)
(plurality opinion) ("legislative judgments alone cannot be determinative of Eighth Amendment standards since that Amendment was intended to safeguard individuals from the abuse
of legislative power") (citations omitted).
392 See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606 (1974); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684,
687 (1894); see also Dix, supranote 388, at 106 n.77. Justice Rehnquist cited this principle in
his dissent in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 319 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), concluding that it is unlikely that "any provision of the Constitution can be read to
require. . . appellate review." Justice Rehnquist's criticism of the Court's decision suggested
that a majority of the Court believed that the due process clause required appellate review of
death sentences. Id. at 324.
393 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id.at
286-90 (Brennan, J., concurring).
394 See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
598 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 118 (1983).
395 Furman,408 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Brennan noted
that " 'the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading and brutalizing...
as to constitute psychological torture.'" Id (quoting People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649,
493 P.2d 880, 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 166 (1972)).
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terrence, and retribution. It rejects rehabilitation 396 and serves the
second goal, incapacitation, no better than life imprisonment. 39 7 Furthermore, the death penalty has no clearly established deterrent effect. 398 Ultimately, therefore, if justification for the death penalty exists,
399
it must arise from the retributive goal.
Because the deprivation of a criminal defendant's life differs qualitatively from all other punishments, "there is a corresponding difference
in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."'40 0 The Supreme Court therefore

396 Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); see supra note 393 and accompanying text.
397 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 236 n.14 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see aLro
Greenberg, supra note 366, at 927.
398 The deterrence of heinous crimes is probably the most common argument advanced
in favor of capital punishment. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUST., MURDER AND THE
DEATH PENALTY: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PEOPLE 8 (1981) (criticizing the California

Supreme Court for "thwarting death penalty laws," and claiming that "the citizens of California are four times more likely to be [murdered] today than they were when killers were
executed"); Carrington, Deterrence, Death, and the Victims oCrime: A Common Sense Approach, 35
VAND. L. REV. 587, 596 (1982) (advocating a "common sense analysis" to support the deterrence theory; noting that the number of recorded murders in the United States doubled from
10,000 in 1966 to 20,000 in 1976 during the ten-year nationwide moratorium on capital punishment); Yuncker, The Relevance of the IdentifrationProblem to StatisticalResearch On CapitalPunishment, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 96, 96 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Yuncker, The Relevance ofthe
!dentijfation Problem] (analyzing methodological problems with studies that fail to find evidence of the death penalty's deterrent effect, and concluding that "the hypotheses relied upon
by the defenders of capital punishment possess greater inherent plausibility than those relied
upon by its opponents'); c. Cederblom & Munevar, The Death Penalty: The Relevance oDeterrence, CRIM. JUST. REV., Spring 1982, at 63 (advancing a theoretical argument that the deterrence rationale for capital punishment is not limited to deterring future murders, but that
deterrence also serves a retributivist function).
Nevertheless, as Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (plurality opinion), acknowledged, "[a]lthough some of the studies suggest that the
death penalty may not function as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties, there
is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refuting this view." Id.at 185. Of 27
studies published between 1975 and 1980, only five found evidence of deterrence. Yunker,
Testing the Deterrent Eect of CapitalPunishment, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 626, 631 (1981-82); see also
Faia, Wilf#u, Deliberate, Premeditated and Irrationa- Reflections On the Futility of Executions, 55
STATE Gov'T 14-21 (1982) (rebutting assumption of deterrence theory that would-be murderers rationally calculate the risks of their contemplated behavior before acting); id. at 20
(noting that "[t]he deterrence hypothesis, as applied to capital punishment, has not withstood
the test of social research'); Lempert, Desert andDeterrence: An Assessment ofthe MoralBases ofthe
Casefor CapitalPunishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1177, 1224-25 (1981) (providing comprehensive
analysis of recent studies and concluding that "[t]he empirical evidence is . . . sufficiently
strong and one-sided that we should. . . [make] the assumption that capital punishment does
not deter'); Yunker, The Relevance ofthe IdenificationProblem, supra, at 96 (noting that the great
majority of recent multiple regression studies fail to find that executions reduce the number of
criminal homicides).
399 The relationship between the death penalty and the retributive goal of punishment is
itself questionable. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 236-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Greenberg, supra note 366, at 927 ("[w]hatever retributive function capital punishment might serve . . . cannot be served by the current system . . . in which executions

occur only rarely and after great delay").
400 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Califor-
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"has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as
is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake. ' 40 1 In short, states must adopt the most
thorough, fair, and consistent procedural safeguards reasonably avail40 2
able to ensure that sentencing errors are minimized.
States may advance fairness and consistency in capital sentencing
by requiring detailed sentencing guidelines and meaningful appellate
review. In Furman and Gregg, the Court demanded detailed capital sentencing guidelines. 40 3 The Court has never expressly held, however, that
the eighth amendment requires meaningful appellate review of death
sentences. 40 4 Nevertheless, traces of support for mandatory appellate review of death sentences appear in the Court's (and individual Justice's)
opinions, 40 5 beginning with the Court's recognition of the inherent inad40 6
equacies of statutory sentencing guidelines in McGaulha v. Cafornia.
In Mcautha, the Court recognized the impossibility of adequate
legislative prescription of capital sentencing guidelines:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides
and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express
these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and
applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.

40 7

nia v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3451 (1983) ("The Court ... has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree
of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination."). See generaly The Supreme Court, 1982
Tem, supra note 394, at 118 & n.2; Comment, CapitalPunishment and the Waiver of Sentence
Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 513 (1983).
401
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
402
See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2746-47 (1983); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982) (plurality opinion); id at 118-19 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 & n.13 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (plurality opinion); id. at
363-64 (White, J., concurring).
403
See supra notes 70-119 and accompanying text.
404
Dix, supra note 388, at 106 & n.77; Comment, supra note 400, at 511 n.135.
405
These traces of support for mandatory appellate review of death sentences do not
conclusively establish that any particular form of appellate review is constitutionally required. See Dix, supra note 388, at 102. Nevertheless, such statements are relevant to an
analysis of the Court's and the individual Justices' views on the subject. Ultimately, they
support the conclusion that a constitutional requirement of meaningful appellate review (including both comparative proportionality review and procedural compliance review) would
partially fill Furman'sprescription for a capital sentencing scheme that produces fair and consistent results.
406
402 U.S. 183 (1971); see inqfra notes 407-08 and accompanying text; see supra notes 63188 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of McGautha, Furman, and the
Furman progeny.
407
Mcautha, 402 U.S. at 204; see supra note 67; see also Dix, supra note 388, at 161; cf.
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) ("Necessity ...
fixes a point
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Although the Mcautha Court relied on this notion to uphold two statutory death penalty schemes that gave the sentencing authority "absolute
discretion" in imposing the death penalty,40 8 Furman and subsequent
cases have rejected that solution. 40 9 Instead, the Court has permitted
state legislatures to allocate sufficient discretion to the sentencing authority to permit consideration of the individual defendant's character
and background, 4 10 while insisting on thorough statutory supervision of
4t
such discretion . 11
Establishing a constitutional right of appellate review of death
sentences would compensate for the natural deficiencies of legislatively
prescribed sentencing guidelines, and thereby assure the degree of enforcement consistency that capital cases merit. Thus, although a constitutional right of judicial review does not exist for noncapital cases, the
establishment of such a right for death penalty cases would be consistent
with other procedural protections that are required only in capital
cases. 4 12 Such a right is indispensable to a constitutional capital sentencing scheme given the Supreme Court's recent willingness to allow
4 13
increased sentencing discretion.
Although Furman itself contained little discussion of appellate review, the 1976 decisions, upholding three post-Furman statutory death
penalty schemes and striking down two others, permitted the Court to
evaluate the merits of appellate review.4 14 The capital sentencing procedures of Georgia, Florida, and Texas passed constitutional muster
largely because they provided the sentencing authority with guidelines
beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel [the legislature] to prescribe
detailed rules . . . .
408
Mcautha, 402 U.S. at 189-90, 207. Justice Brennan, in dissent, raised many objections to standardless capital sentencing procedures that would resurface in several of the
Furman opinions. Justice Brennan insisted that "due process of law is denied by state procedural mechanisms that allow for the exercise of arbitrary power without providing any means
whereby arbitrary action may be reviewed or corrected." Id. at 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Douglas, in a separate dissent, also noted that the lack of review compounded the
constitutional deficiencies of standardless capital sentencing procedures. Id at 247 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
409
See supra notes 70-188 and accompanying text.
410
See supra notes 117, 136 and accompanying text.
411
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
412
See Comment, supra note 400, at 512 n.139 (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625
(1980) (jury must be permitted to consider lesser included noncapital offense in deciding guilt
of capital defendant; note 14 of the opinion explicitly limits it to capital cases); Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Court vacated defendant's capital sentence due to his inability
to confront all information contained in the presentence report submitted to trial judge);
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (requiring capital defendant's presence at sentencing
hearing)).
413
See supra notes 189-363 and accompanying text.
414
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v.
Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 325 (1976). For a more thorough discussion of these cases,
see supra notes 102-42 and accompanying text.
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aimed at controlling the exercise of discretion, 4 15 but the plurality of
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens repeatedly emphasized that appellate review was "an important additional safeguard. '4 16 In Gregg, Justice Stewart observed that "[w]here the sentencing authority is required
to specify the factors it relied upon in reaching its decision, the further
safeguard of meaningful appellate review . . . ensure[s] that death
'4 17
sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner.
Similarly, Justice White, in a concurring opinion, declared that if the
Georgia Supreme Court fulfilled its statutory duty under the Georgia
law,418 "death sentences imposed for discriminatory reasons or wantonly
or freakishly for any given category of crime will be set aside. '4 19 In
addition, in upholding Texas's capital sentencing scheme in Jurek v.
Texas,420 the plurality asserted that "[b]y providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas
has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consis'42 1
tent imposition of death sentences under law.
The plurality in Woodson v. North Carolina422 and Roberts v. Louisiana
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 206 (plurality opinion); see also Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253, 258-60
(plurality opinion); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion); S. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (plurality opinion).
417 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion). In Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733
(1983), discussed supra notes 208-78 and accompanying text, the Court reviewed Gregg, and
suggested that the eighth amendment requires appellate review of death sentences. Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, observed that
[t]he [Gregg] plurality's approval of Georgia's capital sentencing procedure
rested primarily on two features of the scheme: that the jury was required to
find at least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance and to identify it in
writing, and that the state supreme court reviewed the record of every death
penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate. These [two] elements, the [Gregg] opinion concluded, adequately protected against the wanton and freakish imposition of the death
penalty.
Id. at 2742 (footnote omitted).
418
The statute approved in Greggrequires, inter alia, that the Georgia Supreme Court, in
reviewing death sentences, shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence
supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance
. . . and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
GA. CODE § 17-10-35(c) (1982). The statutes upheld in Proffitt and Jurek both require appellate review of death sentences, but neither statute provides standards for such review. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4) (West Supp. 1983); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(o (Vernon 1981).
419
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice White's concurring opinion in Gregg.
420 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
421
Id. at 276.
422 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
415
416
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(S Roberts) 423 also invalidated the death penalty statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana partly because of their lack of appellate review provisions. 424 In Woodson, the plurality held that the North Carolina statute
was unconstitutional because it lacked sentencing guidelines, and because it provided "no way. . . for the judiciary to check arbitrary and
capricious exercise of that power through a review of death
sentences. ' 425 Similarly, the plurality declared in S Roberts that "[t]he
Louisiana procedure neither provides standards to channel jury judgments nor permits review to check the arbitrary exercise of the capital
jury's defacto sentencing discretion. ' 426 In Gregg, Profitt,Jurek, Woodson,
and S Roberts, therefore, the plurality opinions implicitly recognized
that meaningful appellate review provides an element of fairness and
consistency in capital sentencing that legislative sentencing guidelines
427
cannot supply.
The Court's decision in Godfrey v. Georgia4 28 reemphasized the importance of appellate review of death sentences. The Georgia Supreme
Court, in affirming Godfrey's death sentence, agreed with the jury's
finding, as a statutory aggravating circumstance, 4 29 that his crime was
or wantonly vile, horrible [and] inhuman' "in nature.4 30
The United States Supreme Court reversed the sentence, holding that
the Georgia Supreme Court had applied the statutory language too
broadly, in conflict with its own prior efforts to narrowly construe the
4 32
statute. 43 1 In approving the narrowing function of appellate review,
C'outrageously

423 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
424
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion); S Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (plurality
opinion).
425
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (footnote omitted).
426 S Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted).
427 In Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), reo'd, 104 S. Ct. 871
(1984), the Ninth Circuit interpreted Gregg as requiring the states' highest courts to perform
comparative proportionality review of all death sentences. Id. at 1196. In Harris, the court of
appeals vacated the federal district court's denial of the defendant's habeas corpus petition,
ordering the district court to vacate the death sentence unless the California Supreme Court
undertook comparative proportionality review within 120 days. Id at 1192. Although such a
position is consistent with the conclusions reached in this Project, the Ninth Circuit's analysis
lacked substance. First, the opinion correctly noted that "[a] plurality of the . . . Supreme
Court has approved proportionality review whether [it] is provided by statute [as in Gregg] or
by case law [as in Profflit]." Id. at 1196. Nevertheless, the opinion then makes the unsupported statement that Gregg and Proffitt "required" such review. Id. But see supra notes 404-26
and accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of Harris,see in/a notes 436-68 and accompanying text.
428 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
429 See GA. CODE § 17-10-35(c)(2) (1982) (referring to the statutory aggravating circumstances in § 17-10-30(b)).
430 Godfrey v. State, 243 Ga. 302, 310, 253 S.E.2d 710, 718 (1979) (quoting GA. CODE
§ 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982)). Godfrey had shot both his wife and mother-in-law in the head,
killing them instantly. 446 U.S. at 425.
431
Codfrt, 446 U.S. at 431-33 (plurality opinion). The Georgia Supreme Court had previously interpreted this aggravating circumstance as requiring that the killer's actions indi-
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the Court again implicitly recognized the importance of such review to a
4 33
constitutional capital sentencing scheme.
Although these decisions strongly support the use of comparative
proportionality review, and appellate review in general, as means of
minimizing capital sentencing errors, the Supreme Court recently held
in Pulley v. Harri 3 4 that the eighth amendment does not require com4 35
parative proportionality review of death sentences.
3.

Pulley v. Harris

After a California jury convicted Robert Alton Harris of the kidnapping, robbery, and first degree murder of two teenage boys, Harris
was sentenced to death in a separate sentencing proceeding.4 36 The Cal43 7
ifornia Supreme Court, pursuant to the state's death penalty statute,
reviewed and affirmed Harris's sentence.4 38 After petitioning unsuccessfully for a writ of habeas corpus from the state court and a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, Harris sought habeas
corpus relief in federal district court. 439 The district court judge denied
his petition, rejecting Harris's claim that the California Supreme Court
violated his eighth and fourteenth amendment rights by failing to pro44 0
vide for comparative proportionality review of his death sentence.
44
On appeal, ' the Ninth Circuit held that the eighth amendment required comparative proportionality review of death sentences, and vacate a "depravity of mind," as evidenced by torture or serious physical abuse of the victim
before death. Id. at 429-31 (citing Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (1977); Harris
v. State, 237 Ga. 718, 230 S.E.2d 1 (1976)).
432 For a discussion of the narrowing function of appellate review, see supra notes 388-91
and accompanying text.
433 One commentator maintains that societal interests in the eighth amendment protections afforded by post-sentencing appellate review of death sentences are so great that courts
should not permit capital defendants to waive such review. See Comment, supra note 400, at
524 ("Since appellate review of capital sentences is necessary to carry out the requirements of
the eighth amendment, it should be considered inalienable."); accord Gilmore v. Utah, 429
U.S. 1012, 1018-19 (1976) (White, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from
termination of stay of execution) (condemned person's consent does not authorize constitutionally questionable imposition of death penalty); Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 810
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (same). But see Lenhard v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807 (1979) (majority opinion) (denying application for stay of execution where condemned person consents);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1976) (majority opinion) (terminating stay of execution; recognizing condemned person's waiver of federal rights).
434 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
435 Id. at 879-80.
436

Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 871 & n.1.

437 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1984) & 1239(b) (West 1982 & Supp.
1984) require automatic appeal of death sentences, but provide no standards for the California Supreme Court's review of such sentences.
438 People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 964, 623 P.2d 240, 256, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 695
(1981).
439 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 874.
440

Id.

441

Harris was able to appeal the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition
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cated the district court's denial of Harris's habeas corpus petition. 442
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 443 and reversed. 444 Justice
White, writing for the majority, reviewed earlier discussions of the im446
445
portance of appellate review in Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida,

andJurekv. Texas.447 The Court recognized that the Gregg plurality "sug448
gested that some form of meaningful appellate review is required,"
and conceded that the Proffitt andJurekplurality opinions also noted the
importance of such review. 449 The Court, however, found that these
cases did "not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. ' 450 In particular, the Court noted that the Jurek Court upheld a capital sentencing scheme "even though neither the statute,...
nor state case-law, . . . provided for comparative proportionality re-

view. '45 1 Satisfied that the Court had not found such review to be constitutionally required in these earlier cases, the Harrismajority chose not
to inquire further into the merits of comparative proportionality
452

review.
Although the Hams majority opinion did not expressly determine
whether the eighth amendment requires appellate review of death
because the court issued a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1976).
For an explanation of this procedure, see in/ja note 480.
442 Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). The
court of appeals instructed the district court "to grant the petition relieving [Harris] from his
sentence of death unless the California Supreme Court undertakes [proportionality review]
within a reasonable time not to exceed 120 days from the date this order is filed . . . ." Id.
443 Harris v. Pulley, 103 S.Ct. 1425 (1983). Justice White's dramatic last-minute grant
of Texas defendant James Autry's application for a stay of execution in Autry v. Estelle, 104
S. Ct. 24 (1983), pending the Court's decision in Harris, heightened the significance of the
Court's decision as to whether the Constitution requires comparative proportionality review.
Autry was executed on March 13, 1984. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1984, at A27, col. 1.
444 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984). Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Marshall
joined.
445 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
446 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion).
447 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the Court's references to
appellate review in these cases, see supra notes 414-21 and accompanying text.
448 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 877 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06 (plurality opinion)).
449 104 S. Ct. at 877-79 (citing Aroffti,
428 U.S. at 250-51 (plurality opinion);Jurek, 428
U.S. at 276 (plurality opinion)).
450 Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 876.
451 Id. at 878. Justice White also stated that "[i]n view ofJurek,we are quite sure that at
that juncture the Court had not mandated comparative proportionality review [of every]
death sentence . . . ." Id. at 879. In addition, Justice White reviewed the Court's declaration in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983), that meaningful appellate review is one of
"two important features" that "guide and channel the exercise of discretion" in death penalty
cases. Zant, 103 U.S. at 2741. He concluded that Zant "did not hold that comparative review
was constitutionally required." Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 879.
452 After discussing prior case law, the Harris Court examined California's death penalty
scheme, concluding that it guaranteed sufficient fairness and consistency in capital sentencing. 104 S. Ct. at 880-81. For an analysis ofthe Court's conclusions, see in/,a text accompanying notes 453-68.
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sentences, 45 3 Justice Stevens asserted that Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek did
establish a constitutional requirement of "some form of meaningful appellate review" of death sentences. 454 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment that comparative proportionality review is not
constitutionally necessary in capital cases, noting that he was "not persuaded" that such review was the only method by which appellate
455
courts could perform "meaningful" appellate review.
Even if the plurality opinions in Gregg, Proqffitt, and Jurek did not
establish a constitutional requirement of comparative or other appellate
review of death sentences, lack of precedent alone cannot justify the
Supreme Court's decision in Harris.456 Although the Hams Court reviewed earlier capital sentencing decisions, it failed to discuss the relative merits of comparative proportionality review. Because postsentencing appellate review provides a valuable check on unfair or in457
consistent capital sentencing that statutory guidelines cannot supply,
analysis of such review illustrates its particular importance to a constitutionally permissible capital sentencing scheme.
The widespread use and proven effectiveness of comparative proportionality review confirms that comparison of a condemned person's
sentence with sentences imposed on others convicted of similar crimes is
the most logical means of ensuring consistent state-wide enforcement of
a death penalty statute. 458 Thirty-one of thirty-seven states currently
permitting the imposition of the death penalty provide for such review. 459 Comparative proportionality review has led the Georgia
Supreme Court to vacate death sentences in at least seven cases since
1974.460 Comparative proportionality review has produced similar results in other states. 461 The frequency and irrevocability of capital sentencing errors justify the moderate judicial resources necessary to
453 The Harris Court conceded that the Gregg plurality had "suggested" a need for some
form of appellate review. See supra note 448 and accompanying text. The HarrisCourt thus
may have implicitly recognized a general need for such review.
454
Harris, 104 S. Ct. at 884 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Stevens added that in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), the Court deemed
appellate review of the sentencing decision to be essential to upholding the jury's application
of Georgia's death penalty statute. Harrs, 104 S. Ct. at 884.
455
104 S. Ct. at 884 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
456
Indeed, the Court has reached other major capital punishment decisions without the
benefit of precedent. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory
death sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (per curiam) (arbitrary and capricious imposition of death penalty constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment).
457
See supra notes 414-33 and accompanying text.
458
See Haris, 104 S. Ct. at 890 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparative proportionality
review is "the most logical way to identify [capital] sentencing disparities . .
").
459 See supra note 382; see also infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text.
460
Harrs, 104 S. Ct. at 890-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing these cases).
461
Id. at 891 (citing cases).
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administer such review.4 62
The Harris decision has only a limited immediate effect: it will
hasten executions in Texas and California, the only two states with significant death row populations that do not provide comparative proportionality review of death sentences. 4 63 Nevertheless, Harris, like
Fuman,4 64 failed to resolve the issue of whether the eighth amendment
requires some form of meaningful appellate review of death sentences, 465
once again leaving state legislatures without guidance. Moreover, states
that now require comparative proportionality review may begin to relax
or eliminate such review in light of Harrisholding that such review is
not constitutionally required. 466 Such a trend would create a greater
likelihood of unfairness and inconsistency in capital sentencing because
comparative proportionality review provides the best means of detecting
abuses of discretion in sentencing.4 6 7 Justice White's assertion that no
capital sentencing scheme is perfect 468 cannot explain the Court's failure
to insist on the best scheme available for minimizing constitutional errors
in cases in which life is at stake.
B.

The Collateral Review of Federal Habeas Corpus
1. FederalHabeas Corpus in Capital Cases

In
writ of
writ of
process

1948, Congress codified the right to apply to a federal court for a
habeas corpus as a means of relief from state custody. 469 The
habeas corpus historically was a fundamental element of due
of law,47 0 created to guarantee freedom from unlawful executive

462 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Harris, asserted that comparative proportionality review serves to eliminate some, if only a small part, of the irrationality that currently infects
imposition of the death penalty by the various states. Before any execution is carried out,
therefore, a state should be required under the eighth and fourteenth Amendments to conduct such appellate review. Id.
463
See id.at 876 (majority opinion). For a discussion of the states that do require comparative proportionality review, see infra notes 747-52 and accompanying text.
464 See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
465 See supra note 453 and accompanying text.
466
See supra notes 450-52 and accompanying text.
467
See supra notes 457-62 and accompanying text.
468 Harri, 104 S. Ct. at 881 (citations omitted).
469 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). Section 2254(a) provides that
[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he
is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.
Prior to enactment of § 2254, federal case law provided for the right to apply for a writ of
habeas corpus. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.8 (1982).
470 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-409 (1963). The Court declared that "[the] root
principle [of habeas corpus] is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to
conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release." Id. at 402.

1202

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1129

detentions. As codified by Congress, the federal writ serves as a form of
collateral review of state court judgments by federal courts, permitting
the federal judiciary to supervise state adjudication of federal claims
and protect constitutional guarantees. 47 1 Moreover, federal district
courts, acting as the Supreme Court's designees, 472 use the writ to pro473
mote uniformity in the administration of due process guarantees.
The employment of the writ as a form of collateral review, however, enjoys less support than its use as a means of relief from pretrial
custody. 474 The Supreme Court has emphasized that "direct appeal is
the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence, '475 and that
"[t]he role of federal habeas proceedings . . . is secondary and limited. '476 Thus, "[w]hen the process of direct review . . . comes to an
end, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction
'4 77
and sentence.
The constitutional protections afforded by federal habeas corpus
are most needed in death penalty cases. 4 78 Consequently, despite the
presumption of finality attributed to a criminal conviction once the defendant has exhausted all avenues of direct appeal, federal courts reviewing post-conviction petitions for habeas corpus are "particularly
'4 79
sensitive to comprehensive and careful review of death penalty cases."
For example, in discussing the issuance of a certificate of probable cause,
which permits appeal of a federal district court's denial of an applicaOne critic suggests that life-tenured federal judges are more likely to protect the con471
stitutional rights of the accused than elected state judges, because the former need not respond to public indignation at rising crime rates. See Yackle, The Reagan Administration's
Habeas Corpus Proposals,68 IowA L. REV. 609, 616 (1983); cf. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The
Supreme Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367 (1983).
See Olsen, Judicial Proposals to Limit the JurisdictionalScope of FederalPost-Conviction
472
Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims of State Prisoners, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 301, 307-08
(1982). Because the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction cannot encompass all state criminal cases in which defendants raise federal issues, the federal district courts must handle federal habeas corpus petitions in order to guarantee a federal judicial forum for review of these
issues. Id. at 311. Professor Olsen argues that "[t]he Supreme Court's certiorarijurisdiction
cannot accomplish this function since that Court does not, and cannot, review convictions
merely for error." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
473
Yackle, supra note 471, at 617.
474
Yackle, supra note 471, at 609-10; see infra note 487 and accompanying text.
475
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391 (1983).
476
Id; see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543 n.3 (1981) (recognizing "limited nature" of review provided by federal habeas corpus).
477
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391 (1983); accord 28 U.S.C.§ 2254(d) (1976).
478
See supra notes 400-02 and accompanying text. In addition to the heightened appellate vigilance required by the eighth amendment to permit the lawful imposition of a death
sentence, the due process clause itself demands greater protection of the rights of defendants
in capital cases. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 309 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the degree of procedural regularity required by the Due Process Clause increases with
the importance of the interests at stake"); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895

(1961).
479

Olsen, supra note 472, at 338 n.193.
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tion for a writ of habeas corpus, 480 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the nature of the [death] penalty is a proper consideration
in determining whether to issue a certificate of probable cause." 41 Judicial sensitivity to the death penalty has produced startling results:
courts of appeals have uncovered constitutional deficiencies and set
aside death sentences in sixty-seven percent of the capital cases in which
they have heard the merits of a defendant's federal habeas corpus appeal. 482 Federal habeas corpus thus affords significant and valuable pro-

tection of the constitutional rights of condemned persons.
2.

The Debate Over FederalHabeas Corpus Reform

In recent years, the debate over the merits of federal habeas corpus
has intensified. 48 3 The attack on the present scope of federal habeas
corpus stresses three points:
484
(1) federal habeas corpus strains the principles of federalism;
48 5
(2) federal habeas corpus suffers from "progressive trivialization"
through overuse, imposing an unjustifiable burden on judicial resources; and
(3) federal habeas corpus causes judicial delays that undermine final486
ity in criminal proceedings.

Critics have offered a battery of proposals for limiting the scope of fed480
If a federal district court denies an application for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.c.
§ 2253 (1976) provides that
[a]n appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order
in a habeas corpus proceeding where the detention complained of arises out of
process issued by a State court, unless the justice or judge who rendered the
order or a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of probable cause.
Congress imposed this limitation "to prevent frivolous appeals from delaying the States' ability to impose sentences." Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3393. In applying § 2253, the federal courts
have generally refused to issue a certificate of probable cause unless the petitioner makes a
" 'substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal right.' "Id. at 3394 (quoting Stewart v. Beto,
454 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 925 (1972)). The federal district
courts therefore dismiss most habeas corpus applications without a certificate of probable
cause. See Olsen, supra note 472, at 309. If the district court or court of appeals issues that
certificate, the court of appeals must entertain and decide the appellant's appeal on the merits. Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3394; accord Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per
curiam).
481
Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3394. The Court, however, cautioned that "the severity of the
[death] penalty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate." Id.
But seeJurek v. Estelle, 450 U.S. 1014, 1019 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) ("[t]he severity of a defendant's punishment. . . simply has no bearing on. . .the
extent to which federal habeas courts should defer to state court findings").
482
See Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3405 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., at le-6e); see infra notes 546-51 and accompanying text.
483
Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, FederalHabeas Corpus and Its Refonn: An EmpiricalAnaljsis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 675-76 (1982); see infia notes 487-92 and accompanying text.
484
Olsen, supra note 472, at 305.
485
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
486
See Olsen, supra note 472, at 305.
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48 7
eral habeas corpus, somewhat tarnishing the luster of the Great Writ.
These same proposals have sparked an equally vehement defense of
habeas corpus. 488 Judges, 48 9 legislators, 490 and legal scholars49 1 have

492
joined both sides of the debate.

The Supreme Court has also played an active role in this controversy. 493 Several members of the Court have recently exhibited an intolerance for procedural delays attributable to federal habeas corpus
proceedings.4 94 Ironically, the Court's discontent has been most conspicuous in capital cases, where detailed procedural safeguards are particularly justifiable. 495 For example, the Court's impatience with
execution delays caused by habeas corpus is particularly apparent in
Barefoot v. Estelle.496
487 See Meador, Straightening Out FederalReview o/State CriminalCases, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 273
(1983); Smith, FederalHabeas Corpus-A Needfor Reform, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1036
(1982); Weick, Apportionment of theJudicialResources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be
Eliminated, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 740 (1972).
488
See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 472; Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in FederalHabeas Corpus:
An Argumentfor a Return to First Principles,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine]; Yackle, supra note 471.
489 See, e.g., Hooper, Habeas Corpus Under 28 USC Section 225f-Bane or Blessing, 9 CuM.
L. REV. 391 (1978) (federal district court judge); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between
the FederalandState Courtsiomthe Perspectiveofa State CourtJudge,22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801
(1981) (Justice O'Connor, as Arizona Court of Appeals judge); Rosenn, The Great Writ-A
Reflection ofSocietal Change,44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337 (1983) (federal court of appeals judge); see also
Olsen, supra note 472 (analyzing various judges' positions concerning reform of habeas
corpus).
490 See, e.g., S. 217, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2216, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R.
6050, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see also Remington, State PrisonerAccess to PostconvictionRelief-A Lessening Rolefor FederalCour4,"An Increasingly ImportantRole/or State Courts, 44 OHIO ST.
L.J. 287, 292-96 (1983) (discussing recent legislative proposals for federal habeas corpus
reform).
491
See, e.g., P. ROBINSON, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW
OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS (1979); Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, supra note 483; Michael,
The "New" Federalismand the Burger Court'sDeferenceto the States in FederalHabeas Corpus,64 IOWA
L. REV. 233 (1979); Remington, supra note 490; Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certficate of Probable Cause, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 307 (1983); Saltzburg, supra note 471; Weick, supra note 487.
492
The Reagan Administration has added its own set of proposals for federal habeas
corpus reform. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., FINAL REPORT 58-60 (1981); see also Yackle, supra note 471.
493 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3394 (1983) (permitting courts of appeals
to "adopt expedited procedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals") (discussed in/a
notes 497-521 and accompanying text); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (district courts
must dismiss habeas corpus petitions containing one unexhausted claim regardless of the
number of exhausted claims legitimately presented) (discussed in/ta notes 534-36 and accompanying text); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (fourth amendment exclusion claims unreviewable on application for writ of habeas corpus where defendant afforded an opportunity
for "full and fair" state court consideration).
494 See infa notes 557-59 and accompanying text.
495
Capital sentencing proceedings merit greater procedural protection of constitutional
rights because an execution cannot be reversed once the state has carried it out.
496
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983). One can find further evidence of the Court's impatience with
execution delays caused by habeas corpus in the rhetoric of individual Justices' statements
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Barefoot v. Estelle

3.

In 1978, a Texas jury found Thomas Barefoot guilty of murdering a
police officer 497 and sentenced him to death in a separate sentencing
proceeding, 498 as required by Texas law. 499 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Barefoot's conviction, 50 0 and later denied two applications for habeas corpus. 501 Barefoot then sought a writ of habeas
corpus from the federal district court, claiming that the state trial judge
had violated Barefoot's eighth and fourteenth amendment rights by perat the sentencing stage
mitting the introduction of psychiatric testimony
50 2
to assess Barefoot's future dangerousness.
The district court denied Barefoot's application, but issued a certificate of probable cause,50 3 permitting him to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 50 4 This certificate guaranteed Barefoot
appellate review of the merits of his application for habeas corpus. 50 5
Barefoot subsequently asked the court of appeals to stay his execution,
which was scheduled for January 25, 1983.506 The court of appeals
heard Barefoot's appeal on January 19, 1983, allowing his counsel unlimited time at oral argument to discuss any relevant issue. 50 7 The following day, the court of appeals denied Barefoot's application for a stay
of execution, discussing but not deciding the merits of his application for
habeas corpus. 50 8 On January 24, 1983, the day before Barefoot's sched-

uled execution, the Supreme Court granted a stay of execution and issued a writ of certiorari, 50 9 agreeing to hear argument on Barefoot's
claims that (1) the introduction of psychiatric testimony concerning his
future dangerousness violated his eighth and fourteenth amendment
rights and (2) the court of appeals denied him the right to full appellate
appended to recent denials of applications for stays of execution and petitions for certiorari.
See inra note 559 and accompanying text.
497 Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3389 (1983).
498
499

Id

506

Id

TEx. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1981).
500 Barefoot v. State, 596 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Grim. App. 1980) (en banc), crt. denied, 453
U.S. 913 (1981).
See Barefoo, 103 S. Ct. at 3390.
501
502 I. at 3390. The American Psychiatric Association concluded that two out of three
psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are wrong. Id at 3408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association at 9, 13). This conclusion supports Barefoot's assertion that such testimony is too unreliable to use at a capital
sentencing proceeding. See infa note 512.
103 S. Ct. at 3390. For an explanation of the certificate of probable cause, see supra
503
note 480. See generally Robbins, supra note 491.
103 S.Ct. at 3390.
504
505 Id.
507 Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), afd,
(1983).
508 Id at 600.
509 459 U.S. 1169 (1983).

103 S. Ct. 3383'
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review of the merits of his application for habeas corpus. 5 10
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Barefoot's application for a writ of habeas corpus. 5 11 The Court held that
5 12
psychiatric testimony is admissible at a capital sentencing proceeding
and concluded that the Fifth Circuit did not violate Barefoot's constitutional rights by denying his application for a stay without issuing a for5 13
mal ruling on his appeal from denial of habeas corpus.
Justice White, writing for the majority, recognized that issuing a
certificate of probable cause guarantees a full appellate review of the
merits of the defendant's application for habeas corpus. 5 14 In addition,
the Court acknowledged that "if a court of appeals is unable to resolve
the merits of an appeal before the scheduled date of execution, the petitioner is entitled to a stay of execution to permit due consideration of
the merits." 5 15 In assessing the Fifth Circuit's denial of Barefoot's application for a stay of execution, and its failure to rule expressly on the
merits of Barefoot's habeas appeal, the Court concluded that the court
of appeals had fully considered the merits of Barefoot's appeal simultaneously with his application for a stay. 5 16 Although the Court acknowl510
For a discussion of the procedure used by appellate courts in reviewing a denial of
habeas corpus, see supra note 480.
511
103 S. Ct. at 3400.
512
Id. Despite the American Psychiatric Association's assertion in its amicus brief that
psychiatric testimony concerning the future dangerousness of a defendant was unreliable, see
id. at 3408-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), the Court approved the use of such psychiatric testimony at the sentencing stage, even where the experts testifying had not personally examined
the defendant. Id. at 3399. The Court based this conclusion on its belief that juries could
"separate the wheat from the chaff." Id.at 3398 n.7.
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun questioned whether juries, inexperienced in criminal
and psychiatric matters, are capable of second-guessing experts who themselves are wrong
more often than not. Id. at 3413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, Blackmun noted that
psychiatric testimony could be potentially prejudicial because of the" 'aura of scientific infallibility' "surrounding that testimony. Id.at 3411 (quoting Giannelli, The Admissibilitpof Novel
Scientifz Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Haf-Centu7 Later,80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1237
(1980)). The Court's receptiveness to the admission of potentially erroneous expert testimony
in capital sentencing proceedings belies the Court's professed dedication to fairness and consistency in death penalty cases. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 394, at 121.
513 Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3393.
514 Id. at 3392 (citations omitted).
515
Id.
516 Id There are two possible explanations for the Fifth Circuit's actions in Barefoot.
either the court of appeals fully considered the merits of Barefoot's appeal simultaneously
with his application for a stay, or it followed its prior practice of requiring a capital defendant
to make "a showing of some prospect of success on the merits" of his appeal as a condition
precedent to issuing a stay of execution. Id.(citing, as examples of the Fifth Circuit's practice,
Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1982); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706, 708 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
The Court admitted that requiring a showing of some prospect of success on the merits
before issuance of a stay of execution might prevent constitutionally sufficient review of a
capital defendant's application for habeas corpus. Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3392. The court of
appeals' failure to issue an express ruling on the merits of Barefoot's appeal suggests that the
court required such a preliminary showing, and may not have fully considered the merits of
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edged that expressly affirming the district court's judgment would have
been "advisable," 51 7 it concluded that the court of appeals had clearly
and effectively ruled on the merits of Barefoot's appeal in denying his
application for a stay. 518 The Court thus found the practice of simultaneously considering the merits of a habeas corpus appeal and an application for a stay of execution constitutionally permissible, 51 9 concluding
that a remand to the Fifth Circuit merely to affirm the district court's
judgment would be "an unwarranted exaltation of form over
substance.

' 520

The Court in Barefoot then issued a set of guidelines to help lower
federal courts cope with the "increasing number of death-sentenced petitioners [that] are entering the appellate stages of the federal habeas
process. '5 21 In large part, these guidelines did not break new ground;
nevertheless, they reflect the Court's new emphasis on reducing delays in
executions at the expense of fairness and consistency in capital sentencing procedures, marking a disturbing departure from prior interpretations of the eighth amendment.
4. In Defense of CollateralReview of Death Sentences
The Court's third guideline in Barefoot, permitting the courts of apBarefoot's appeal. The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, however, and therefore refused to consider the constitutionality of requiring a preliminary showing for a stay of
execution.
517
103 S.Ct. at 3393.
518 Id. The court of appeals had stated that it found "no patent substantial merit, or
semblance thereof, to [Barefoot's] constitutional objections." Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d
593, 600 (5th Cir. 1983).
519 103 S. Ct. at 3392-93. Justice White noted that the requirement of a decision on the
merits "'does not prevent the courts of appeals from adopting appropriate summary procedures for final disposition of such cases."' Id at 3392 (quoting Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.
234, 242 (1968)). See Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1968) (per curiam) (sanctioning simultaneous consideration of a request for a certificate of probable cause and the
merits of the appeal).
520
Barefoot, 103 S.Ct. at 3393. The Court's conclusion that the Fifth Circuit had effectively ruled on the merits of Barefoot's appeal in denying his application for a stay of execution probably had little impact on the result of the case. The court of appeals, unimpressed
with the substance of Barefoot's constitutional claims, almost certainly would have reached
the same result even if it had considered the merits of Barefoot's appeal more extensively.
521 Id. at 3393. The Court set forth five guidelines. First, the Court noted that the severity of the death penalty does not by itself justify issuing a certificate of probable cause, although courts may consider it in reviewing habeas applications. Id at 3394. Second, the
Court stated that circuit courts should grant a stay of execution where necessary to permit a
decision on the merits of the appeal. Id. Third, the Court recognized that courts of appeals
may adopt expedited procedures in death penalty cases to permit them to resolve the merits
of an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus prior to the scheduled execution date. Id. at 339495. Fourth, the Court stated that federal courts should dismiss second or successive petitions
that either fail to allege new grounds for relief or allege new grounds that the defendant
should have included in an earlier petition. Id.at 3395. Finally, the Supreme Court warned
that it would not automatically issue a stay of execution to consider a condemned person's
petition for a writ of certiorari. Id.
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peals to adopt expedited procedures in capital cases to resolve the merits
of an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus prior to a scheduled execution date, 522 is the most worrisome of the Barefoot guidelines. The adoption of summary procedures by courts of appeals, and the very notion of
"photo-finish" appellate review, 523 would subjugate the goals of fairness
524
and consistency to that of expediency in reviews of capital sentences.
This sacrifice would conflict with the demands of the eighth amendment, particularly in view of the Court's new tolerance for sentencing
525
discretion.
The Court in Barefoot failed to give any reasons for its approval of
expedited procedures in capital cases involving appeals from denials of
habeas corpus, 5 26 thus making the decision difficult to analyze. Commentators who advocate reform of habeas corpus generally articulate
three complaints about federal corpus procedures: first, federal habeas
corpus generates friction between federal and state courts; 52 7 second,
federal habeas corpus has placed a growing burden on federal judicial
resources; 528 and third, federal habeas corpus undermines the desire for
finality in criminal proceedings. 529 Because the Court probably relied
on these arguments in formulating the Barefoot guidelines, an analysis of
the Court's new restrained attitude toward the use of federal habeas
corpus in death penalty cases must address each of these criticisms of
federal habeas corpus.
a.

States' Rights and CapitalPunishment

Congress created federal habeas corpus "to furnish a method additional to and independent of direct Supreme Court review of state court
522
523

Id. at 3394-95.
"Photo-finish" appellate review refers to the courts' attempts to complete expedited
review of death sentences prior to scheduled execution dates.
524
Restriction of the judicial time and effort devoted to habeas corpus appeals will reduce detection of constitutionally significant capital sentencing errors. In recent years, courts
of appeals have detected these errors in 67% of federal habeas corpus appeals. See infra notes
546-51 and accompanying text; see also The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supranote 394, at 121 (in
Barefoot, "the Court demonstrated. . . a new willingness to tolerate significant potential errors in capital sentencing").
525 For a discussion of this trend, see supra notes 150-363 and accompanying text.
526 Justice White, writing for the majority, relied heavily on three pre-Funnanhabeas
decisions, only one of which involved the death penalty. See Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3391-92
(citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968) (courts of appeals must permit appeal
from denial of habeas corpus where district court issues a certificate of probable cause, even if
state has released defendant); Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam)
(court of appeals erred by denying condemned person the opportunity to address the merits
of his appeal after granting certificate of probable cause); Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S.
542, 543 (1967) (per curiam) (where district court grants certificate of probable cause, court of
appeals must permit appeal from a denial of habeas corpus)).
527 See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 472, at 305.
528
Id
529

Id
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decisions for the vindication of... constitutional guarantees. 5 30 The
existence of this remedy inevitably conflicts with notions of state autonomy in criminal proceedings.5 3 1 Although minimizing federal-state judicial friction is one concern of the Supreme Court, the Court has
recognized that federal habeas corpus necessarily entails a certain
amount of this friction.5 32 Federal and state courts should be especially
tolerant of such conflict in death penalty cases, because both federal and
state governments have a vital interest in preserving the lives of their
citizens.
The Barefoot decision, which focused primarily on federal appellate
procedure, referred to states' rights only twice.5 33 Nevertheless, the
Court may have based its approval of summary procedures for federal
habeas corpus appeals in death penalty cases partly on each state's right
to enforce its criminal sentences without undue delay. The Supreme
Court has previously indicated the importance of this right. In Rose v.
Lundy, 534 a noncapital federal habeas corpus case, the Court held that
the federal district courts must dismiss a habeas corpus petition that
contains any unexhausted claim (one for which state avenues of relief
still exist) regardless of the number of exhausted claims legitimately
presented.5 35 Justice O'Connor asserted that this exhaustion require530 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416 (1963).
531 Congress sought to minimize federal interference with state criminal justice systems
by creating in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c)(1982) an exhaustion requirement for federal habeas
corpus:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless
it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he
has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure,
the question presented.
532 See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550-52 (1981).
533 See Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3391 ("[flederal courts are not forums in which to relitigate
state trials"); id. at 3395 ("the State has a quite legitimate interest in preventing such abuses
of the writ') (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc., at 41).
534 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
535 Id. at 510 (plurality opinion). Although the Supreme Court's adoption of a rigid
"total exhaustion" requirement was not inconsistent with the language of the federal habeas
corpus statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982), supra notes 469, 531, the Court rejected the
Sixth Circuit's more flexible approach of allowing district courts to dismiss unexhausted
claims raised in petitions for habeas corpus and proceed to the merits of the exhausted claims.
The Sixth Circuit's approach eliminated the need for amendment or resubmission of petitions
containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. At the time of the Supreme Court's
decision in Lundy, seven of the other circuit courts had adopted the Sixth Circuit's approach.
Lundy, 455 U.S. at 513 n.5. For a fuller criticism of Lundy, see Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine,
supra note 488, at 424-31; Note, FederalHabeas Corpus: The Exhaustion Doctrineand Mixed Peti-
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ment prevents federal review of claims until after the state has had a full
opportunity to adjudicate them, thus promoting judicial comity and
protecting the state's right to convict and sentence its criminals without
536
federal interference.
State interests, however, cannot always prevail over the defendant's
interest in meaningful enforcement of constitutional rights. The history
of habeas corpus "is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental rights of personal liberty. ' 53 7 Habeas corpus provides its most
significant protection when the taking of a life is at stake. Therefore,
although restricting federal habeas corpus in the interests of insulating a
state from undue federal interference may be proper when, as in Lund,
the defendant only faces a prison term,5 38 a restriction of federal habeas
corpus in the interests of state autonomy is inappropriate where a defendant faces execution.5 39 In such a case, even if "the interest in imposing the death penalty is essentially a state interest," 540 federal courts
have a compelling interest in ensuring that states impose the death penalty in a constitutionally permissible fashion.
b.

A Jusifiable Use ofjudicial Resources

Because federal habeas corpus traditionally served as a "secondary
and limited" remedy, 54 1 critics commonly assail its current availability,
primarily on the ground that frivolous federal habeas corpus petitions
'5 42
undeservingly consume "precious and limited judicial resources.
Unquestionably, federal courts should devote judicial resources to their
most productive uses. Productivity must be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively, however. Although expedited habeas corpus
procedures arguably enable federal courts to handle a greater number of
cases, such a quantitative increase would inevitably result in a qualitative reduction in reliability by requiring the federal courts to give less
consideration to the merits of each case. In death penalty cases, this
reduction may violate the eighth amendment's mandate of fairness and
543
consistency in capital sentencing.
lions-Rose v. Lundy and "Exhaustion" Under the Illinois Post-Conviction Remedies, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REV. 515, 520-27.
536 Lundy, 455 U.S. at 518-20 (plurality opinion).
537 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 (1963).
538 See Lundy, 455 U.S. at 510 n.1.
539 Barefoot, therefore, may have misjudged the balance of states' rights and individual
rights in concluding that courts of appeals could adopt expedited procedures for federal
habeas corpus appeals in capital cases.
540 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari).
541 Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3391 (1983); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S.
539, 541 (1981) ("limited nature" of federal habeas corpus).
542 Olsen, supra note 472, at 305; see also Weick, supra note 487, at 747-48.
543 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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The Court in Barefoot set forth guidelines 544 for appellate review of
federal habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases in part to lighten
the burden on judicial resources caused by "an increasing number of
death-sentenced petitioners. . . entering the appellate stages of the federal habeas process.15 45 The Court's approval of expedited procedures
implies a belief that federal habeas corpus petitions in death penalty
cases do not fully merit the current level of federal judicial resources
devoted to them.
The percentage of condemned persons' federal habeas corpus appeals that are successful suggests that these petitions merit the current
level of federal judicial resources devoted to them. 546 According to statistics compiled by the NAACP, of forty-one decisions by the courts of
appeals in capital cases from 1976 through February 1983,54 7 thirty-four
involved condemned persons' appeals and seven involved state appeals. 548 Of these forty-one cases, the condemned person prevailed in
thirty, a success rate of 73.2%. 549 Of the thirty-four cases in which the
condemned defendant appealed, the defendant prevailed in twentythree, a success rate of 67.6%.550 This success rate is remarkably high,
particularly in comparison with the 6.5% overall rate of success for appeals of federal criminal judgments. 55' This extremely high success rate
for condemned persons' federal habeas corpus appeals strongly suggests
that the appeals are not frivolous and that the court of appeals' current
allocation of judicial resources to these cases is justified.
The Supreme Court in Furman and Gregg recognized that the eighth
amendment requires the minimization of capital sentencing errors. 5 52
The frequency with which federal courts of appeals set aside state death
sentences indicates that federal appellate review currently plays a vital
role in reducing sentencing errors. Because the guidelines in Barefoot
may lessen the judicial resources federal courts of appeals expend in fulfilling this vital role, those guidelines constitute an unwarranted redistribution of judicial resources at the expense of fairness and consistency in
See supra note 521 (summarizing the guidelines in Barefoot.
Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3393.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., app.
E, at le-6e, Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. 3383.
547
Id at le.
548 Id at le-6e.
549
Id at 6e.
550 Id The American Bar Association presented different numbers in its amicus brief in
Barefoot, finding that courts of appeals had set aside death sentences in 22 out of 37 capital
cases since 1976, a 59.5% rate. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association at 7, Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. 3383. The ABA's numbers hardly undermine the argument that federal
habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases merit the current level of federal judicial resources devoted to them.
551
Greenberg, supra note 366, at 918 & n.64 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 97, 2, 51).
552
See supra notes 80-85, 116-19 and accompanying text (discussing Furman and Gregg).
544
545
546
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capital sentencing. Where an irrevocable punishment is at issue, the judicial system can ill afford this qualitative sacrifice.
c.

The Unique Finality of CapitalPunishment

A third objection to the present scope of federal habeas corpus focuses on the delays caused by habeas corpus proceedings. 553 Critics
claim that these delays "frustrate society's compelling interest in having
its constitutionally valid laws swiftly and surely carried out." 554 Although society's interest in finality may be compelling in noncapital
cases, that interest is outweighed by eighth amendment protections af555
forded to capital defendants.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly defended the need for finality
in criminal proceedings at the expense of the procedural protections afforded by federal habeas corpus. 556 Ironically, the Barefoot decision
reveals the Court's particular concern for expediting the adjudication of
defendants' federal habeas corpus petitions in death penalty cases. In

Barefoot, Justice White asserted that such defendants must not use federal habeas corpus "to delay an execution indefinitely. '557 Instead, the
Court urged federal courts to process federal habeas corpus petitions in
death penalty cases "as certainly and swiftly as orderly procedures will
permit." 558 Several recent memorandum decisions further demonstrate
the Court's impatience with execution delays. 559 By restricting the role
553 See Olsen, supra note 472, at 305; Yackle, supra note 471, at 610.
554 Jurek v. Estelle, 450 U.S. 1014, 1021 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
555 See supra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
556 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 528 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 n.3 (1981); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,
410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973).
557 Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3391.
558

Id.

559 Justice Rehnquist has been the Court's most vehement proponent of the need for
expeditious appellate procedures in capital cases. In his dissent from the Court's denial of
certiorari in Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949 (1981), for example, Justice Rehnquist concededly failed to find any meritorious constitutional issue, id. at 956 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), but, according to Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist wanted to
"promptly grant certiorari and decide the merits of every capital case coming from the state
courts in order to expedite the administration of the death penalty." Id. at 949 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist insisted in Coleman that the Court's
irresponsible denial of certiorari would "simply further protract the litigation." Id. at 963
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Rehnquist's suggestion is at best
impractical, because adding all state capital cases to the Court's already overcrowded docket
would undoubtedly increase administrative delays in capital cases. See id at 949-50 (Stevens,
J., concurring in denial of certoriari). Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist's proposal reveals his
antipathy toward procedural precautions that delay executions. The "arcane niceties" of
capital sentencing review, wrote Justice Rehnquist, amount to a "mockery of our criminal
justice system" by providing capital defendants with too many "bites at the apple." Id. at
957-58 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
ChiefJustice Burger has also expressed great impatience with execution delays. In Gray
v. Lucas, 104 S. Ct. 211 (1983) (denial of certiorari and application for stay), Chief Justice
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of federal habeas corpus in death penalty cases, the Court has exhibited
disdain for the heretofore guiding principle in capital punishment
cases-that the imposition of the death penalty requires the fairest and
560
most consistent procedural safeguards reasonably available.
Even more alarming is the Court's view, expressed in Barefoot, that
delays in administering the death penalty are more deplorable than delays in imposing other forms of punishment because, "unlike a term of
years, a death sentence cannot begin to be carried out by the State while
substantial legal issues remain outstanding. '561 This attitude reveals a
shocking disrespect for the procedural guarantees of the eighth amendment as interpreted in the Court's earlier decisions. 56 2 Justice Marshall,
in his dissent, attacked the Barefoot majority's apparent belief "thatfewer
safeguards are required where life is at stake than where only liberty or
563
property is at stake," calling this belief "truly a perverse suggestion."
The majority's suggestion in Barefoot ignores the different meaning that
the need for finality in criminal proceedings has in capital cases. Finality in a death penalty case means not merely the conclusion of legal
proceedings and the implementation of a judgment, but the irreversible
termination of a life. The constitutional requirement that exhaustive
Burger stated that "[t]his case illustrates a recent pattern of calculated efforts to frustrate
valid judgments after painstaking judicial review over a number of years; at some point there
must be finality." Id. at 213 (Burger, C.J., concurring in denial of certiorari and denial of
application for a stay). Gray was executed in Mississippi's gas chamber on September 2,
1983. See NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 1.
In Brooks v. Estelle, 459 U.S. 1061 (1982) (mem.), the Court faced issues similar to those
it encountered in Barefoot v. Estelle. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had rejected
Brooks's application for a stay of execution without ruling on the merits of his federal habeas
corpus appeal. Brooks v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). The
Supreme Court rejected Brooks's contention that the Fifth Circuit had not fully considered
the merits of his appeal, agreeing with the court of appeals' refusal to reconsider claims "so
often considered and of such little merit." 459 U.S. at 1067 (quoting Brooks v. Estelle, 697
F.2d at 590). Brooks was executed on December 7, 1982. See supra note 2.
Justice Powell has also expressed misgivings about execution delays caused by the adjudication of federal habeas corpus petitions. In a speech delivered on May 9, 1983, to a conference of Eleventh Circuit judges, Justice Powell asserted that such delays "undermine public
confidence in our system ofjustice." Sherrill, Death Row on Trial,N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 80, 103, and that the criminal justice system "irrationally permits [such]
. . . abuse of process." Nat'l L.J., June 6, 1983, at 11, col. 1.
560 See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, supra note 394, at 122; see also supranotes 400-02 and
accompanying text.
561 Barefoot, 103 S. Ct. at 3391.
562 For a discussion of these earlier decisions, see supra notes 70-188 and accompanying
text.
563
103 S. Ct. at 3404 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall
also attacked "the Court's conclusion that consideration of the merits in ruling on a stay
makes an actual decision on the merits of an appeal unnecessary." Id. at 3403. Although
technically correct, this particular objection was possibly unwarranted: the court of appeals
"afforded [Barefoot] an unlimited opportunity to make [his] contentions upon the underlying
merits by briefs and oral argument," Barefoot v. Estelle, 697 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1983),
and probably fully addressed the merits of his appeal in denying the stay. Id. at 596-600. See
supra notes 516-20 and accompanying text.
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procedural safeguards accompany the imposition of the death penalty 564
surely outweighs the administrative inconvenience caused by the delays
unavoidably attending the enforcement of these safeguards. 565 The
Court may choose to tolerate procedural shortcuts in noncapital federal
habeas corpus cases,5 66 but should not allow these shortcuts in capital
punishment cases.
CONCLUSION

In the 1970s, the Supreme Court held that capital punishment was
compatible with the eighth amendment only if imposed through fair
and reasonably consistent means. 567 Although the Court recognized the
need for discretion in the sentencing authority's consideration of the individual defendant's character and the nature and circumstances of his
crime, 568 it insisted that statutory capital sentencing schemes must direct and limit such discretion in order to prevent arbitrary, discriminatory, or excessive sentencing decisions. 569 Most states have sought to
achieve fairness and consistency in inflicting the death penalty by
promulgating detailed statutory guidelines that limit sentencing discre57 0
tion, and by providing for direct appellate review of death sentences.
The collateral review of federal habeas corpus provides an additional
means of detecting errors5 7' that render the capital sentence unconstitutional. In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has exhibited a
willingness to accept capital sentencing statutes and appellate review
procedures that compromise both fairness and consistency in imposing
the death penalty. These decisions establish a disturbing trend for the
future of capital punishment.
The Court has accepted broader sentencing discretion in the sentencing authority's consideration of both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. Allowing the sentencing authority to consider any releSee supra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
In Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950-51 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari), Justice Stevens indicated that these delays may be only temporary. He ascribed
part of the delays in the administration of the death penalty to "the enactment of [postFurman] state legislation [which] generated a number of novel constitutional questions," concluding that present delays are likely to become shorter as the constitutional requirements
grow clearer. Id.
566
See, e.g., Garrison v. Patterson, 391 U.S. 464, 466 (1968) (per curiam) (courts of appeals may concurrently consider questions of probable cause and the merits of a habeas
corpus appeal).
567
See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982).
568 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding a Georgia death penalty statute permitting sentencing authority to take into account aggravating
and mitigating factors).
569 See id. at 206-07.
570 See infra notes 609-12, 743-52 and accompanying text.
571
For a definition of capital sentencing "errors," see supra note 364.
564
565
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vant mitigating circumstance raised by the defendant 72 does not directly disadvantage that defendant. Nevertheless, this practice reduces
statutory supervision of the sentencing process, contrary to the Court's
prior insistence that the sentencer's discretion must be "suitably directed
and limited. '5 73 The Court's acceptance of increased sentencing discretion in considering aggravating circumstances gives rise to a more serious concern. The Court has recently upheld death sentences where the
sentencing authority may have based its decision partly on an invalid
aggravating circumstance (or on a potentially aggravating factor unrelated to the defendant's character or the nature of his crime), because
the sentencer also found a valid aggravating circumstance. 5 74 These decisions increase the likelihood of capital sentencing errors that result in
unconstitutional executions. Although a sentencing authority may
properly impose a death sentence where it finds only one valid aggravating circumstance, it may also choose in its discretion not to impose that
penalty. The added presence of an invalid aggravating circumstance
may tip the sentencing authority's decision toward imposing a death
sentence.
Similarly, statutory capital sentencing schemes that provide only
"threshold" guidance of sentencing discretion, by permitting untrammeled discretion once the prosecutor has established a statutory aggravating circumstance, 575 increase the likelihood of unfair or inconsistent
sentencing decisions. Aside from requiring one aggravating circumstance, these "threshold" statutes provide no more guidance than the
death penalty statutes struck down in Furman. The Court's approval of
these statutes is therefore inconsistent with the Court's capital punishment decisions of the 1970s.
Recent developments in the areas of state appellate review and federal habeas corpus review of death sentences also increase the potential
for unfairness and inconsistency in capital punishment. State appellate
review, including comparative proportionality review and procedural
compliance review, provides a valuable post-sentencing check against
capital sentencing errors that statutory guidelines cannot supply. States
that now require comparative proportionality review of death sentences,
however, may restrict or eliminate that review in light of the Court's
572 See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
573 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
574 Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748-50 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418,

3427-28 (1983).
575 Georgia's death penalty statute, upheld in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983),
provides such "threshold" guidance. As the Zant Court noted, "in Georgia the finding of an
aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion." Id. at 2741.
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decision in Pulley v. Harris.576 Equally troubling is the prospect of the
adoption of summary procedures to expedite a condemned person's appeal from a denial of federal habeas corpus. 577 In the past, the Court
has repeatedly recognized that the death penalty's unique severity and
irrevocability demand greater procedural precautions in administering
578
that penalty than in administering punishment in noncapital cases.
Yet the Court's new procedural guidelines, which tolerate shortcuts in
federal habeas corpus appeals in order to minimize execution delays,
reduce the role of federal habeas corpus in death penalty cases and turn
this uniqueness principle on its head.
Thus, the Supreme Court's recent death penalty decisions mark an
abandonment of its pursuit of fairness and consistency in capital sentencing. By accepting capital sentencing schemes that provide the sentencing authority with greater discretion, the Court has increased the
likelihood that sentencing authorities will abuse this discretion by permitting factors wholly unrelated to the defendant's character or the nature of his crime to influence their decisions. By allowing greater
restrictions on the condemned person's opportunities for meaningful review of his sentence in state and federal courts, the Court has decreased
the likelihood that courts engaging in death sentence review will detect
instances of these abuses of discretion. By simultaneously enhancing the
possibility of capital sentencing errors and reducing the possibility of
detecting these errors, the Court has greatly increased the likelihood of
state executions that violate the eighth amendment.

Raymondj. Pascucci
Emanuel D. Strauss
Gregog R. Watchman

576
577
578

104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
See Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3394-95 (1983).
See supra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
DISCUSSION OF STATE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTES
CURRENTLY IN FORCE

This Appendix describes and analyzes the various capital punishment statutes in the United States. Thirty-six states plus Vermontwhich retains an unused capital punishment statute of dubious constitutionality 579 -have death penalty laws. The thirty-six states are: Ala-

bama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
5 80
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.
PRE-FURMAN STATUTES

Prior to Furman v. Georgia,5 1 state legislatures generally accorded

the sentencing authority absolute discretion in determining whether
persons convicted of a capital offense should be executed. 5 2 One of the
Georgia statutes challenged in Furman, for example, provided in part:

"The crime of rape shall be punished by death, unless the jury recommends mercy, in which event punishment shall be imprisonment for life
..
,583 This provision failed to help the jury decide whether a capital defendant should be put to death or given mercy. Justice Stewart

therefore concluded in Furman that
the death sentences now before us are the product of a legal system
that brings them .

.

. within the very core of the Eighth Amend-

ment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments ...
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way

58 4
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.

Furman thus reversed three death sentences imposed by juries acting
579 See infia notes 590-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Vermont statute).
580 Eleven states have carried out at least one execution since 1977: Alabama, Florida
(seven persons executed), Georgia (two), Indiana, Louisiana (three), Mississippi, Nevada,
North Carolina, Texas (three), Utah, and Virginia. See supra notes I & 2.
581 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
582 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
583 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1968). The other statutory provisions that the Furman Court struck down were § 26-1005 of the Georgia Code, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1968), providing that the jury may recommend life imprisonment instead of death for a defendant convicted of murder, and article 1189 of the former
Texas Penal Code, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. app. tit. 15 ch. 8, art. 1189 (Vernon 1974) (repealed 1973) providing that "[a] person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five." 408 U.S. at
239-40.
584 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); see supranotes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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without statutory guidelines, 58 5 effectively invalidating the capital pun-

ishment laws in thirty-nine out of forty states with death penalties. 586
Most state legislatures responded to Furman by passing new death
penalty statutes. 58 7 At present, thirty-seven states include executions as
part of their criminal justice system.58 8 Vermont is the only state with a
pre-Furmanstatute still in force. Originally enacted in 1957,589 the Vermont law simply provides that "[t]he punishment for murder in the first

degree of [any corrections employee or law enforcement officer] shall be
death or imprisonment for life as the jury shall determine. '590 This statute, which gives the capital sentencing jury absolute discretion in fixing
5 1
a penalty, remains in force only because Vermont has never used it. 9
MANDATORY DEATH SENTENCE STATUTES

Ten states responded to Furman's invalidation of discretionary capital sentencing schemes by prescribing mandatory imposition of the
death penalty for certain violent crimes. 5 92 This approach was
"designed to eliminate sentencing discretion altogether" in an effort to
avoid a Furman-type challenge.5 93 In Woodson v. North Carolina,594 however, the Supreme Court found that North Carolina's mandatory capital punishment statute "fail[ed] to provide a constitutionally tolerable
response to Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sentences. '595 Similarly, in Roberts v. Louisiana (H. Roberts),59 6 the Court struck down Louisiana's statute mandating the death
penalty for the murder of a police officer 597 because it did not "allow for
consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to
either the particular offender or the particular offense. '598
For a discussion of Furman, see supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179 & n.23 (1976) (plurality opinion) (noting that
at least 35 states enacted capital punishment statutes after Furman).
588
For a listing of the 37 states with a death penalty, see supra text accompanying notes
579-80. Massachusetts is the most recent state to have enacted a death penalty statute. See
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 70 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (approved Dec. 22, 1982;
effective Jan. 1, 1983).
589
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303 (Supp. 1983).
590
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(c) (Supp. 1983).
591
Gillers, supra note 5, at 13 n.48.
592
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
593
Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness & Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26
CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 565 (1980).
594 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
595
Id at 302 (plurality opinion); see supra text accompanying notes 133-34.
596 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam).
597 The Court had previously held that Louisiana's statute imposing a mandatory death
penalty for any first degree murder violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments in Roberts
v. Louisiana (S. Roberts), 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976).
598 H. Roberts, 431 U.S. at 637 (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 141.
585
586
587
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Most state legislatures responded to the Supreme Court's decisions

by repealing their mandatory death penalty laws.5 99 Until recently,
New York was the only state that retained a mandatory death sentence
statute. 600 Although the New York Court of Appeals declared this statute unconstitutional in 1977,601 one section of the statute not challenged
in that case 60 2 remained in force until the state's highest court struck it
down in a 1984 decision. 60 3 The last section of the New York statute to
be invalidated mandated capital punishment for murder committed by
60 4
a prisoner serving a life sentence or an escapee from a life sentence.
This section of the statute remained in force as long as it did only because New York has not executed anyone since

1964.605

GUIDED DISCRETION IN CAPITAL SENTENCING

In the four years following the Court's decision in Furman, twentyfive states60 6 adopted modified versions of the Model Penal Code capital
sentencing scheme, 60 7 by providing for detailed statutory sentencing
guidelines to control the sentencing authority's discretion in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty. This system of "guided discretion" strikes a "balance between the wide discretion allowed before

Furman and the rigidity of mandatory death penalty laws passed in response to Furman but found unconstitutional in several rulings during
599

See LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CAPI-

1977, at 1 (Nov. 1978).
The New York law imposing a mandatory death sentence for persons convicted of

TAL PUNISHMENT

600

murder while serving a prison sentence of 15 years or more was held unconstitutional in
People v. Smith, No. 235 (N.Y. July 2, 1984) (available on LEXIS, N.Y. Library, cases file).
601
People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 37, 371 N.E.2d 456, 466, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735, 746, cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 998 (1977).
602 Id at 34 n.3, 371 N.E.2d at 465 n.3, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 745 n.3.
603 See People v. Smith, No. 235 (N.Y. July 2, 1984) (available on LEXIS, N.Y. library,
cases file) (holding that "a mandatory death statute simply cannot be reconciled with the
scrupulous care the legal system demands to insure that the death penalty fits the individual
and the crime.").
604
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 12 5. 2 7 (1)(a)(iii) (McKinney 1975) (defining first degree murder).
This section is then read concurrently with § 60.06, the mandatory death sentence statute.
See supra note 600.
605 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, supra note 3, at 15 (New York entry in table 2) (193081). In People v. Smith, No. 235 (N.Y. July 2, 1984) (available on LEXIS, N.Y. library, cases
file), the New York Court of Appeals vacated the sentence of the lone resident of New York's
death row. See supra note 603.
606 After Furman, 35 states enacted new death penalty statutes. See supra note 587 and
accompanying text. Of these states, only 10 enacted mandatory death penalty statutes. See
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "following Furman 10 States enacted laws providing for mandatory capital punishment"). The
remaining 25 states passed statutes providing for detailed statutory guidelines to control the
sentencing authority's discretion in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See supra
note 101 and accompanying text.
607 For a description of the Model Penal Code approach, see supra note 14.
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1976."608

All thirty-six of the post-Furman state death penalty laws 60 9 currently in effect are modeled after one of the three statutory schemes upheld by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia,6 10 Proftill v. Florida,6 1I and
Jurek v. Texas.61 2 The large majority of these statutes are modeled after
the Florida law upheld in Profft. 6 13 The statute challenged in Profflt
required the trier of fact to weigh eight aggravating circumstances
against seven mitigating circumstances to determine whether to impose
the death penalty. 6 14 These enumerated statutory circumstances relate
to the manner in which the capital offense was committed and the character of the defendant. Twenty-nine states have followed this framework and now provide statutory lists of aggravating and mitigating
6 15
factors relevant to sentencing.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982, supra note 3, at 3.
Only Vermont has a death penalty statute that is not modeled after the statutes upGregg, Proffitt, andjurek. The Vermont statute fails to provide for guided discretion in
sentencing. See supra notes 589-91 and accompanying text.
610
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
611
428 U.S. 242 (1976).
612
428 U.S. 262 (1976). See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-45 to -55 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-703 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1301 to -1305 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.2-.5 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-46a (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE §§ 17-10-30 to -44 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9
(Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 532.025(2)-.035 (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. arts. 905.3-.9 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 412-414
(Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, §§ 68-71 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101 to -107 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030-.035 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -310 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2522 to
-2523 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.552, 200.030-.035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3120A-3 to -6 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000 to -2202 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2929.02-.06 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.9-.13 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-20 to -28 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-27A-1 to -41 (1979 & Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-203 to -205 (1982); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 &
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206 to -207 (1978 & Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2264.2 to -264.5 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020-.150 (Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT.
§§ 6-2-102 to -103 (1983).
613 See infra note 615 and accompanying text.
614 See 428 U.S. at 248-49 (plurality opinion). The Florida statute challenged and upheld
in Proffitt was FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1976-1977) (current version at FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1984)). Florida's capital sentencing procedure was essentially patterned after the Model Penal Code. See Protflt, 428 U.S. at 248. For discussion of the
Model Penal Code approach and the states that have followed it, see supra note 14; supra notes
606-07 and accompanying text.
615
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-49 to -51 (1982 & Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13703(F)-(G) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1303 to-1304 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190.2(a), 190.3 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)-(6), (5.1)-(6) (1978 &
Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(O-(g) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(5)-(6)
608
609
held in
capital

(West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,

9-1(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE
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The second group of states follow the Georgia scheme upheld in

Gregg.6 16 These five states6 17 provide a list of statutory aggravating circumstances, 618 but give no guidance as to the mitigating circumstances
the sentencer should consider. The Oklahoma statute, for example, provides that "[i]n the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as
to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circum' 619
stances enumerated in this act.
The third type of death penalty statute, upheld injure6 20 and followed in Texas and Virginia, does not specify aggravating circumstances. The Texas statute designates five specific forms of murder as
capital offenses: murder of a peace officer or fireman, murder committed in the course of certain felonies, murder for hire, murder committed
by a prison inmate, and murder committed while escaping from
prison. 62 1 After the jury has determined guilt, the court submits three
questions to the same jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death
of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provo622
cation, if any, by the deceased.
If the jury returns affirmative findings on all three questions, the court

ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)-(c) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2) (Baldwin
1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 905.4, 905.5 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 413(d), (g) (1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69 (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.012.2,
565,012.3 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-303 to -304 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.033, 200.035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)-(5) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 31-20A-5, 31-20A-6 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e), () (1983); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d), (e) (Purdon 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i), (j)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202, 76-3-207 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.95.020-.070 (Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h), (j) (1983).
616 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a description of this Georgia statute, see supra note 109.
617 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(1)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(o (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp. 1983).
618 The first group of states also provide lists of statutory aggravating circumstances. See
supra note 615 and accompanying text.
619 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983).
620 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
621
See suur notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
622 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981); see supra note 128.
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must impose the death penalty. 62 3 Although the Texas law is a
mandatory death sentence statute on its face, 6 2 4 Texas courts have interpreted the future dangerousness question (question (2)) as allowing the
625
defendant to offer any mitigating evidence.
In Virginia, the seven forms of capital murder are: murder in the
commission of abduction, murder for hire, murder by a prisoner, murder in the commission of armed robbery, murder during or after the
commission of rape, murder of a law-enforcement officer, and murder of
more than one person as part of the same act or transaction. 626 Under
Virginia's death penalty statute, the sentencing authority cannot impose
the death penalty unless
(1) after consideration of the past criminal record of convictions of the
defendant, [it] find[s] that there is probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society or that his conduct in committing the
offense

. . .

was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman

in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim; and (2) recommend[s] that the penalty of death be
627
imposed.
Unlike Texas, Virginia provides statutory guidance concerning mitigat62 8
ing factors.
CAPITAL OFFENSES

In Coker v. Georgia,629 the Supreme Court held that the penalty of
death for the rape of an adult woman was disproportionate and excessive to the crime and therefore violated the eighth amendment. 6 30 In
response, the majority of states have restricted capital offenses to some
form of murder or felonies resulting in death. 63' Some states, however,
continue to designate crimes not resulting in death as capital offenses.
Four states make some form of aggravated kidnapping a capital of623

TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN.

art. 37.071(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

See supra note 129.
625
SeeJurek, 428 U.S. at 272-73.
626 VA. CODE § 18.2-31 (Supp. 1983).
627 VA. CODE § 19.2-264.2 (1983); see also VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983) (state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt probability of future dangerousness or that conduct was
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman" before death penalty can be imposed).
628 VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983).
629 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
630 Id at 592 (plurality opinion). For a further discussion of Coker, see infra note 638.
631 See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1981, supra note 3, at 10-11 ("status of death penalty statutes by jurisdiction"). The following felonies resulting in death are capital offenses in California: "Assault by life prisoner resulting in death"; "Hindering preparing for war causing
death"; "Omitting to note defects in articles of war resulting in death"; "Perjury resulting in
the death penalty"; and "Train wrecking resulting in death." Id at 10. In Georgia, rape or
armed robbery resulting in the victim's death is a capital offense. Id Kidnapping resulting in
death to the victim is a capital offense in both Kentucky and Montana. Id at 11.
624
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fense. 632 Three states make some form of aggravated rape a capital offense. 633 A person convicted of treason may be sentenced to death in

three states. 634 Two states include skyjacking as a capital offense. 635 Finally, Colorado provides that certain drug offenses may warrant the
death sentence. 636 The Supreme Court, however, has not decided
whether most crimes other than murder may be constitutionally desig638
nated as capital offenses. 6 37 In light of the Court's decision in Coker,
632 Id. at 10-11 (Georgia-"kidnapping with bodily injury"; Idaho-first degree kidnapping, unless kidnapper released victim unharmed; South Dakota-kidnapping when the kidnapper inflicted gross permanent physical injury on victim; Wyoming-kidnapping, unless
kidnapper released victim unharmed).
633 Id (Florida--"The sexual battery of a female child age 11 or under by a male age 18
or older"; Mississippi--"The rape of a female child under age 12 by a person age 18 or older";
Oklahoma--"The rape of a female under age 14 by a male over age 17 or the rape of a person
mentally incompetent").
634 Id (California, Georgia, and Mississippi).
635 Id (Georgia--"Aircraft hijacking"; Mississippi--"Aircraft piracy").
636 Id at 10 ("inducing a person age 25 or under to use or administer narcotic drugs
unlawfully; unlawfully administering or dispensing a narcotic drug to a person age 25 or
under; using a person age 25 or under for the unlawful transportation or production of narcotic drugs").
637

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982, supra note 3, at 2-3 n.5.

In Coker, four members of the Court concluded that "a sentence of death is grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by
638

the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opin-

ion) (footnote omitted). The plurality "observe[d] that in the light of the legislative decisions
in almost all of the States and in most of the countries around the world, it would be difficult
to support a claim that the death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of the States'
criminal justice system." Id.at 593 n.4. The plurality further noted that of the 16 states which
declared rape a capital offense prior to Furman, only three states-Georgia, Louisiana, and
North Carolina-retained that classification when they revised their death penalty statutes in
light of Furman. Id. at 594. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger criticized the plurality, arguing
that "it is myopic to base sweeping constitutional principles upon the narrow experience of
the past five years [given that] [c]onsiderable uncertainty was introduced into this area of the
law by this Court's Furman decision." Id. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
According to Chief Justice Burger, a second reason underlying the holding in Coker was
"a subjective judgment that death is an excessive punishment for rape because the crime does
not, in and of itself, cause the death of the victim." Id.at 613. Justice White, writing for the
plurality, noted that rape is a serious and reprehensible crime deserving of severe punishment,
but nevertheless concluded that "in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person
and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which . . . involve[s] the unjustified
taking of human life." Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
The Coker plurality thus based its holding on two grounds: first, "the legislative rejection
of capital punishment for rape," id. at 597; and second, "[t]he murderer kills [while] the rapist
. . .does not." Id.at 598. See also id at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (dividing the analysis
of the plurality opinion into two parts). Of the five crimes that certain states currently designate as capital offenses but which do not cause death to the victim, no more than four states
agree that any one of those crimes deserves the death penalty. See supra notes 632-36 and
accompanying text.
Coker could be interpreted as establishing a two-part constitutional test for valid capital
offenses: first, legislatures must not have widely rejected capital punishment for the crimes in
question; and second, the crime must involve the taking of life. Because most states have
rejected capital punishment for crimes that do not cause death to the victim, and because
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capital punishment for these crimes would probably be struck down as
disproportionate and excessive.
BIFURCATED PROCEEDINGS
639
The Supreme Court held in McGaulha v. Calfornia
that separate
guilt determination and sentencing trials are not constitutionally required in capital cases. 640 Although the Court noted that "the Federal
Constitution . . . does not guarantee trial procedures that are the best
of all worlds,"' 64 1 it conceded that "bifurcated trials . . . are [a] superior
means of dealing with capital cases. '6 42 All thirty-six states with valid
capital punishment statutes provide for bifurcated proceedings. 64 3 The
Florida statute, for example, provides that "[u]pon conviction of adjudication of guilt of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct
a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant
'644
should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

At the separate sentencing proceeding the prosecution may present
evidence of aggravating circumstances, while the defense may present
these offenses do not involve the taking of life, the imposition of the death penalty on an
offender who has not himself caused death might be unconstitutional.
639 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
640 Id. at 220; see supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
641 402 U.S. at 221.
642 Id; see supra note 64.
643 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(a) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301(3) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West Supp. 1984); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(b) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209(b) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 192515(c) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9(a) (Burns Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(1) (Baldwin 1983); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(a)
(Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.2 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.552 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:113(c)(1) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1(B) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(a)(1) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C) (2) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-2
(1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(a) (1982); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 1(a)
(Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19-2-264.3(C)
(1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.050(1) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(a)
(1983).
The Georgia statute did not specifically require bifurcated proceedings in capital cases:
"In all cases tried by a jury in which the death penalty may be imposed, upon a return of a
verdict of 'guilty' by the jury, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury." GA. CODE § 17-10-2(c) (1982) (enacted 1974) (emphasis added). The
Georgia Supreme Court, however, resolved this ambiguity in the language by interpreting
Georgia's capital punishment statute as requiring a separate sentencing proceeding. See
Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 559, 229 S.E.2d 376, 377 (1976).
644 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983).
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evidence of mitigating circumstances. 645 The purpose of bifurcated proceedings in capital cases is to focus additional evidence and argument
solely on the choice of whether to impose the death penalty. Bifurcation
thus allows a capital defendant to exercise his fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination by not testifying at the guilt-determination
stage without forfeiting any opportunity to speak on his own behalf regarding the sentencing decision. 646 Bifurcation also prevents the prosecution from offering, at the guilt determination stage, prejudicial
evidence that should be considered only for sentencing purposes.

647

EVIDENCE AT THE SENTENCING TRIAL

Depending on the jurisdiction, the ordinary rules of evidence for
criminal trials may or may not apply in the penalty hearing in capital
cases. Seven states expressly provide that counsel may present any relevant evidence regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules
of evidence. 648 The Alabama capital punishment statute, for example,
provides: "Any evidence which has probative value and is relevant to
sentence shall be received at the sentence hearing regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay
statements." 649 At least fifteen other states' capital punishment statutes
seem to allow the sentencing authority to hear any evidence, although
the statutes do not expressly indicate that the ordinary rules of evidence
shall not apply.65 0 In Idaho, for example, "[e]vidence offered at [the

guilt determination] trial but not admitted may be repeated or amplified if necessary to complete the record. '65 1 In Mississippi, "evidence
may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to
sentence," but this language "shall not be construed to authorize the
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the [Federal or
645
646
647
648

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983).
See supra note 64.
See id
AiA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983);

MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-18-302 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(C) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(3) (Supp.
1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(c) (1983).
649 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(d) (1982).
650 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(c)(1) (1979); GA. CODE § 17-10-2(a)-(b) (1982);
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1979); IND. CODE. ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (Burns. Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Baldwin 1983); MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 413(c) (Supp. 1983);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521 (1979); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-1(C) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983);
TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1981).
651
IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1979).
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-652 The Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
State] Constitutions ....
Texas statutes have similar provisions. 653 California's capital punishment statute provides generally that the court may admit any evidence
at the sentencing hearing, but there are two statutory exceptions: evidence regarding the defendant's prior nonviolent criminal activity and
evidence regarding any prior criminal prosecution in which the defend65 4
ant was acquitted.
Only three states-Louisiana, Missouri, and Virginia-unambiguously subject evidence offered at the sentencing stage of capital cases to
the same rules of evidence that govern at trial. 655 The Pennsylvania
capital punishment statute implies that the ordinary rules of evidence
shall govern, but does not expressly mention those rules: "evidence may
be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant and admissi,,656
ble on the question of the sentence to be imposed ....
Five states provide that evidence of any mitigating circumstances
may be presented regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; but the rules do apply with respect to aggravating circumstances. 65 7 The Ohio capital punishment statute affords the defendant
"great latitude" in presenting evidence in mitigation of the sentence. 658
In Illinois, evidence of statutory aggravating circumstances (including
the defendant's rebuttal evidence) is subject to the ordinary rules of evidence, but the court may admit evidence relating to the statutory mitigating circumstances and to any additional (nonstatutory) aggravating
659
factors without regard to those rules.
The New Jersey and South Dakota death penalty laws do not indicate whether the ordinary rules of evidence for a criminal trial apply to
evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing in capital cases. The
New Jersey statute provides that "[t]he State and the defendant [may]
652

MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1).
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(a) (Vernon 1981).
654
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984).
655 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.2 (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.030.4 (Vernon Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983).
656 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a) (2) (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added).
657 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301(4)
(1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(2) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(c)
(1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
658 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Page 1982).
659 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). It is unclear whether the
Illinois provision allowing any evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors would survive
constitutional scrutiny. Although the Supreme Court has recently exhibited a tolerance for
increased capital sentencing discretion regarding aggravating circumstances, see general/ supra
notes 196-363 and accompanying text, the Court has not allowed the sentencing authority to
consider any aggravating factor. The Illinois provision seems to directly conflict with Furman
and its progeny, see cases cited supranote 25, which require that a capital sentencing authority's discretion "be suitably directed and limited." Furman, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion). See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
653
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rebut any evidence presented. . . and. . . present argument as to the
adequacy of the evidence to establish the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating factor. ' 660 The South Dakota law simply states that the capital sentencing "hearing shall be conducted to hear additional evidence
'6 6 1
in mitigation and aggravation of punishment.
STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Thirty-four states have capital punishment statutes that provide
lists of specific aggravating circumstances weighing in favor of the death
sentence. 662 These aggravating circumstances vary considerably in
number and specificity from one state statute to another. In drafting
post-Furman death penalty laws, state legislatures have focused on five
broad considerations in determining which capital defendants should
receive the death penalty. These considerations include the defendant's
motive in committing the crime, the method or manner of the crime, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, the defendant's
663
background, and the identity of the victim.
The aggravating circumstance designated in most state statutes relates to the capital offender's motive. Committing a crime for pecuniary
664
gain or for hire is an aggravating circumstance in thirty-three states.
660 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(2) (West 1982).
661 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-2 (1979).
662 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49 (Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (Supp.
1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6) (1978 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)
(1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(e)(7) (1979 & Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 9-1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-502-9(b) (Bums Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d) (1982 &
Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2 (Vernon Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (1979); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.033 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(a) (Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:I1-3(c)(4) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(e) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.12 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20()(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp.
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1), 76-3-207(2)
(Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)
(1983).
663 These five broad considerations are not mutually exclusive. Many of the specific factors listed by state legislatures as aggravating circumstances fall into more than one of these
overlapping categories.
664 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(6) (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F) (Supp.
1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(6) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(1) (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(e) (Supp. 1983) (arguably only murder for hire);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(6) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(o) (Supp.
1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)( 0 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(4)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(4) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 9-1(b)(5) (Smith-Hurd
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Committing a crime to prevent a lawful arrest or effectuate an unlawful
escape from custody is an aggravating circumstance in twenty-two
states.665 Committing a crime to hinder or interfere with any governmental function, including the enforcement of laws, is an aggravating
factor in seven states. 666 In California, it is an aggravating circumstance
if the "victim was intentionally killed because of his race, color, religion,
'66 7
nationality or country of origin.
A second consideration is the cruelty that the defendant may have
exhibited. Twenty-one states list as an aggravating circumstance that
the capital offense was especially "heinous," "atrocious," "cruel," ".outrageously or wantonly vile," "horrible," "inhuman," or "exceptionally
brutal. ' 668 In Florida, it is an aggravating circumstance that the deSupp. 1983) (only murder for hire); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(4) (Burns Supp. 1983)
(only murder for hire); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(4) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(e) (West Supp. 1984) (arguably only murder for hire); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(6) (1982) (only murder for hire); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch.279,
§ 69(a)(5) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984) (only murder for hire); MIss. CODE ANN. § 9919-101(5)( 0 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(1)(c) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(6) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(II)(a)(6) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(d) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-5(F) (1981) (only murder for hire); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(2) (Page 1982) (only murder for hire); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(d)(2) (Purdon 1982)
(only murder for hire); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(3) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(4)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(0, (1)(g) (Supp. 1983) (murder for pecuniary gain
and murder for hire respectively); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(4) (only murder for
hire) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(vi) (1983).
665 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(5) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(5) (1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(5) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(b)
(1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(e) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(10)
(1982); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(a) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 413(d)(3) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 279, § 69(a)(6) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(10)
(Vernon Supp. 1984); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.033(5) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(I)(a)(5) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(4)(t) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-5(C) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(4) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(A)(3) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(5) (West 1983); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (9) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(6), (8)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(e) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(v) (1983).
666 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(7) (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(7) (1977); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(g) (West Supp. 1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(g) (Supp.
1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1) (1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(7) (1983);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202a(Supp. 1983).
667 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(16) (West Supp. 1984).
668 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(6)
(Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(14) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1611-103(6)(i) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(4) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(e)(1)(i) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 1710-30(b)(7) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(5) (1979); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905. 4 (g) (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(d) (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(h)(7) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(4)(c) (West
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fendant committed the homicide "in a cold, calculated, and premedi'6 69
tated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification.
Similarly, in Idaho, it is an aggravating circumstance that the defendant
"exhibited utter disregard for human life."'6 70 Hiring another person to
67
commit the crime is an aggravating circumstance in seventeen states. '
A finding that the defendant was lying in wait will justify the death
sentence in four states. 6 72 Ten state statutes list torture as an aggravating circumstance. 673 Seven state statutes designate the use of explosives
as an aggravating circumstance, 674 and four states list the use of
6 75
poison.
Another category of aggravating circumstances relates to the defendant's background or status at the time of the crime. The defendant's status as a prisoner at the time of the capital offense is an
aggravating circumstance in twenty-four states. 6 76 Twenty-one states
1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4)

(West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-27A-1(6) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-2-203(i)(5) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(q) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2102(h)(vii) (1983).
669 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(i) (West Supp. 1983).
670 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(6) (1979). See also NEv. REv. STAT. § 2 00.033(g) (1983)
(an aggravating circumstance where "[t]he murder was committed upon one or more persons
at random and without apparent motive"); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 69(a)(7)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984) (an aggravating circumstance where the defendant
"demonstrat[ed] a total disregard for the suffering of the victim").
671 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(4) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a46a(g)(5) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(m) (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 17-1030(b)(6) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(4) (1979); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905. 4 (e) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. STAT. art. 27, § 413(d)(7) (1982); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.2(6) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(6) (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(e) (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(3) (West 1983); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(d)(2) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(6) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(5) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(4) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5- 2 02 (1)(g) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(5) (Supp. 1983).
- 672 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11103(0(6) (1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (Burns Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-303(4) (1983).
673 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1901.2(a)(18) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 420 9 (e)(1)(1) (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279,
§ 69(a)(7) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(7) (Vernon Supp.
1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(3) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(8) (1983); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(4)(c) (West 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(d)(8) (Purdon
1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983).
674 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(6) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11103(6)( 0 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(2)0) (Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 3550-2-9(b)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 69(a)(9) (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d) (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5202(1)(1) (Supp. 1983).
675

CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(19)

(West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,

§ 4 209(e)(1)(1) (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(h) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); UTAH. CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(n) (Supp. 1983).
676

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(1)

(Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(7)

1230

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1129

designate the defendant's commission of a prior violent felony or the

defendant's history of violence as an aggravating factor.6 77 Fourteen
states specifically designate a prior murder or capital offense as an ag67 8
gravating circumstance.
Circumstances surrounding the commission of the capital offense
may also warrant infliction of the death penalty. Committing the crime
in connection with a separate felony of violence is an aggravating circumstance in twenty-five states. 679 In Pennsylvania, it is an aggravating
circumstance that the defendant committed a homicide during the per(Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(1) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(b)

(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(e)(1)(m) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5)(a) (West Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(5) (Baldwin 1983);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(i) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,

§ 413(d)(2) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(a)(2) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(a) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(10) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(1) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033 (1983);

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(a)(1) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(D)(E)
(1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(1) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(4)
(Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(6) (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 23A-27A-1(8) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(8) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-202(1)(a) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(3) (Supp. 1984); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(i) (1983).
677

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(2) (Supp. 1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-703(F)(2) (Supp.

1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(3) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(12) (1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(i) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(b) (West Supp.

1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(1) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(1) (Baldwin
1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(c) (West Supp. 1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 9919-101(5)(b) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(1)(a) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(2) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
1 630:5(11) (a) (2) (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 701.12(1) (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d)(9) (Purdon 1982); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(1) (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(8)(2)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(ii) (1983).
678 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(1) (Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(a) (1978); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(1)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(1) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(7) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(a) (Baldwin 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(8) (1982); MASS. ANN.

LAWS ch. 279, § 69(a)(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18303(2) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:11-3(c)(4)(a) (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-

20(C)(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(h) (Supp. 1983).
679

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(4) (Supp. 1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West

Supp. 1984); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(g) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(1)
(1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(i) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(d)
(West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(2) (1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, T 9-1(b)(6)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(2) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(a)
(West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(10) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
279, § 69(a)(10) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(d)
(Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(11) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.033(4) (1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(g) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3120A-5(B)

(1981);

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5)

(1983);

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2929.04(A)(7) (Page 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(a)-(i) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp.
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petration of any felony.680 In addition, twenty-five state statutes list as

an aggravating circumstance that the defendant knowingly created a
grave risk of harm to more than one or to many persons. 68 ' Kidnapping
or holding the victim for ransom, 6 2 as a hostage, 68 3 or as a shield 684 are
also aggravating circumstances in some states.
The fifth type of statutory aggravating circumstance focuses on the
victims of capital crimes. Twenty-six states deem it an aggravating circumstance if the victim was a police officer, fireman, or corrections employee. 68 5 Sixteen states make it an aggravating factor if the victim was
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(9) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iv)
(1983).
680 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(6) (Purdon 1982).
681 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(3) (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(3)
(Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1303(4) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(h)
(Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(g)(3) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(c)
(West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(3) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(3) (1979);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(3) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.4(d) (West Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(a)(8) (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(c) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.2(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(5) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(l)( 0 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(3) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(I1)(a)(4) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(b) (West 1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(10) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(2) (West 1983); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(7) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(2) (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(c) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iii) (1983).
682
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(d) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(e)
(1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(4) (Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(7)
(1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(3) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5202(1)(o) (Supp. 1983).
683
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(6)(d) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e) (1) (e)
(1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(3) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5202(1)(o) (Supp. 1983).
684 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4209(e)(1)(e) (1979); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9711(d)(3) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(o) (Supp. 1983).
685 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7)-(9) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11103(6)(c) (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(c) (1979); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(8)
(1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(9) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(a)(7) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(b), (i) (West
Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(1) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 279,
§ 69(a)(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2(8), (13) (Vernon
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303(6) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(g)
(1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(7) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(4)(h) (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(A), (E) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8)
(1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(6) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.12 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(d)(1) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20(C)(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-1(7)
(Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(9) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(k)
(Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(1) (Supp. 1984).
These formulations differ considerably from state to state. Some state statutes include
only police officers killed in the line of duty, some include former police officers, and some
broadly define "peace officer" or "public servant." Most states include firefighters. Several
state statutes expressly include elected officials. Only Ohio specifically provides that the as-
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a judge or prosecutor targeted because he was carrying out his official
duties. 68 6 Thirteen states designate as an aggravating circumstance that
the victim was or would have been a witness against the defendant in
some legal proceeding. 68 7 Finally, the fact that the capital offense involved multiple victims is an aggravating circumstance in ten states. 6 8
Tennessee, for example, will sentence a defendant to death if he has
committed "mass murder," 689 unless the sentencing authority finds suf690
ficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating factor.
STATUTORY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The capital punishment statutes in thirty states provide lists of mit-

igating circumstances in addition to enumerated aggravating circumstances. 69t The Supreme Court's decisions in Locket v. Ohi 6 92 and Edsassination of the President of the United States shall be an aggravating circumstance. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(1) (Page 1982). Some state statutes also include visitors to
correctional 'facilities. In Washington it is an aggravating circumstance if the victim was a
"newsreporter and the murder was committed to obstruct or hinder the investigative, research, or reporting activities of the victim." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(10) (Supp.
1984).
686 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (11)-(12) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§4209(e)(1)(d) (1979); GA. CODE § 17-10-30(b)(5) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(9)
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(6) (Burns Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279,
§ 69(a)(3) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.2.(5) (Vernon Supp.
1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(4)(g) (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8)
(1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(d)(1) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-320(C)(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1(4) (Supp.
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(10) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(k) (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(6) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(viii)
(1983).
687
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(10) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.11,
§ 4209(e)(1)(g) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(10) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
9-1(b)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(h) (West Supp.
1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(a)(3) (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 565.032.2(12) (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5(G) (1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (8) (Page 1982); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (d)(5) (Purdon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(l)(i) (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(6) (Supp. 1983).
688 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(e)(1)(k) (1979); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(0(2) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9l(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(6) (Baldwin 1983);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(9) (1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(l)(e) (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(12) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(b) (Supp. 1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(8) (Supp. 1984).
689
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(i)(12) (1982) (defining "mass murder" as the "murder
of three or more persons within the state. . . within a period of forty-eight months").
690
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(g), (g)(2) (1982).
691
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G) (Supp. 1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1984); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5), (5.1) (1978 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(0
(1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(C)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5 (West
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dings v. Oklahoma693 established that capital sentencing authorities may
not be precluded from considering every possible mitigating factor that
the defendant presents. 694 As a result, state death penalty statutes listing mitigating circumstances must indicate that such statutory lists are
nonexclusive and do not limit the sentencing authority in its considera695
tion of other factors weighing against imposition of the death penalty.
Therefore, the lists of aggravating and mitigating circumstances now
serve different functions. The former define permissible areas of consideration; the latter merely suggest legitimate grounds for leniency.
A greater consensus exists among the states concerning proper mitigating circumstances than exists regarding aggravating circumstances.
Twenty-eight states agree that leniency may be warranted if the capital
defendant acted under substantial duress or the domination of another
person. 696 Twenty-seven states also agree that the defendant's age at the
time of the crime is relevant to the sentencing decision. 697 Although the
Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279,
§ 69(b) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6) (Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(II)(b) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(5) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B) (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(j) (1982);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B) (1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j) (1983).
692 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
693 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
694 See supra notes 157-58, 161-62, 171-72 and accompanying text.
695 For an argument that nonexclusive lists of statutory mitigating circumstances should
be constitutionally required, see supra note 185.
696 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(5) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(2) (Supp.
1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(2) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(g) (West Supp.
1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a()(3) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(e) (West
Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 9-1(() (4) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-50-2-9(c)(5) (Burns Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(6) (Baldwin
1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(c) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413(g)(3) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(3) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(e) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(3) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 292523(2)(b) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.035(5) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(II)(b)(3) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(e) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6(B) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(0(5) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(5) (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)C()(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(j) (6)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(c) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.070(5) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(v) (1983).
697 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5) (Supp.
1983); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(a)
(1978 & Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(f)(1) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(6)(g) (West Supp. 1983) Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(8) (Baldwin 1983);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(o (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art 27,
§ 413(g)(5) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(5) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
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majority of states only list "age," some states define the age factor more
narrowly as consideration of the defendant's "youth. '69 8 In contrast,
Tennessee provides that the sentencing authority shall consider the
"youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime" in
mitigation of the penalty.699 The Massachusetts law designates as a mitigating circumstance that "the defendant was over the age of seventyfive at the time of the murder, ' 700 and recommends that the sentencing
authority consider "any other relevant consideration regarding the age
of the defendant. ' 70 1 In Colorado and Ohio, a person under age eight70 2
een can never be sentenced to death.
In twenty-eight of thirty statutes listing specific mitigating factors,
the fact that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired when he committed the crime weighs against imposition of the death penalty. 70 3 Fourteen of these statutes do not spec1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99 -19 -101(6)(g) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(7)
(Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(7) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 292523(2)(d) (1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.035(6) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(II)(b)(5) (Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(5)(c) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6(I) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.04(B)(4) (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 1(e)(4) (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(j)(7)
(1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26- 3 - 2 07(2)(e) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(v) (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(7) (Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(vii) (1983).
698
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(1)(1) (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(8)
(Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.5(o (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN.
3
CODE art. 27, § 41 (g)(5) (Supp. 1983); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.035(6) (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(b)(5) (Supp. 1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(b)(4) (Page
1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76- 3 -207(2)(e) (Supp. 1983). In Montana, it is a separate mitigating circumstance if the defendant is under age 18. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(7) (1983).
699
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2030)(7) (1982).
700 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(5) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
701
Id
702
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(a) (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1)
(Page 1982).
703
ALA. CODE 13A-5-51(6) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (Supp. 1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(3) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West Supp. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(b) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(f)(2) (1983); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)() (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (Burns
Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(7) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM.
3
PRoc. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 41 (g)(4) (Supp.
1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(6)() (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1984);
2 9 2 23
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §
- 5 (2)(g) (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. %630:5(II)(b)(4) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1-3(c)(5)(d) (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(C) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000()(6) (1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(3) (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (e)(3)
(Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-2-2030)(8) (1982) UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(d) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE
§ 19.2-264.4(B)(iv) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(6) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT.
§ 6-2-102(j)(vi) (1983).
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ify the causes of such impairment.7 0 4 Of the more precise statutes,
thirteen name substantial impairment due to mental disease or defect, 70 5 eleven include intoxication, 70 6 and only four include drug
abuse. 7 0 7 Acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance is a mitigating factor in twenty-five states. 708 Massachusetts
recognizes as a mitigating circumstance that "the defendant was experiencing post-traumatic stress syndrome caused by military service during a declared or undeclared war. ' 70 9 Some states recognize as a
mitigating factor that the capital defendant reasonably believed that his
criminal conduct was morally justified. 710 It is a mitigating circum704 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(6) (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(1) (Supp.
1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a()(2) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)() (West
Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(0 (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.3(6) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(4) (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(II)(b)(4) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(C) (1981); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(o(6) (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(3) (Purdon 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(iv)
(1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-1020)(vi) (1983).
705 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(3) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West Supp.
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025(2)(b)(7) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (West Supp.
4
4
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 13(g)( ) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 279,
§ 69(b)(4) (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(g) (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c) (5) (d) (West 1982);. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (3) (Page
1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2030)(8) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(d) (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(6) (Supp. 1984).
706 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(3) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(b) (Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-29(c)(6) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(7) (Baldwin 1983); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.5(e) (West Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279,
§ 69(b)(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(g) (1979); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(5)(d) (West 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(j) (8) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(d) (Supp. 1983).
707 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(3) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(b) (Supp.
1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279; § 69(b)(4) (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(d) (Supp. 1983).
708
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(2) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(1) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.3(d) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(a) (Supp. 1983);
9-1(C)(2)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(b) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(2) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.5(b)
(West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(b) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032.3(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(2) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2523(2)(c) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.035(2) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(II)(b)(2) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(5)(a) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6(D) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(2) (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9711(e)(2) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2030)(2) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(ii) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2) (Supp.
1984); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(ii) (1983).
709 MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 279, § 69(b)(7) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
710 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(o (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11103(5.1)(e) (Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(4) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE
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stance in twenty-one states that, although the capital defendant was an
accomplice to the offense, his participation in its commission was relatively minor. 71' Twenty-one states recognize the victim's participation
7 12
in the crime or consent to the criminal conduct as a mitigating factor.
Only four state statutes list the defendant's cooperation with law enforcement authorities after the commission of the capital offense as a
mitigating circumstance. 7t 3 Four states also list as a mitigating circumstance the unlikelihood that the defendant will engage in future acts of
criminal violence.7 14 Finally, twenty-eight of thirty statutes specifying
mitigating factors suggest leniency when the capital offender has no sig-

GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(d) (West Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2030)(4)
(1982). The New Mexico statute lists as a mitigating factor that the defendant "acted under
circumstances which tended to justify or excuse" his conduct. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A6(F) (1981). Ohio is the only state that expressly recognizes provocation as a mitigating circumstance. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(2) (Page 1982).
711
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(4) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(3) (Supp.
1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(1) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3() (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a() (4) (1983);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(d) (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(4)
(Burns Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(5) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE
9
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 05.5(g) (West Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.012.3 (Vernon
Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(6) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(e)
(1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000()(4) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(6)
(Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(7) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-320(C)(b)(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203()(5) (1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)() (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(4) (Supp.
1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102()(iv) (1983).
In Illinois, it is a mitigating circumstance that the capital defendant was not present at
the scene of the murder. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(c)(5) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983). In
Maryland, leniency may be warranted if the defendant's act was not "the sole proximate
cause of the victim's death." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(6) (Supp. 1983).
712 ALA. CODE 13A-5-51(3) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(c) (West Supp. 1983);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 9-1 (c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-29(c)(3) (Burns Supp. 1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(3) (Baldwin 1983); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, §41 3 (g)( 2 ) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 69(b)(2)
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(c) (Supp. 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(5) (1983);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)() (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.035(3) (1983); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(b) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(E) (1981); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000()(3) (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (e)(6) (Purdon 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(j)(3)
(1982); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(iii) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(3) (Supp.
1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(])(iii) (1983).
Ohio's statute includes as a mitigating circumstance that the victim "facilitated" the
capital offense. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(1) (Page 1982).
713 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(c) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:113(c)(5)(g) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(H) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2000(0(8) (1983).
714 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(g) (Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413(g)( 7) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(G) (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.070(8) (Supp. 1984). For an argument that inquiries into a capital defendant's future
dangerousness should not be permitted, see supra note 350.
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71 5
nificant history of prior criminal activity.

THE SENTENCING AUTHORITY

Although all states with valid death penalty laws now provide for
separate sentencing stages in capital cases, 716 the identity of the sentencing authority may differ from one jurisdiction to another. Where a jury
convicted the capital defendant, most states provide that the same jury
shall remain empaneled for the penalty stage. 7 17 If it is impracticable
for the same jury to sit again for the purpose of sentencing, a number of
states provide that a new jury shall be specially selected for that purpose. 7 18 When the defendant has pled guilty or has been tried without a
715
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51(11) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1304(6) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5.1)(b) (Supp.
1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6)(a) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 91(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c) (1) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(1) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
905.5(a) (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(1) (Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN.
LAWs ch. 279, § 69(b)(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19101(6)(a) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984); MoNr. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-304(1) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(a) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.035(1) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(I1)(b)(1) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3(c)(5)() (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-6(A) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(0(1) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(5) (Page 1982); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §9711(e)(1) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. 16-3-20(C)(b)(1) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-2036)(1) (1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(2)(a)
(Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(B)(i) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(1)
(Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(j)(i) (1983).
716
See supra note 643 and accompanying text.
717
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(b) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301(3) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.4(c) (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(1) (1978); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-46a(b)(1) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b)(1) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-2(c) (1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch 38, 91(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (Burns Supp. 1983); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 535.025(1)(b) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.1(A)
(West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b)(1) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279,
§ 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1) (Supp. 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.030.2 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:II-3(c)(1) (West 1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-1(B) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(a)(1) (Purdon 1982);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A27A-2 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(a) (1982); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(a) (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2264.3(C) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(3) (Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT. § 6-2102(b) (1983).
718
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(b) (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(c) (West Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-46a(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(b)(1) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38,
9-1(d)(2)(C) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.1(B)
(West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (2) iii)-(iv) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1983);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3(c)(1) (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1983);
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jury, some states provide for a jury at the sentencing proceeding. 7 19
Other states provide that the trial judge shall preside at the sentencing
stage where there was no trial jury.7 20 In Nebraska, Nevada, and Ohio,
a panel of three judges determines the sentence in cases where the capital defendant was convicted without a jury.72 1 In Arizona, Idaho, and
Montana, the penalty hearing is conducted before the court alone, re72 2
gardless of whether a jury determined the defendant's guilt.
THE SENTENCING DECISION

The majority of capital punishment laws require the sentencing authority to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in determining whether to impose the death penalty. 723 In
Idaho, for example, the statute provides that "[w]here the [sentencing
authority] finds a statutory aggravating circumstance [it] shall sentence
the defendant to death unless [it] finds that mitigating circumstances
which may be presented outweigh the gravity of any aggravating cir§ 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.050(3)
(Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(b) (1983).
719 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(b) (West Supp. 1984);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(b) (2) (A) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b)(2) (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(1) (West Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 9-1(d)(2)(A)-(B)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b)(3) (Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(1) (West 1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(b) (Purdon 1982); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (Supp. 1984). In New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, a defendant who has pled guilty to a capital offense may choose whether to have the sentencing
proceeding conducted by the trial court or by a jury. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-I(B) (1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(a)(i)-(ii) (1983).
720 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(1) (1978); GA. CODE § 17-10-32 (1982); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-50-2-9(d) (Burns Supp. 1983); Ky.REV. STAT. ANN. § 535.025(l),(3) (Baldwin
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006.2 (Vernon Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10
(West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2102(a)(i) (1983).
721
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520, 29-2522 (1979) (determination shall be made by panel of
three judges if presiding judge who accepts pleas of guilty so requests); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 175.552 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C)(2)(a) (Page 1982).
722
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(B) (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (1983). In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the
Supreme Court held that judicial sentencing in capital cases is constitutionally permissible.
See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
723 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979); IND. CODE. ANN. § 3550-2-9(e)(2) (Burns Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (Supp.
1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4 (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1979);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(2) (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1-3(c)(3) (West 1982); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2929.03(D)(2) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 971 l(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203()-(g) (1982); Wyo.
STAT. § 6-2-102(d)(i)(B) (1983).
UTAH CODE ANN.
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cumstance found and make imposition of death unjust. ' 7 2 4 The Alabama statute is one of the few that explains how the sentencing
authority should conduct the weighing process:
The process ... of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine the sentence shall not be defined to mean a
mere tallying of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the
purpose of numerical comparison. Instead, it shall be defined to mean
a process by which circumstances relevant to sentence are marshalled
and 'considered in an organized fashion for the purpose of determining whether the proper sentence in view of all the relevant circumstances in an individual case is life imprisonment without parole or
725
death.
The Nebraska statute seems to favor leniency in close cases since the
death penalty may be withheld when "sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approachor exceed the weight given to the aggravat' 726
ing circumstances.
Fifteen states do not expressly require that sentencing authorities
conduct a weighing process between aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital cases. 727 The Arizona law provides that the sentencing court "shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. . . and shall impose a sentence of death if [it] finds one
or more of the aggravating circumstances . . .and that there are not
mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. '"728
New Hampshire simply requires the sentencing jury to find at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance before it "may fix the sentence of
death. ' 729 In Washington, the court submits the following question to
the jury: "Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been
found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there
724 IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979). A similar statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2(B)
(1981), provides that "[aifter weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances, weighing them against each other, and considering both the defendant and the
crime, the jury or judge shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death
or life imprisonment."
725
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-48 (1982). See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1984) (providing similar explanation of weighing process).
726 NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1979) (emphasis added).
727 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4)
(Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(e) (1983); GA. CODE § 17-10-31 (1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, 9-1 (g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 535.025(l)(b) (Baldwin 1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-18-305 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-320(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1979); Tax. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 31.071(e) (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(3) (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(2) (Supp.
1984).
728
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1983).
729 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(IV) (Supp. 1983).
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are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?" 730 An
affirmative answer by a unanimous jury mandates imposition of the
73
death penalty. '
Most states expressly require the sentencing authority to find at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt
before it can impose a death sentence. 732 In Virginia, the sentencing
jury cannot impose a death sentence unless it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that "there is a probability. . . that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society, ' 733 or that his crime was particularly heinous. 73 4 In
Texas, the jury may sentence the defendant to death if it expressly finds
that the defendant deliberately acted to cause death, that he is likely to
commit future criminal acts of violence, and that his response to provocation, if any, was unreasonable. 735 In contrast, the Colorado and Connecticut statutes provide that the sentencing authority may not impose a
death sentence if it finds any statutory mitigating circumstances, even if
73 6
it also finds several aggravating circumstances.
If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict at the sentencing
stage, twenty states expressly provide that the court must sentence the
defendant to life imprisonment. 737 In at least two states where the stat730

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(4) (Supp. 1984).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.080(1) (Supp. 1984).
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45() (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(E) (Supp. 1983);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1, 190.3 (West Supp. 1984);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(e) (1983); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1)(a) (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West Supp. 1983);
GA. CODE § 17-10-31 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(b) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, Y 9l(g) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e)(1) (Burns Supp. 1983); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (West Supp. 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g), (h)
(1982 & Supp. 1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554(3) (1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c)(1) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B), (C) (Page 1982);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203() (1982); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(c) (Vernon 1981); VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.030(2) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (1983).
733 VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983). For an argument that inquiries into a capital defendant's future dangerousness should not be permitted, see supra note 292.
734 VA. CODE § 19.2-264.4(C) (1983). The Virginia death penalty statute is discussed at
supra notes 626-28 and accompanying text.
735 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b), (e) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1984). The
Texas death penalty statute is discussed at supra notes 621-25 and accompanying text.
736
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4) (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46a(e)
(1983).
737
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1302(3) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4) (Supp.
1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,T 9-1(g) (SmithHurd Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(k)(2) (1982); MISs. CODE ANN. § 99-1910 1(3) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030.4 (Vernon Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 630:5(V) (Supp. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(c)(3)(c) (West 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
731
732
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ute does not address this issue, courts have directed the trial court to
impose a life sentence if the jury cannot unanimously agree on capital
punishment. 738 The Massachusetts and Washington statutes simply
provide that a jury decision in favor of the death sentence must be unanimous. 7 39 In California if the sentencing jury cannot reach a unanimous

decision, a new jury is selected; if the new jury cannot agree, the trial
court has the discretion to empanel a third jury or to impose a sentence
of imprisonment. 740 Two states give the sentencing decision to the trial
judge or to a panel of judges if all twelve jury members cannot agree on
74
the fate of a capital defendant within a reasonable period of time. '
The Florida and Indiana statutes do not bind the trial court to follow
742
even unanimous jury sentencing recommendations.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES

All thirty-six states with valid death penalty statutes require automatic appellate review of death sentences. 743 Typically, the individual
state's highest court will review a death sentence even when the capital
defendant has not moved for an appeal. The Delaware statute, for example, requires that the Delaware Supreme Court receive a complete
transcript of the sentencing hearing when a condemned defendant does
not appeal his death sentence within thirty days.7 4 4 In addition, many
states specify that the condemned person shall not be executed if the
state's highest court determines that the sentence was imposed "under
the influence of passion or prejudice or any other arbitrary factor" 74 5 or
§ 2929.03(D)(2) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203(h) (1982); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(e) (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 19.2264.4(E) (1983); WYo. STAT. § 6-2-102(e) (1983).
738 See Miller v. State, 237 Ga. 557, 559, 229 S.E.2d 376, 377 (1976); State v. Sonnier, 402
So. 2d 650, 657 (La. Sup. Ct. 1981).
739 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 68 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.060(3) (Supp. 1984).
740 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West Supp. 1984).
741
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9() (Burns Supp. 1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.556
(1983).
742 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2) (West Supp. 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(e)
(Burns Supp. 1983). In Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3156 (1984), the Supreme Court
upheld Florida's procedure in capital cases allowing a trial court to override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence, concluding that "[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a
jury's recommendation of life imprisonment in a capital case be final so as to preclude the
trial judge from overriding the jury's recommendation and imposing the death sentence."
743 See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S.Ct. 871, 876 (1984).
744 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4 2 09(g) (1979).
745 COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(7) (Supp. 1983). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a46b(b)(1) (1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.075(3)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(1) (1982); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 71(1) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19105(3)(a) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035.3 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE
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that the evidence presented does not support the finding of statutory
746
aggravating circumstances.
Most states allowing capital punishment also require the reviewing
court to conduct comparative proportionality review of all death
sentences.747 Comparative proportionality review ensures that no person will be executed if the penalty would be "disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of
the crime and the character and record of the defendant. ' 748 The death
penalty laws in twenty-six states expressly require comparative proportionality review. 749 In Nebraska, for example, the statute provides:
In order to compensate for the lack of uniformity in charges
which are filed as a result of similar circumstances it is necessary for
the [Nebraska] Supreme Court to review and analyze all criminal
homicides committed under the existing law in order to insure that
each case produces a result similar to that arrived at in other cases
750
with the same or similar circumstances.
§ 46-18-310(1) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(a) (Supp. 1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(3) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit.21, § 701.13(C)(1) (West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(3)(i) (Purdon
1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-27A-12(1) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205(c)(1) (1982) ("in any arbitrary fashion"); VA. CODE § 17-110.1(C)(1) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(c)
(Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(d)(i) (1983).
ANN.

746

COLO. REV. STAT.

§ 16-11-103(7) (Supp. 1983);

CONN. GEN. STAT.

§ 53a-46b(b)(2)

(1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(b) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(b)
(Baldwin 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e)(2) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 279,

§ 71(2) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(b)(Supp. 1983);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035.3 (Vernon Supp. 1984); MONT.CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(2) (1983);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(b) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(C)(1)
(1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701(C)(2)
(West 1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (h)(3)(ii) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-25(C)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27A-12(2) (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-205(c)(2) (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(a) (Supp.
1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(d)(ii) (1983).
747
Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876 (1984).

§ 9711(h)(3)(iii)

748

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

749

ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT.

(Purdon 1982).

§ 53a-46b(b)(3) (1983);

DEL.

CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g) (2) (1979); GA. CODE § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982); IDAHO CODE § 192827(c)(3) (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1983); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 414(e) (1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 279, § 71(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp.
1984); MIss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035.3(3)
(Vernon Supp. 1984): MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 292521.01(5), 29-2521.03 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2) (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630.5(VII)(c) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(e) (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 31-20A-4(C)(4) (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.05(A) (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13(C)(3) (West 1983); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (Purdon 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(C)(3) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1983);

S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 23A-27A-12(3)

(1979); TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 39-2-205(c)(4) (1982); VA. CODE § 17-110.1(C)(2) (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.95.130(2)(b) (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-103(d)(iii) (1983).
750
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.01(5) (1979). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03
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In Louisiana, the rules of the state supreme court require comparative
proportionality review. 75 ' Finally, the courts in at least four states have
held that proportionality review must be undertaken whenever the
75 2
death penalty is imposed.
Despite a consensus among states that comparative proportionality
review is necessary in capital cases, the Supreme Court, in Pulley v. Harns, 753 recently held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments do not
require state appellate courts to compare the penalties imposed in simi754
lar cases before a death sentence can be carried out.
Raymondj Pascucci

(1979) ("[n]o sentence imposed shall be greater than those imposed in other cases with the
same or similar circumstances").
751 LA. Sup. CT. R. 905.9.1, § 1 (applicable to LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9
(West Supp. 1984).
752 See State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976); Collins v. State,
261 Ark. 195, 221, 548 S.W.2d 106, 120 (1977); State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973);
People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145, 161-62, 411 N.E.2d 849, 856-57 (1980). Although the Texas
Supreme Court has not held that comparative proportionality review is required, some Texas
appellate courts have undertaken such review on their own initiative. See, e.g., Roney v.
State, 632 S.W.2d 598, 603 ('ex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc). In Indiana, proportionality
review apparently does not involve a comparison of other cases; review is limited to the facts
of the case at bar. See Williams v. State, 430 N.E.2d 759, 764-65 (1982) (defendant sentenced
to death while his accomplices received less severe sentences). The Utah Supreme Court will
consider a claim that a death sentence is disproportionate, but that court has not clearly
indicated whether it will conduct comparative proportionality review in all death penalty
cases. See State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1345 (Utah 1977). The Colorado statute provides
for a review of the substantive "propriety" of each death sentence, but does not expressly
require proportionality review. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(7)(a), (b) (Supp. 1983). The
Colorado Supreme Court has yet to define the scope and method of this review. See Brief for
Respondent, app. A at 3a, Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
753
104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
754
Id. at 876-80. For a discussion of Harris,see supra notes 436-68 and accompanying
text.

